mullins: Not really. Why don't… why don't we just go ahead? I'm,
mullins: I'm sort of lost out there trying to send Alan an email, and I haven't found my way back, so…
Gus Breytspraak: Okay, well, We can still see you, so you're still linked with us.
Gus Breytspraak: So let's see, I believe Alan's gonna say a few words, then, Paul, is going to be the respondent, and Paul has some questions he's going to post
Gus Breytspraak: in the chat when he gets started, but he didn't want to distract from, from Alan's opening remarks. So, Alan, we appreciate your being here to talk with us about this very interesting new book and its relation to Polanyi.
Allen Dyer: Okay, thank you. Good to see you all, nice to be with you.
Allen Dyer: as, as, Paul,
Allen Dyer: mentioned in, and will mention, I guess, there's this kind of sense of urgency that I undertook to write this book, Madness and the Political Divide. It derives, actually, from some concerns that I articulated first at the 2014 Yale conference.
Allen Dyer: where we talked about… in honor of Bill Poteet and his papers delivered to the Yale Divinity School. And at that point, I talked about madness as metaphor, which was going to be the original title of this book.
Allen Dyer: Madness as metaphor, psychiatry, Ethics, and the political divide. But the editors at Rutledge and I decided, just call it Madness and the political divide. And that's the sense of urgency
Allen Dyer: But as a metaphor, madness straddles both psychiatric and social definitions. Psychiatrically, psychosis. Madness is the inability to distinguish reality from non-reality.
Allen Dyer: But socially, madness is the unwillingness to distinguish reality from non-reality, particularly in view of social media,
Allen Dyer: misinformation, disinformation, and some of the issues that I talk at some length about with a sense of urgency in the book, Madness.
Allen Dyer: And the political divide.
Allen Dyer: The, impetus for this, in part, was what we're living through in this political age.
Allen Dyer: which William Butler Yates, referred to in his poem, The Second Coming.
Allen Dyer: Which I think is relevant 100 years later. Things fall apart.
Allen Dyer: The center cannot hold. Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world.
Allen Dyer: The best lack all conviction, while the worst are full of passionate intensity. And we might talk more about passionate intensity, what passions and emotions are, but there's been a lot written psychiatrically about what's wrong
Allen Dyer: with our president, what's wrong with Trump, and although there's a lot that psychiatrists could say about that, and should say about that, and maybe inhibited about saying about that, in terms of what has come to be called the Goldwater rule.
Allen Dyer: The project I undertook in this book is to look at madness in terms of the influence that an authoritarian leader might have on those who support him, and what makes us all vulnerable to
Allen Dyer: to authoritarian leadership, not only in the United States, but… but globally around the world, in India, in Turkey, in Russia, in Iran, in,
Allen Dyer: Rwanda, the list goes on and on, and The Economist Economic Group has documented a global recession of democracy and a corresponding rise of authoritarianism.
Allen Dyer: So,
Allen Dyer: The book is obviously largely informed by a post-critical epistemology, and there is a chapter which has been shared with you all on madness and the political divide. So, that's kind of the quick introduction.
Gus Breytspraak: Okay, Paul, you want to open with some thoughts and questions?
Paul Lewis: Yeah, before I get to the questions, I thought I would just add a little bit to Alan's summary of the book. I don't know how many of you have read it. I highly commend it. It's a brief book, but, as Alan said, it's a very passionate book, addressed to the
Paul Lewis: I mean, a lot of the big issues of our time. But just to give a context for Chapter 5,
Paul Lewis: At least as I read the book, the chapters sort of clump into three different groups. The first three chapters are sort of historical in nature. Chapter 1 examines how madness has been understood from the 14th century to the present.
Paul Lewis: Chapter 2 discusses the ethics of diagnosing madness. Alan just mentioned the thing about the Goldwater rule. Chapter 3 analyzes mass manias like the Dutch tulip mania from the 1600s.
Paul Lewis: So there's kind of a historical…
Paul Lewis: component to those first three chapters. The next two chapters, address
Paul Lewis: if madness amounts to a denial of reality, how do we know what's real? And so Chapter 4 talks about
Paul Lewis: traditional journalistic commitments to seek truth, act independently, and so on. Things that should help us discern reality, but have been overwhelmed by the misinformation, disinformation.
Craig Wickstrom: propaganda.
Paul Lewis: that social media and AI make possible.
Paul Lewis: Chapter 5, then, the one that we've read for today, draws from Polanyi to talk about how science can provide a way of understanding reality.
Paul Lewis: Then the last section of the book, chapters 6, 7, and 8, combine insights from Hannah Arendt, accounts of psychological defense mechanisms, terror management theory, to more directly address, the rise of authoritarianism.
Paul Lewis: Really as a denial of the reality of threats that are too frightening to address head on.
Paul Lewis: Chapter 8 draws from psychoanalytic theory,
Paul Lewis: to show how… and Moby Dick. I mean, one of the things I should say that I enjoy about the book is that Alan brings literary material in to address the more technical stuff as well.
Paul Lewis: But Chapter 8 talks about… shows how narcissism reflects a denial of reality, that can lead to rage, where one blames others for one's own imperfections.
Paul Lewis: And then, in the last chapter of the book, Dyer argues that our survival requires an honest self-appraisal that balances reason with emotion.
Paul Lewis: So that's a very quick, overly simplified overview, but we get a sense of how Chapter 5 fits into the larger book.
Allen Dyer: Well done, Paul, thank you for that.
Paul Lewis: Oh.
Paul Lewis: Well…
Paul Lewis: Thank you for providing such a rich, rich book to think about. Anyway, I've got 4 questions that I'm going to put up in the chat, and I will, let you know.
Paul Lewis: Maybe I'll put them up in the chat.
Paul Lewis: I've hit send, is it showing up?
Bruce Vojak: None yet.
Stan Scott: Not the,
Paul Lewis: Hmm… And now let's try it this way.
Paul Lewis: Well, I'm doing what my computer tells me to do, and it does not see…
Paul Lewis: I'm sending it to everyone.
Craig Wickstrom: Are there the questions that, Phil sent to us?
Paul Lewis: I didn't know Phil sent any questions.
mullins: I don't believe I did.
Craig Wickstrom: Oh, okay.
Gus Breytspraak: He just had a… he had a few comments in one of the.
mullins: Oh, yeah, those were just questions I made up, I think.
Paul Lewis: Well…
Gus Breytspraak: So, Bruce figured out how to do it, because his test showed…
Charles Lowney: Cut and paste into the chat. Cut the…
Paul Lewis: Yeah, that's what I did, and I'm hitting the enter button.
Paul Lewis: And it's not…
Bruce Vojak: I think… I think you have to be an engineer, Paul.
Paul Lewis: Well, then we're out of luck. Okay, well, and I'm just gonna… I'm just gonna go through the questions fairly quickly.
Paul Lewis: And Alan knows what these are in advance, and he can take them in whatever order he wants to take them, or ignore them, as often was the case in graduate seminars, and we will go from there. So the first question really is a question about
Paul Lewis: Reality. Polanyi says that reality always promises to reveal itself in fresh ways.
Paul Lewis: Well, it seems to me that one implication of that is we'll never come to a complete grasp of reality, which means that we're perennially susceptible to denial.
Paul Lewis: Alright, psychoanalysis can ameliorate that tendency for individuals, but what about at the social level?
Paul Lewis: For Polanyi, the traditions and practices of the scientific community do that. But what analogs to the scientific community exist, or need to exist, to resist the impulses to narcissism and totalitarianism?
Paul Lewis: Whether it's a totalitarianism of right or left, in order to non-violently promote a more just society.
Paul Lewis: That's one question.
Gus Breytspraak: Yeah.
Paul Lewis: Then, at several points along the way, Alan acknowledges that the solution to our situation has to address leasing of the motion.
Paul Lewis: But at least the way I read the book, it seemed… the treatment of emotions seemed to reinforce what some people call the myth of the emotions, which the emotions are only disruptive forces, opponents to reason.
Paul Lewis: Certainly that is the case sometimes, but for Polanyi, emotions don't just get in the way of reason. They also motivate us to continue to explore this reality that we only know partially. So, emotions have positive functions, and I would invite Alan to speak a little bit more about that.
Paul Lewis: The third question.
Paul Lewis: relates Polanyi to, postmodernism. In the chapter, Alan said that it classified Polanyi as a post-critical version of postmodernity, and so I…
Paul Lewis: since postmodernity still seems to me to be a fairly contested topic, what you say… see about, postmodernity? And the last question,
Paul Lewis: you know, you make a lot of use of Freud in the book, a very positive use of Freud. Polanyi was not a fan of Freud, so how do you reconcile that?
Paul Lewis: So I'll turn it back over…
Allen Dyer: Thank you.
Allen Dyer: Thank you for sharing those questions within me in advance. It gave me a chance to think about them, which I've been thinking about, actually, for a long time.
Allen Dyer: And that's a nice way of focusing it. Let's take them in order, I don't mind doing that, and let… why don't you restate the first question, and I'll respond to that, and then, go on to second, third, and fourth.
Paul Lewis: Okay,
Paul Lewis: Right? We're… for Polanyi, reality always promises to reveal itself in fresh ways. So our… our knowledge of reality is always going to be incomplete.
Paul Lewis: Which leaves us open to, the temptation or the possibility of denial of reality.
Paul Lewis: So, what are some of the social mechanisms Analogs to the scientific community.
Paul Lewis: That can help us, keep us on track.
Allen Dyer: So, so,
Allen Dyer: individual mechanisms and social mechanisms, and I think… I think the thing about personal knowledge that's so useful, in a sense, it's obvious that what we believe is what we believe. How do we know what we know?
Allen Dyer: Polanyi suggests that every declarative sentence should begin with the words, I believe that, in order to remind ourselves of the commitment to that which we claim to know. That is, that is a more
Allen Dyer: foundational and radical statements than I think we might appreciate, because,
Allen Dyer: Often people believe what they believe without recognizing the personal component of it, and that might come from
Allen Dyer: what I learned growing up in my family, or what I learned growing up in my community, or in my church. But,
Allen Dyer: But I think we need to remind ourselves, as Polanyi reminds us, that,
Allen Dyer: That reality isn't a fixed thing outside of us, but it's within us in terms of our experience, in terms of what we know.
Allen Dyer: If we think of the objective stance that he takes issue with, the Archimedean principle that if, as Archimedes said in the 3rd century BCE, if I had a lever long enough and a fixed place to stand, I could move the earth. And
Allen Dyer: And objective, objectivists, objective scientists or positivists, or empiricists, are always writing, as we've been encouraged to do in school, write in the third-person passive voice.
Allen Dyer: as if we were standing on an Archimedean, point outside of the world.
Allen Dyer: So… so I think this is an important reminder, and in terms of the difference between the individual and the social, I would say that's the task of education, and… and perhaps in an age of AI, when, people are, are,
Allen Dyer: have a tendency to promote something or to put forward something that they've learned from someone else, that the task for all of us, as educators and all of us as citizens, is to remind ourselves and encourage our colleagues,
Allen Dyer: to accredit their own knowledge, their own beliefs, with this recognition, this recognition of the humility of the scientists in pursuit of discovery. I believe that.
Paul Lewis: Shall we, is that…
Allen Dyer: Is that an answer to what you said, as Paul?
Paul Lewis: Yeah, and I was curious if other folks want to jump in on this.
Craig Wickstrom: I was… I was kind of surprised that you didn't, at least in this chapter, you didn't play up, Polanyi's definition of reality more.
Allen Dyer: Huh.
Craig Wickstrom: I mean, you, you said reality is what we perceive it to be, reality is what we believe it to be, or even reality is what we want it to be, whereas Polanyi's, I thought that Polanyi's definition of reality is, is,
Craig Wickstrom: the, what?
Craig Wickstrom: the unexplainable, the surprising, aspects of… of what might be is… is more, you know, I would think that that would be helpful in your argument.
Allen Dyer: I don't disagree with that, Craig, and I think,
Allen Dyer: I think there's a… there is a kind of, forward-lookingness, a kind of hope for the future in terms of that, and I guess probably I'm focused more on the
Allen Dyer: the negative looking backwards aspect of it, but you're absolutely right, because the humility that Polanyi, as a scientist, as a scientist turned philosopher.
Allen Dyer: recognizes is that, we could always be proven wrong by subsequent, evidence and subsequent discoveries. So, you're quite right about that.
Gus Breytspraak: Mary Moody, or Dick, has a question.
marymoodey: Yes, I'd like to distinguish between saying, I believe that, and I know that.
Allen Dyer: Okay.
marymoodey: For example, Mary and I are sitting here in one another's presence.
marymoodey: I know that I'm a really real person, and I also know that she's really real.
marymoodey: Now, I see you on a screen.
marymoodey: I believe that you're really real.
marymoodey: But I don't know it in the same way that I know that
marymoodey: Mary is, who's in my presence.
marymoodey: Because…
marymoodey: you're mediated, you know, your voice and image are mediated through technology, and this could be a massive deception. But I know that I'm not being deceived about the reality of marrying myself. I don't believe that. I know that.
Allen Dyer: And of course, the fact that we've met in person on several occasions makes this more convincing. But, say, I were a physicist, and I tapped on the table.
Allen Dyer: And I said, you know, this sounds very solid, but I want you to believe that this is made up of largely empty space
Allen Dyer: with electrons spinning around nuclei in little teeny atoms. We might be willing to believe that, but we don't believe it on the basis of
Allen Dyer: A perception, or even the same convince… the same convincingness of reality that you just identified.
marymoodey: I think tied to that is, if you look at people's pictures on Zoom.
marymoodey: We can manipulate the background and only see a head, or we can put our heads in outer space, or something like that. So, we want to believe that the head we're talking to is real.
marymoodey: But there's all this distortion in the background, whereas Dick is real in my… I mean, right in my…
marymoodey: felt, perception, sense, and I know this is Dick, And there isn't any distortion.
marymoodey: But when we start working with computer technology, And now, especially with AI,
marymoodey: You have to really question, is that…
marymoodey: a real person, or is that the image of that person who wants to be perceived as, this is who I am?
Gus Breytspraak: So, seeing as believing no longer holds.
marymoodey: Right.
Gus Breytspraak: There were, let's see, Stan's… oh, go ahead, Alan, please.
Allen Dyer: Well, I was just gonna say, because AI can create bots that sound very convincing, and they can look just like
Allen Dyer: You or me, but aren't, because somebody else is manipulating them, so that's an ominous portent of the future in terms of our ability to distinguish reality from non-reality.
Gus Breytspraak: Yeah, Charles and Stan both, charles…
Stan Scott: Charles was ahead of me.
Charles Lowney: Yeah, I think in response to Paul's question about the possibility of there being dispute between different
Charles Lowney: Like, fabricated realities, emphasizing, Emphasizing the personal nature and emphasizing doubt actually works against the idea that
Charles Lowney: To try to bring somebody in to…
Charles Lowney: a better, more objective understanding of reality. You need… I think, to focus on, like, the methods of science and community and discussion.
Charles Lowney: open discussion to get to an objective reality together, rather than… than just… which is true, focus on the personal nature of it. I have to add, I believe, because you do that, and people who are trapped in their own
Charles Lowney: illusions are going to just say, well, see, you don't know either, so I'm right too, right? I'm… I can be right. Yeah. So…
Allen Dyer: You're, you're caught.
Allen Dyer: Calling for a convivial order.
Charles Lowney: Yes.
Gus Breytspraak: Right.
Charles Lowney: Yeah, as, as a sort of a…
Charles Lowney: Inoculation against following the narcissist into their own, manufactured reality.
Allen Dyer: Yeah, I like that metaphor, Charles, because it's something that has occurred to me in terms of personal knowledge, which I studied in graduate school, and even a little bit before graduate… before I went to graduate school, is a kind of inoculation against being deceived, being fooled, being subject to someone else's view of reality, that
Allen Dyer: for me personally, and I think for all of us.
Allen Dyer: It has been a kind of inoculation against a false, objective, propagandized distortion of reality.
Charles Lowney: Watch out for dogmatists that, that,
Allen Dyer: Yeah.
Charles Lowney: Don't have a fallibilism.
Gus Breytspraak: Okay, Stan, and then we'll move to question two, but go ahead.
Stan Scott: Yeah, I… I… I appreciate the book a lot, Alan, thank you. I…
Stan Scott: You know, I do think philosophy has a role. I think the… I think the condition of totalitarianism
Stan Scott: Potential totalitarianism that we're facing.
Stan Scott: In this country and worldwide is extremely urgent.
Stan Scott: But I do think philosophy has a role to play in In… in resistance.
Stan Scott: So I appreciate the book on that.
Stan Scott: on those grounds, we… Are experiencing something like
Stan Scott: I like your quote from Keith Richards.
Stan Scott: We're facing something like mass psychosis.
Stan Scott: You know, and the real question is.
Stan Scott: How do we… I mean, I… like…
Stan Scott: philosophers, like most Polanyians, I love the question of what is real and how do we know
Stan Scott: what is real? And the answer, in my view, as we
Stan Scott: that we get it from Polanyi is that,
Stan Scott: In order to avoid dogmatism, or… or…
Stan Scott: Or… or autocracy, for that matter.
Stan Scott: The answer is not another another ideology
Stan Scott: You know, that we're, in…
Stan Scott: Intending to impose on things, but…
Stan Scott: discovery. It's the discovery process, and…
Stan Scott: I think as teachers, that's something that
Stan Scott: I can teach as a general rule about life. It's not just in science.
Stan Scott: Particularly in politics.
Stan Scott: In any case, I, I'm always curious.
Stan Scott: Whatever I read about current conditions.
Stan Scott: Searching always for what are the answers?
Stan Scott: I hear a lot of… a lot of pretty good analysis.
Stan Scott: Of what's going on, including, you know.
Stan Scott: philosophical analysis that, you know, that there's…
Stan Scott: There's mass psych… or psychological analysis, that there's mass psychosis going on, but Surely there are answers.
Stan Scott: And I think that's the great thing about Polanyi, is he has this… he offers this open frame of mind that is… that refuses to be dogmatic, but claims
Stan Scott: But there is an answer.
Stan Scott: There are solutions out there, although
Stan Scott: We seem stuck. The nation and the world seem stuck in trying to find answers.
Stan Scott: Autocracy, so…
Allen Dyer: Well said, Stan, and just to jump on your reference to Keith Richards, Keith Richards is one of the musicians in the Rolling Stones.
Allen Dyer: And he noticed that his job was to,
Allen Dyer: fire up the crowd. Their job was to fire up the crowd, which he saw as a kind of mass psychosis, and wondered if this was like what Hitler found in his rallies, or we might, by analogy, say what Trump sees in his rallies. And so Keith Richards wasn't just a musician, he was a philosopher as well, so thank you for that.
Gus Breytspraak: And if you haven't read the book, there's a reference to that in one of the epilogues.
Gus Breytspraak: As I recall. Bruce, one more, and Phil also has something before we go to question two.
Bruce Vojak: Yeah, thanks, Gus. I, you know, I apologize, I've not read the chapter or the pre-work, but I find this topic fascinating, so I'm just going to chime in a bit.
Bruce Vojak: You know, we've talked a bit so far today, and alluded a bit to… to science, and I think in an accurate sense, science
Bruce Vojak: could benefit this active discovery that was being discussed by Stan not long ago. I'm fully bought into that.
Bruce Vojak: But I think there's been kind of a fetishizing of science, if you will, to the point of it being, misrepresented. And I'm going to share a link to
Bruce Vojak: to something from the Wall Street Journal from about 2 months ago. And, you know, this is stuff that's come out
Bruce Vojak: you know, post-COVID, where, there were, you know, a number of, you know, very reputable scientists who were, speaking out, or trying to speak out, counter to, this whole, if you will, trust science view of the world.
Bruce Vojak: And I think, if anything, the way COVID was handled and the way, science was thrown in people's face did more to damage science than I think most people,
Bruce Vojak: on the right can… or on the left, rather, excuse me, can imagine. And I'm not arguing for injecting people with Clorox, or, you know, I mean, please don't get me wrong, but I think
Bruce Vojak: that the reaction to some of this was so misguided and simplistic. I mean, I'll go beyond oversimplified, simplistic, that great damage was done. And so, you know, Alan, you know, given what I understand of your thesis.
Bruce Vojak: I mean, I agree, I think there's been a lot of, you know, look, and I said this in the show to, you know, trust… Trump says and does things that I'm daily surprised by. It's, you know, we talk about… about reality revealing itself in fresh ways. I think, he does that too.
Bruce Vojak: But I think it occurs more subtly on the left as well, and I think that if we're really looking to find reality, it's not a middle ground. I think it's something entirely separate.
Bruce Vojak: from what the discourse currently is, for the most part. And I'd be hard-pressed to find
Bruce Vojak: really politicians on either side that I trust.
Bruce Vojak: on any of these topics, so I'm just going to kind of throw that out there, Alan. I gather that some of what you've written has been in response to a very current situation, but I see this as being something that… that predates this. You know, Dick, you talked about going back to,
Bruce Vojak: you know, and I forget his name, I can picture him, but the Republican politician decades ago.
Bruce Vojak: I think this kind of discourse has gone on for a long time. That's not to minimize it, but it's to say that I think this grasp of discovery and reality is just not… is not a commonly held view in the world. So I don't know how to address that, but I think
Bruce Vojak: I think the society could really provide great value if we could bring people back to that.
Allen Dyer: So what I hear you saying, Bruce, and what I… I agree with you on this.
Allen Dyer: is that the scientist has to say more than, trust me, I'm an expert. And as science becomes more and more specialized, scientists are experts, and they know more than most of us do about the things that they're expert on, but that's not convincing in and of itself.
Allen Dyer: It's the link with what they claim to know, with the evidence that needs to be explained.
Bruce Vojak: Yeah, I agree. I think the one thing that I'm going to maybe expand on that a bit is,
Bruce Vojak: is that there were people who were silenced to have that kind of data, and that's why I share this link. Again, you know, I know a lot of you may not necessarily view the Wall Street Journal as, you know, a source that you'd use as a go-to, but I think it's probably more legitimate press than you'll find in other places.
Bruce Vojak: And so I'm just saying that the shoe doesn't fit on both feet, really, at this point, and I think it's problematic.
Stan Scott: Mary.
marymoodey: I… Bruce, I want to take it way, way back before COVID.
marymoodey: And go to…
marymoodey: The act of discovery and the way in which science is not taught in schools very early on.
marymoodey: It's… Right now, science is taught When it is taught.
marymoodey: Not in a lab, not where students can experiment, but from a textbook where there are
marymoodey: Certain questions that have The right answer…
marymoodey: That then appear in a standardized test, but there's no…
marymoodey: You know, occasionally, you'll have a project where you can pour baking soda and vinegar into a homemade volcano, papier-mache, but that's not…
marymoodey: the way science is taught every day in the classroom, so the whole act of discovery is not even part of the curriculum. And that starts very early on, and we've lost
marymoodey: Teachers are so…
marymoodey: they're pushed. I am not faulting the teachers. They have to be on a certain page, at a certain day, at a certain hour.
marymoodey: The teachable moment is lost, and so much discovery arises out of students' inquiries that are being quashed.
marymoodey: And so… I… I mourn the way science
marymoodey: the loss of the way science is being taught. I think about how my mother taught it, and what she offered to her students just through hands-on, experiential, let's discover to
marymoodey: That's There's hardly any room for it in the curriculum now.
Gus Breytspraak: Hmm.
marymoodey: In the elementary grades, and it saddens me.
Gus Breytspraak: Okay, Phil…
mullins: I think what Stan was saying about Discovery and others too, and what Paul has suggested about,
mullins: reality and Polanyi's notion about indeterminate future manifestations.
mullins: all of that is sort of rich territory for doing what Prosch called healing the modern mind, which I think Alan is up to in his own way, too.
mullins: But I think another sort of ingredient in Polanyi's account is tradition. It's tradition and discovery.
mullins: And that perhaps the cultural situation we are now in is one that does require
mullins: in a certain sense, plugging tradition a bit more, too, and maybe exploring those themes like, verification and validation, which are in Polanyi. Those seem to me to be,
mullins: perhaps… Some kind of medicine for the strange sort of situation in which we live.
Gus Breytspraak: Well, I see, Alan is nodding, and
Gus Breytspraak: Let's, but I think as the clock ticks, maybe we should move to, the second question here.
Paul Lewis: Right?
Paul Lewis: Yeah, and again, the second question to… to really summarize it is, you know, I want to hear… would like to hear more about the positive ways that emotions can contribute to our understanding of reality.
Allen Dyer: Yeah, so…
Allen Dyer: what we call emotions, and what… Polanyi often talks about them as passions, and he's well aware of the importance of passions as motivating factors in discovery, and I wouldn't… what I'm trying to suggest is the balance of reason and emotion that
Allen Dyer: We don't become overwhelmed by our emotions, but that we don't be underwhelmed by them either.
Allen Dyer: And that when we try to reason, and perhaps try to reason with people who see the world differently from the way we see it, that we try to keep reason and emotion in balance. That would be my quick answer to a very complicated question.
Gus Breytspraak: So, Paul, did you… I think when you were explaining the question, you thought that Alan may have
Gus Breytspraak: neglected the positive role somewhat? And there are certainly others who… I forget, what was the term you had?
Paul Lewis: The myth of the passions is what one philosopher calls it, that reason and emotion, or reason and passion are opposed to each other.
Paul Lewis: And I guess, I mean… Part of it is, if…
Paul Lewis: Part of it's understanding what the passions are that are driving people this way.
Paul Lewis: In whatever extreme they're being… being driven in. And how can we…
Paul Lewis: What do I activate passions to kind of move them back from the brink?
Paul Lewis: of denial.
Paul Lewis: Reason enough isn't necessarily going to be enough to do that.
Allen Dyer: So, in a sense, the problem we face, I think, that so much of this is in our heads.
Paul Lewis: Man.
Allen Dyer: And… and… Not in our hearts or our gut.
Allen Dyer: In a sense, that's what embodiment is when we talk about, well, where is that in the body?
Allen Dyer: I mean, and it is in the body, I mean, we could answer that in terms of neuroscience, but that's not part of the communication. And so I think that's an impediment of the old modern age, is that it is abstract and removed from our lived experience in that way, and that that's a part of the task of recovery for personal knowledge.
Allen Dyer: for our experience, and certainly one of the tasks of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy, although, as we anticipate your next question.
Allen Dyer: What I will tell you is that there's a great deal of resistance even there, to really talking about feelings and emotions in a very direct way.
Gus Breytspraak: John!
Jon Fennell: Yeah, I… I think Polanyi's… Remedy for destructive passion.
Jon Fennell: is passion itself.
Jon Fennell: In other words, We must inculcate in the young, who will later be the old.
Jon Fennell: A passionate commitment to truth.
Jon Fennell: Or to the result of discovery, etc.
Jon Fennell: So, if we want people to be more frequently in alliance with reality.
Jon Fennell: We need to develop a kind of character that is committed
Jon Fennell: to fairness, to open-mindedness, etc, etc. I'm sure most of you will recall
Jon Fennell: in science, faith, and Society, he,
Jon Fennell: He outlines the personal characteristics required for a free society to survive and thrive.
Jon Fennell: And so…
Jon Fennell: If we're concerned about an increasing departure from reality, or an increasing unwillingness to accept reality, I think…
Jon Fennell: Polanyi's answer would be, we need to be more careful in the way we raise people so that they're committed passionately to the procedures and so forth that give us
Jon Fennell: actual reality.
Craig Wickstrom: Which, John, your comment goes back to Phil's comment about tradition being involved as well.
Jon Fennell: That's right, tradition only has an impact if we're committed to it.
Jon Fennell: We have to… we have to somehow believe in it, and associate with it, affiliate with it.
Jon Fennell: And, promote it, support it. And that's a kind of person, right?
Jon Fennell: I view personal knowledge in one way of, I think, of understanding personal knowledge as a book.
Jon Fennell: is as a… An exemplar of the kind of person
Jon Fennell: that Polanyi would have us all be.
Jon Fennell: And…
Jon Fennell: if we want to have a free society with the characteristics that Polanyi values and that most of us value.
Jon Fennell: The answer is to…
Jon Fennell: Cultivate a kind of personality, or a kind of character that will act in this fashion.
Jon Fennell: We all recall from personal knowledge,
Jon Fennell: Polanyi's reference to the statement, I stand here, I cannot do anything else but do that. Who was that? Was it Luther?
Gus Breytspraak: That's Martin Luther.
Jon Fennell: that statement.
Gus Breytspraak: Here I stand, I can do no other.
Jon Fennell: Yep. Now, what's going on when Luther does that? Luther is putting everything on the line. He is, he is…
Jon Fennell: Expressing his commitment to an ideal, to a principle.
Jon Fennell: And… and I think that Polanyi's…
Jon Fennell: one and only possible answer to Alan's issue here.
Jon Fennell: Is to cultivate the kind of people
Jon Fennell: Who will stand forthright for these principles.
Charles Lowney: They need intellectual passion as well as moral passion.
Jon Fennell: That's right, that's right, we, we…
Jon Fennell: We are reaping the fruit of very poor pedagogy over the last hundred years. Pedagogy, I don't mean the schools, necessarily. I mean the kind… I mean the rearing of a certain kind of person.
Jon Fennell: And…
Jon Fennell: the Western tradition that we all so much value is itself the product of this wondrous thing, and if we become less and less aware how this thing came about, and we become less and less careful about preserving it, we shouldn't be surprised that it deteriorates.
Paul Lewis: when I see this in students, right, the whole educational system teaches us to go after performance goals, to get the high scores, get the A, right? It's not necessarily to learn anything.
Paul Lewis: But it's to excel according to certain metrics so we can get into a better school, get a better job, those sorts of things. It really is all about self-aggrandizement. Not necessarily intentionally, but that's the message that they really internalize.
Charles Lowney: And it disguises discovery.
Paul Lewis: Yeah, and when I tell students, hey, look, there's nothing wrong with failing, except if you don't learn from failing. Don't be afraid of failing.
Paul Lewis: Learn from it. Do something different next time.
Paul Lewis: And they all look at me like, huh?
Craig Wickstrom: I'm… I'm reminded of… of… my thoughts about, church membership and participation, that I find that,
Craig Wickstrom: as far as churches go, there's a commercial kind of attitude. You know, I go shopping for my church that I like. If I don't like that church, I go shopping elsewhere.
Craig Wickstrom: And, we have to… to make a difference, we have to stay rooted
Craig Wickstrom: And passionately fight for what we believe, where we are, rather than, cutting and running, so to speak.
Jon Fennell: I'm gonna be lecturing, at Hillsdale in September.
Jon Fennell: And, of course, I'm going to invoke Polanyi, I always do.
Jon Fennell: It's… one of the things I'll be mentioning is how important it is to have exemplars in the lives of the young.
Jon Fennell: And the exemplars are most commonly
Jon Fennell: Revealed in stories of one sort or another.
Jon Fennell: And…
Jon Fennell: When we bring exemplars of courage or honesty.
Jon Fennell: Or fortitude, or whatever, into the lives of the young.
Jon Fennell: It comes in the form of figures, or characters, or something, or events.
Jon Fennell: And… These things become effective in the lives of people if they fall in love with them.
Jon Fennell: In other words, if you wish people to act honestly, Or courageously.
Jon Fennell: They have to be aesthetically shaped.
Jon Fennell: They have to be acquainted with what this looks like in life.
Jon Fennell: And to fall in love with that, so that when they have an opportunity to act.
Jon Fennell: they can act that way as well. And why would they act that way?
Jon Fennell: Why did John McCain cast that vote that preserved Obamacare.
Jon Fennell: You know, he clearly was a critic of it, but when the time came, he felt compelled
Jon Fennell: To vote in the fashion he did, which outraged, of course, the entire conservative movement.
Jon Fennell: And I like to think that was because John McCain
Jon Fennell: viewed the situation as one that required a kind of courage and honesty. And why… why was he that kind of person? Well, because he had been raised in a certain fashion.
Jon Fennell: So, to go back to Alan's issue here, if we want people to act in accordance with reality.
Jon Fennell: They're gonna have to be able and willing
Jon Fennell: To take those steps necessary to do that.
Jon Fennell: They're gonna have to be motivated by a love for a certain kind of candor or something.
Jon Fennell: And be willing to pay the price for that.
Jon Fennell: And I think that comes through a kind of, moral education.
Gus Breytspraak: Okay, we've got a little more than 30 minutes left, and we still have two questions, from Paul, and probably some that some of you, want to introduce, so let's move on to number 3 about, postmodernism as a, or
Gus Breytspraak: Or a post-critical as a subset of postmodernism? Was that… was that…
Paul Lewis: That was basically it, right? Alan classifies Polanyi, or calls Polanyi a post-critical version of postmodernity.
Gus Breytspraak: And I don't have that page in front of me, but that phrase also jumped off the page for me, Alan. Is that the way you sort things out?
Allen Dyer: Yup.
Allen Dyer: So thanks for the question. I think it's an important question, and I think the way to think about… and you're quite right that postmodernism is not something that's clearly defined, or clearly understood, or commonly agreed upon. One of the ways we can appreciate
Allen Dyer: The postmodern turn is that, we think about the old modern age
Allen Dyer: with its recognizable features, the quest for a clear and distinct idea, the quest for an objective sense of reality. And the postmodernist, Frederick Jameson, who taught at Duke for many years and wrote, perhaps, the key book on
Allen Dyer: Postmodernism has a nice, but very ambiguous and thought-provoking definition of postmodernism.
Allen Dyer: He says it can best be understood as the attempt to think historically in the present.
Allen Dyer: when the idea of thinking historically has been lost. And so, if we think of postmodernism as something that we have emerged out of the old modern age from.
Allen Dyer: The question is, where are we now, and what is it that characterizes postmodernism
Allen Dyer: And what I would suggest, and we could get into postmodernism, post-structuralism, and, you know, all kinds of different philosophies.
Gus Breytspraak: occasions.
Allen Dyer: is that Polanyi offers us an alternative to all of that, which is personal knowledge, which he says is neither objective nor subjective, but is personal. And what he means by that is that it's
Allen Dyer: relational in a sense, it's relational in the sense of a community, so that we acknowledge who we are as people, and that goes along with the moral education as well. We acknowledge what we value and disvalue. We acknowledge who we are as people as we encounter and engage with someone else.
Allen Dyer: Now, having said that.
Allen Dyer: With this great political divide, you know, the middle is missing, and the middle is the place where those kinds of conversations might occur, or where we might have to try to recreate some kind of middle ground in which we could speak
Allen Dyer: in the first person, with somebody else who has a different view of reality. So, to acknowledge
Allen Dyer: the ambiguity of what postmodernism is, I think Polanyi offers us an alternative way of thinking about that, which is the most critical epistemology.
Gus Breytspraak: Charles.
Charles Lowney: Yeah, I like your answer on that. I just think, as far as semantics go, and the use of words, it's,
Charles Lowney: postmodern… It gets more associated with the reaction against modernism, and…
Charles Lowney: more with, like, Foucault and a post-truth sort of, approach, so I… I try to distinguish postmodernism, even though it is technically postmodern, it's after the modern, it adjusts it.
Charles Lowney: post-critical from post-modern. And I saw you doing that in the chapter with the hyphen between post and modern.
Charles Lowney: But… but I don't know if that's strong enough. I think you should address the distinction earlier, perhaps.
Allen Dyer: Okay, appreciate that.
Paul Lewis: I was hoping that Dale Cannon would be on here, because he's done a lot of work teasing this apart, and I've got his stuff somewhere, but I haven't been able to find it.
Gus Breytspraak: So, Alan, I had a question about Jamison, who I have not gotten to yet, and I know you overlapped for some period at Duke. Did you get to know him, and did he know anything about Polanyi? Do you know?
Allen Dyer: I didn't get to know him, and I don't know the answer to that question, but…
Allen Dyer: one of my students, and this is going to be the answer to the discussion about Freud,
Allen Dyer: The Second City of the Carolinas, in which I am now a faculty member in teaching, has a new curriculum, and the new curriculum starts with, first course, the evolution
Allen Dyer: And epistemology of psychoanalysis.
Allen Dyer: And one of the students has, before he decided to become an analyst, or actually think he decided to become an analyst, but wanted to do a PhD first in English with Frederick Jameson. So I will ask that question, and I will… I will find out the.
Gus Breytspraak: report, yeah, we'll be interested in that. Phil?
mullins: Well, this is just follow-up on what Paul said. Both Dale and I have, cited, David Griffith makes a distinction between constructive and deconstructive postmodernism, and Polanyi, he puts in a lot… Jerry Gill follows them this… this direction.
mullins: Polanyi puts in the constructive postmodernism, as opposed to the deconstructive, and I think that's a helpful, streaming of things, if you want to put it that way.
Gus Breytspraak: Stan?
Stan Scott: Thank you, Bill. Phil, sorry for bringing up Ray Griffin. I was about to say that myself.
Stan Scott: He makes a distinction between, What he calls, deconstructive postmodernism and constructive postmodernism.
Stan Scott: And deconstructive postmodernism is, you know, kind of the key figure there is Derrida.
Stan Scott: And it's deconstructive in the sense that
Stan Scott: it has no place to stand. It doesn't grant the idea that there is… you know, we've been talking about Luther saying, here I stand.
Stan Scott: And, you know, taking a… and the commitment involved in it, Deconstructive postmodernism.
Stan Scott: Characteristically, anyway, offers no place to stand. It is it makes… Relativism into an absolute.
Stan Scott: And what… What constructive postmodernism does is recognizing that There are no,
Stan Scott: artificial. We can't make a verbal… we can't have a verbal solution, as William James put it, and say, well.
Stan Scott: I, I believe in this
Stan Scott: And spirit, let's say, as an absolute.
Stan Scott: You know, without a discovery process.
Stan Scott: And, and the American pragmatists and Polanyi are all in the… and… and, Whitehead.
Stan Scott: Two, for that matter, all on this path of
Stan Scott: constructive postmodernism, where I think Polanyi fits very naturally, because it takes into account
Stan Scott: The, the, autocratic tendency of of the, of…
Stan Scott: Of earlier eras of history, let's say, including modernism to some extent.
Stan Scott: Takes into account, you know, that you can't just…
Stan Scott: Claim that you have an absolute.
Stan Scott: You know, without demonstrating it.
Stan Scott: And, and so the extremists will say, well, there are no absolutes.
Stan Scott: Well… I'm not so sure that's true, but I'm… because I'm not sure that Polanyi's discovery process would reveal
Stan Scott: Exactly that, that there are no absolutes. It's a matter of discovery to find something that is an absolute.
Stan Scott: Let's just find the place where you can stand.
Stan Scott: As Luther put it.
Stan Scott: So, you know, Alan, I… I think, I think you're very much on the right
Stan Scott: path there, but I mean, that's a… that's a little bit of an enhancement.
Stan Scott: by Phil.
Stan Scott: To the whole theme of postmodernism, because when we use the word postmodernism, typically what we mean is deconstructive.
Stan Scott: postmodernism, and most people in academia that I know of, including the world of literature, are not
Stan Scott: Particularly familiar with this other strand
Stan Scott: Postmodernism that is constructive, that it is willing to look at evidence
Stan Scott: And enter into the tacit dimension In order to,
Stan Scott: In order to wrestle with the issues and the evidence.
Stan Scott: Until it comes to a focal point, That we call discovery.
Stan Scott: You know, so…
Stan Scott: I think philosophy… this is one area where I think philosophy could make a big contribution to the…
Stan Scott: Anti, anti-air… anti, you know, autocracy.
Stan Scott: movement against democracy that we're facing worldwide today, so…
Gus Breytspraak: So, Stan, you're, you're somewhat optimistic about aligning, Polanyi with that branch of postmodernism.
Stan Scott: I am. I, I think, you know…
Stan Scott: some of you know Eric Rustad, but he and I are still very much in touch, but he… he tends to… from talking to me, he knows a fair amount about
Stan Scott: pragmatism. That is, American philosophical pragmatism.
Stan Scott: Which is James Dewey and Peirce, in particular, but…
Stan Scott: He feels that Polanyi is… virtually, Complete… virtually all in.
Stan Scott: So to speak, that he's… he's… he's a… he's of a similar stature to those great characters, but, you know,
Stan Scott: But he's a contributor to the same movement, and it is a… it is a strong cultural
Stan Scott: It's not just philosophical, it's a cultural movement, too.
Stan Scott: It… it hasn't… it hasn't achieved the kind of
Stan Scott: Popularity, let's say, or, or, or, exposure
Stan Scott: That you get from mass psychosis.
Stan Scott: We'll go back to the Keith Richards quote, you know.
Stan Scott: It's… mass psychosis produces a stolid attitude that you know, dogmatism, You know, belief without evidence.
Stan Scott: Which is what we're facing.
Stan Scott: In politics, so much.
Charles Lowney: Pragmatism gives fallibilism without skepticism.
Stan Scott: Yeah, yeah.
Stan Scott: Without negativity, yeah.
Stan Scott: So it can be optimistic.
Gus Breytspraak: Okay, we've got, John and Walt both have questions, but we still have one more from Paul to get to, so let's hear those, and there may be some others, others to raise after we get to the last of Paul's questions, but John?
Jon Fennell: I think Dick might have been before me.
Gus Breytspraak: Dick?
marymoodey: Oh, I just…
marymoodey: I don't want to necessarily change the subject too much, but we haven't said anything about moral inversion, and that was… that's in the title of the…
mullins: Absolutely.
marymoodey: chapter that we read, and it seems to me that moral inversion… well, the way I understand moral inversion is that it's a useful heuristic.
marymoodey: In other words, I don't think it explains everything about what's wrong with the world.
marymoodey: But I think that it's useful to take the model of moral inversion and use it heuristically to see what we can discover about what's wrong with the modern world.
marymoodey: or postmodern world, whatever.
marymoodey: And it seems to me that there's two ways of looking at it heuristically. One of them is, as an ideology, a set of cultural symbols that legitimates acts and agendas, and the other way is as the moral orientation of individuals. And so, it seems to me that that distinction between
marymoodey: personal moral orientations, As moral inversion, and sets of cultural symbols as ideologies.
marymoodey: It's useful to think about that as ways of looking for explanations for what's going wrong.
Gus Breytspraak: Okay, John.
Jon Fennell: Well, now I have two things to say, but let's go back first. It's always struck me that what is perhaps most distinctive about Polanyi
Jon Fennell: Is that he, like the postmoderns.
Jon Fennell: Abandons the, the possibility of foundations.
Jon Fennell: But many of the postmoderns at that point
Jon Fennell: lose… they become sort of… they get vertigo. There's… when they… when they…
Stan Scott: Right.
Jon Fennell: When they assert that there are no foundations, they jump to the conclusion that everything is up for grabs.
Jon Fennell: And I think, Stan… he's… Stan has made several references today to discovery, and now to the pragmatists, as…
Jon Fennell: some of you have argued elsewhere, and I have too, there's quite a bit of similarity between Polanyi and Pierce.
Jon Fennell: In the definition of reality and the emphasis on discovery.
Jon Fennell: I think that, what makes the difference… what's the difference between the postmodernism and Polanyi
Jon Fennell: postmodernism, as it's normally understood, is that Polanyi will Abandoned the hope for foundations, But as Charlie just mentioned.
Jon Fennell: He doesn't fall into the deep skepticism. Instead, he becomes constructive in the manner of Pierce.
Jon Fennell: And we have… we do, in fact, have…
Jon Fennell: reality and truth. It's just not what the moderns thought it was.
Jon Fennell: But now, now, we've got the question of the, Of moral inversion.
Jon Fennell: I want to pose something to Alan. I think you… I think you capture Polanyi's understanding of moral inversion very well, but it wasn't clear at all to me from your Chapter 5
Jon Fennell: How these various phenomena were instances of moral inversion.
Jon Fennell: And you make reference to MAGA, and Maha, and
Jon Fennell: A number of other contemporary phenomena,
Jon Fennell: You make reference to Ukraine, January 6th, the Hungarian Revolution.
Jon Fennell: I think you want to say that all of these things, in some sense, are instances of moral inversion, but I didn't see you showing that in the chapter.
Craig Wickstrom: Yeah, indeed, I guess I… I wonder whether they all are.
Craig Wickstrom: Examples of moral aversion.
Allen Dyer: Okay,
Allen Dyer: question taken, and I think my answer to that would be in terms of understanding the moral inversion in terms of the dynamo objective coupling.
Allen Dyer: So that one defends against the other, and the other defends against the one, that if you have a different moral view, it's objected on the basis of an alternative view of reality, whereas if you take issue with the alternative view of reality, the defense is a passionate denial.
Gus Breytspraak: That's cool.
Allen Dyer: So I think those could be elaborated in terms of, you know, what is the justification, what is the… what is the articulated justification for, in particular, for violence against humanity?
Gus Breytspraak: Yeah, I had, I was going to raise something since this is… this has come up. This was, like, a fifth question, but we do want to get… get to the fourth, but
Gus Breytspraak: is… Polanyi's analysis of Marlin version is different at different points, of course, over his long life, but there's a strong stream of it coming from the,
Gus Breytspraak: denial of any validity to morality, and I don't see that in the left or the right in the culture wars today. They, they, they're, they, they, they are, affirming
Gus Breytspraak: their, moral standards. It's not coming out of that kind of skepticism about Knowing,
Gus Breytspraak: what we should do, or what is it? So I… I'm just… I'm just not sure that moral inversion, as an analysis is… is… is that helpful for analyzing what's going on today. Can anybody help me with that?
Gus Breytspraak: Alan, or anybody else? Charles.
Charles Lowney: I don't see it as a denial of morality, but as a denial of the ability to rationally discuss morality, in which case you can't convince other people of the morality that you hold, and you hold passionately.
Charles Lowney: So I think the, the skepticism part, erodes your ability to try to convince people through reason that this is the right direction.
Charles Lowney: and you hold on to your utopian view as the right direction, whether it's a nostalgic view of America when it was great, or a utopian, sort of.
Charles Lowney: Full equity view.
Charles Lowney: And you see, like, using pretty much utilitarian, sort of capitalist influence morality, you say the ends will justify the means, we just have to get to my paradise.
Gus Breytspraak: That's helpful.
Allen Dyer: One of the things that can be said about postmodernism is that it allows for you to believe anything you want to, and Polanyi is fairly explicit on that in terms of
Allen Dyer: what justifies the pursuit of discovery is universal intent. Now, that, that also leaves some questions unanswered, but I think
Allen Dyer: I think there is the sense that he is pursuing a view of reality. The scientist is pursuing a view of reality, not as an expert, but in a more humble, openness
Allen Dyer: To discovery, to understanding.
Bruce Vojak: I've kind of naively looked at moral inversion as a form of hypocrisy, that you're stating one thing but behaving exactly in reverse. Is that too simplistic a view of it, or is that just not.
Gus Breytspraak: It seems… it seems… it just depends on where you look in Polanyi and what he's analyzing.
Gus Breytspraak: But I, I, I think he's…
Gus Breytspraak: And this, this may be beyond what we want to talk about today, but it seems to me he thinks he has a key to understanding,
Gus Breytspraak: sort of massive cultural shifts in this concept at various points. But it's also specifically related to
Gus Breytspraak: the scientific, quote, scientific, socialism in, you know, in Stalinist Russia and so forth, and it's sort of a denial of any, any morality at that, that point.
Gus Breytspraak: So, but,
Craig Wickstrom: There's… what I see is Polanyi is talking about, in moral inversion, rather than submitting to morality.
Craig Wickstrom: People are trying to control and use reality.
Craig Wickstrom: And I think… I think there's a key word in… in here that… that's important, is humility.
Craig Wickstrom: And the idea of… same thing, not just morality, but submission to reality.
Craig Wickstrom: as well.
Craig Wickstrom: It's important.
wbgulick: So I won't.
marymoodey: Another word that I would put in there is tradition. I think that
marymoodey: I don't think I can understand what my interpretation of moral inversion is, that it's a rejection of traditional morality with the belief that such things as truth and goodness
marymoodey: And… Are real.
wbgulick: Well, I want to challenge the idea that
wbgulick: both sides are moral, when you… particularly when you look at Trump.
wbgulick: Are we talking about… Are we talking about sheer power?
wbgulick: And, and narcissism, and ego.
wbgulick: And, I wouldn't say that's true of all the MAGA folk, But,
wbgulick: Certainly, I think that aspect of
wbgulick: Not necessarily skepticism, but just, self, Interest has taken over.
wbgulick: a lot of things, with power, ability to control others through threats and so forth. And so that doesn't seem to me to have a whole lot to do with moral inversion.
Gus Breytspraak: Moral inversion, right?
Gus Breytspraak: All right, we're, getting close to the end of time. We can come back to this if we want, but let's… let's get to the fourth question, because this is a fascinating one for… for me, the whole,
Gus Breytspraak: question of Freud and Polanyi's lack of exploration. Go ahead, Paul.
Paul Lewis: But basically, Polanyi, when he talks about Freud, considers Freud to be an example of a form of moral inversion, and yet, Alan finds Freud very helpful in understanding things, so the question is, how do you reconcile these two?
Allen Dyer: Yep, thank you for that, Paul, and that's something I'm thinking a lot about as we embark on this new curriculum.
Allen Dyer: with the psychoanalysts, and what I will say right up front is that there's a lot of resistance to thinking differently about this. I think Polanyi is not dismissive. He does use psychoanalysis as a form… a spurious form of moral inversion.
Allen Dyer: But he's not dismissive of
Allen Dyer: Freud or Freudian insights. What he says, and I've just turned to page 233 of that section, men may go on talking the language of positivism, pragmatism, and naturalism for many years, yet continue to respect the principles of truth and morality, which their vocabulary
Allen Dyer: anxiously ignores. And so I think that's the problem for psychoanalysis, that
Allen Dyer: It isn't clear whether it's a…
Allen Dyer: Therapy, a science, a profession, a trade, or a cult.
Allen Dyer: And I think that's what needs to be clarified. And so, in… in the paper that I gave in Baltimore, which you were present, Phil, and
Allen Dyer: and Gelwick discussed, and Diane Yeager wrote the abstract, which forced me to write a paper that delivered on
Allen Dyer: the lofty principles that she articulated for the paper, I talk about the distinction between psychoanalysis and Freudianism, and there are two ways of knowing
Allen Dyer: these worldviews. One is through the things that Freud wrote.
Allen Dyer: And the other is the kinds of things that one learns in analysis. And those are very different, because what one learns in analysis from one's own free associations, with the guidance of an analyst who is not only listening to what you're saying.
Allen Dyer: But listening to what evokes in himself or herself.
Allen Dyer: is a very different kind of knowledge and experience than what you might get from reading Freud. So, for example, if you read The Future of Illusion, you might conclude that Freud was critical of religion, which he was. But it's hard to read The Future of Illusion
Allen Dyer: written at a time, 1929, when Nazism was emerging, and he could see the way in which a mass movement was influencing people, much the way religion,
Allen Dyer: religion was. So, so I think this distinction between
Allen Dyer: psychoanalysis as a way of learning, and freudianism
Allen Dyer: as a way of explaining social phenomenon, hinges… hinges on this question of what do we take to be convincing evidence, and
Allen Dyer: one might read civilization in its discontent, or Moses in monotheism, and say, this doesn't make sense. It doesn't make sense in an empirical kind of way, it doesn't make sense in a pragmatic kind of way, it doesn't make sense in a theoretical kind of way. But I think what Freud was trying to do in his
Allen Dyer: social, observations, his observations about society and civilization, was try to use the evidence that he had learned from listening to his patients, one after another, to try to construct a theory, which is theoretical.
Allen Dyer: and should be understood as theoretical, looking for evidence that we might adduce from the kind of experiences we see. So, for example, the kinds of things that I allude to in terms of
Allen Dyer: the recent wars that we're experiencing, in terms of what's going on in Gaza, in terms of the denial of
Allen Dyer: climate change, the, the difficulty of coming to terms with epidemics, and even infectious diseases and public health, and all of that. All of that depends on
Allen Dyer: All of that depends on understanding
Allen Dyer: the forces, the passions, and the ideas that motivate people to act in certain kinds of ways. And I'll give you one example, which I find problematic and perplexing myself.
Allen Dyer: I'm working on a book.
Allen Dyer: Now, the second edition of Global Mental Health Ethics, which is
Allen Dyer: Springer has asked for only 6 years after the first edition came out, based on the number of digital downloads that libraries have asked for.
Allen Dyer: And what I think about, as I think about the difference in these last 5 or 6 years, is the world is a very different place than it was 5 or 6 years ago.
Allen Dyer: Five or six years ago, what we were talking about in terms of global mental health was taking the
Allen Dyer: mental health expertise we have in Western countries, like the United States and European countries, and taking it to places where there is no psychiatrist, and try to develop ways of making mental health services accessible.
Allen Dyer: What we are now experiences, and this is where the terror management theory comes in that Paul alluded to.
Allen Dyer: Are all of these things, global warming, pandemics, possibility of economic collapse, wars that never existed before, that are
Allen Dyer: Frightening, and lead one to be more vulnerable to an authoritarian leader who promises to solve everything, and make your life better, when in fact, the experience is just the opposite.
Gus Breytspraak: Questions or comments?
Charles Lowney: Maybe going back.
Gus Breytspraak: Carly, go ahead.
Charles Lowney: Maybe going back to, moral inversion and the idea that this is just…
Charles Lowney: power and hypocrisy all over again. I think that for a lot of the people who are pushing movements, it's about power and… and they're being hypocrites, but what makes it specifically moral inversion is the ability to motivate
Charles Lowney: The masses or people, With… with this idea of, utopian, sort of,
Charles Lowney: Pseudo-reality and, activate their moral passions.
Charles Lowney: So I don't think… Walt is wrong, I just think that both can be true.
wbgulick: Well, isn't it one of the motivating factors?
wbgulick: not some ideal.
wbgulick: But resentment.
wbgulick: That feeling like the, you know, working class has been left out of things.
wbgulick: And that's… that's, that's a strong emotional kind of response, rather than an idealistic response.
Charles Lowney: Yeah, that definitely does play a role in… and promoting
Charles Lowney: it's the ideal where I am no longer…
Charles Lowney: Subjugated or taken advantage of, and that would… that probably feeds into part of the…
Charles Lowney: utopian vision, right, of…
Charles Lowney: whether it was real or imagined of the American past, in which you could just… if you worked hard, you could make it, and you wouldn't be stepped on, because you had the right motivations, and that sort of thing.
Charles Lowney: So yeah, that definitely plays in, but does it play in towards the utopian ideal?
Charles Lowney: That emotion.
mullins: Hannah's got his hair nut.
Stan Scott: Hi, thank you.
Stan Scott: You know, the way I see it is we, you know, we've been talking about reason and passions, as if…
Stan Scott: And, and they, they sort of seem like Contraries, or opposites.
Stan Scott: You know, in ordinary experience, and then, you know, then we get lift and right, and we get, you know.
Stan Scott: In pol… in… in politics, it…
Stan Scott: And then in moral inversion, you know, you have the idea that
Stan Scott: You can have a… you can have a false…
Stan Scott: concept of the other person as not being
Stan Scott: Fit for moral consideration, but you can accompany that with huge amounts of passion that then spreads
Stan Scott: into the mass psychosis thing of the Nazi era, and so on.
Stan Scott: But, you know, the trouble with, you know, the positive end, even the… Constructive end of, of,
Stan Scott: Postmodernism is…
Stan Scott: We… we are still kind of stuck in that sense of duality, that the two… the two things
Stan Scott: don't link up. I mean, I think Polanyi's on the right road, because the section of PK about intellectual passions, intellect and passion do not…
Stan Scott: Conflict, they're not opposites.
Stan Scott: But they're not the same. They have different functions, but they need to coordinate.
Stan Scott: And… My, my,
Stan Scott: thought about it all, is that discovery, and I think Polanyi, as well as the pragmatists, leave themselves open to
Stan Scott: kind of pragmatics or empirical.
Stan Scott: Sense of transcendence.
Stan Scott: that ultimately, there is some form of transcendence. It might not fit any religious structure or belief.
Stan Scott: There's some… there's a… in other words, you've got the… the elements of the… of the duality. Well, there's…
Stan Scott: you know, intellect and… or reason and passion, or… or left and right, you know, political views, but there's a third point. There's a third item in the triad.
Stan Scott: Which is… Well, we call it transcendence, but, you know, Polanyi makes clear to me, anyway, that
Stan Scott: Transcendence is primarily a matter of the ability to transfer Your… your allegiance from one
Stan Scott: Framework, one dominant framework of reference, to another more, more valid or more effectual framework.
Stan Scott: Or frame of reference, in the more common language.
Gus Breytspraak: So… Okay.
Stan Scott: That's a… that's the thing I think philosophy can… contribute to
Stan Scott: The whole mess of the slide… democracy.
Gus Breytspraak: Okay, we are at ending point, but let's see if Paul and or Alan have anything to wrap this up with. We're grateful… all of us are grateful to, both of you for
Gus Breytspraak: For, thinking about this and presenting this for us, but, Alan?
mullins: Remember that… just on the… remember that on the 26th of September, I believe we have a companion piece to this Zoom session that will focus on an essay by Paul with some response from Alan, so come back for that.
Gus Breytspraak: Right.
Stan Scott: Although…
Allen Dyer: Exactly, and I'm very grateful to all of you, and I'm very grateful to Paul for
Allen Dyer: formulating such thought-provoking questions, so I'm very much looking forward to the next session.
Gus Breytspraak: All right.
ebeira: Can I?
ebeira: Just a short footnote.
Stan Scott: Yes.
ebeira: Moral amortion, and political divide. Of course, it's related about discussion of totalitarianism.
ebeira: And the footnote is that Anna Arendt.
ebeira: made an interesting discussion of beyond nihilism of Polanyi that is very… I haven't seen it very often cited. I've seen it lastly… largely forgotten.
ebeira: And maybe it's a pity. She is really perplexed with the moral ambassadian idea.
ebeira: So this is just my final footnote.
Gus Breytspraak: Thank you. Well, if you get Alan's book, the next chapter involves, Hannah Arendt in some detail, so…
mullins: You may be able to dig out that, Eduardo, you're right.
Gus Breytspraak: I'd love to see that.
mullins: a little bit.
Gus Breytspraak: Yeah, I'd love to see that. Thank you.
Stan Scott: Thank you all.
Paul Lewis: Bye.