

The Tacit Dimension and Rhetoric: What It Means to Be Persuading and Persuaded

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Michael Polanyi holds that there is a tacit dimension in all knowing (see, e.g., *TD*, p. 60; *M*, p. 61).¹ The metaphor bound up in dimension strikes me as telling. His is fundamentally a tolerant assertion. Although the interplay of the tacit and focal is essential to all knowing, nothing about Polanyi's formulation suggests that one may not legitimately attribute other characteristics, perhaps other dimensions, to continue the metaphor, to acts of knowing.

Some knowing has a rhetorical dimension. To put the proposition differently, rhetorical processes create understanding of a certain sort and thus, at least in many instances, participate in human knowing.

It is my task to unravel a bit the relationship of knowing as Polanyi grasps it, and especially the tacit dimension, and rhetoric. The issues raised relate to the assertion that rhetoric is epistemic.² My attempt will not be to solve these problems, since the controversies are sharp and current enough to suggest that the temper of those involved will not lead quickly to solution. Rather I hope to demonstrate that a tacit dimension in knowing gives a genuine compass to rhetoric and renders attempts to settle the matter pointless. We should be concerned with what ways the controversy can be made productive. My argument is that the role of rhetoric in contemporary democratic societies has both shifted and broadened in important ways.

A tacit dimension resides in all knowing simply because all knowing has a substrate. One can illuminate the substrate, of course; among other ways is the familiar practice of forming explicit statements of assumptions. That practice, however, is ironic. (1) An assumption stated explicitly is different from one unstated. The very meaning of *assumption* suggests that one has an unexamined statement. To make an explicit statement is to examine it at least minimally. To put the matter another way, we cannot illuminate the substrate. And there is a second irony. (2) Usually one forms explicit

versions of statements just so they can be set aside. Setting them aside allows one to pursue the propositions for which they form a basis; or, to put the matter differently, one optimizes from one point of view the working of the tacit. (3) Moreover, even if some assumptions can be explicitly formulated, there must be others that cannot be. That position is assured by the constant recognition that we live and work as individuals in a culture, in a generation, in a profession, in an institution, and so forth, and we come to know as consequences of our affiliations more than we can ever say (see, e.g., *TD*, pp. 60-61).

The tacit dimension is not just another name for *assumption*. It is also bound up in the immediate act of knowing. Polanyi repeatedly illustrates that the use of apparatus in gathering and analyzing data, constantly deposits with the data and the analysis what is bound up in knowing how to use the apparatus. Knowing-how must be tacit if the use is to be skillful. In less-than-skillful use attention must be focused on the apparatus and its use, and the content of the acts shifts consequently. Such acts are those of the initiate or apprentice. "Learning how to know" is a phrase that might be applied to them; it is a clumsy phrase, and in an important way wrong since one must know in order to know (e.g., *PK*, p. 128), but if taken guardedly, the phrase may point both to the existence of a tacit dimension and to the importance of its being tacit.³

I find particularly simple and beautiful Polanyi's illustrations of the way subsidiary awareness and focal awareness work, the use, for example, of the probe in exploring a hidden cavity (see, e.g., *M*, p. 33). The simplest instance provides a profound insight: "Every time we assimilate a tool to our body our identity undergoes some change; our person expands into new modes of being" (*SOM*, p. 31).

The tacit dimension, then takes into account both the human capacity to abstract, illustrated here by our relationships to assumptions, and the concreteness of human experience, illustrated here by the acquiring of tools and skills. Of course these merge. Language, the great instrument of abstraction, is both a tool available in a culture and a skill individually acquired and deployed.⁴

Obviously I cannot in a few words catch all the nuances of Polanyi's concept of the tacit dimension of knowing. For that matter, I could not accomplish such a task in many words since one vital aspect of the expression of his concept is his own style. Take, for example, a passage in which he reflects on the commitment of scientists:

Current theories of scientific inquiry that ignore the mechanism of tacit knowing must ignore and indeed deny such commitments. The tentativeness of the scientist's every step is then taken to show that he is uncommitted. But every step taken in the pursuit of science is definitive, definitive in the vital sense that it definitely disposes of the time, the effort, and the material resources used in taking that step. Such investments add up, with frightening speed, to the whole professional life of the scientist. To think of scientific workers cheerfully trying this and trying that, calmly changing course at each failure, is a caricature of a pursuit that consumes a man's whole person. Any questing surmise necessarily seeks its own confirmation. (*M*, pp. 59-60)

Here one could remark on the repetitions that bind the sentences together and give the whole passage the rhythms that integrate it. One might find some fascination in the allusion of the questor hero. The modern critic

would probably be inclined to pose this question: how does he make his thought clear?

Rather than try to answer the question, I must note one of its terms; for I have introduced the question in order to make a transition. As Hans-Georg Gadamer remarks, "This concept of clarity belongs to the tradition of rhetoric."⁵ As we know, nothing is clear in itself. Anything that is clear, is clear to someone: clear-to-me or clear-to-you. Furthermore, we notice consistently that the experience of finding something clear, especially if that something has been hidden in a hitherto puzzling way, seems to stimulate a desire to share, to enlighten others. "Make it clear," is a demand we hear constantly, from ourselves and from others. Thus, problems of clarity are apt to lead to social interchange in such circumstances that the influencing of one person by another is potential. When influence is actuality, it is always mutual. Since that assertion raises some problems that lead to issues that are tangential at best, let me amend it: influence that is intended is always mutual.

If I seek to influence you, you have influenced me. The concept of *the audience* stands as at least faint testimony for my point.

I have now discussed briefly tacit knowing and have introduced the concept of *rhetoric*. I shall attempt to bring the two together in an effort to show how Polanyi's insight may enable us to illuminate the role of rhetoric in human knowing.

Right now that role badly needs illuminating. I make this assertion for two reasons: although the concept of rhetoric and its development are among the oldest concerns of the intellect in the West, the enterprise just now seems to be in a crisis of transition. Further, our times seem to be ones in which human relationships are especially strained and the means of social cohesion especially vital. The latter concern has found frequent expression in the supposed efficacy of *communication*. As an invocation, for example in such expressions as "barriers to communication" or "communication breakdown," *communication* is seen as a remedy. As a scholarly problem, *communication* is seen as a part of human reality that can be studied in ways analogous to, if not identical with, traditional scientific treatment of reality. In the plural, as *communications*, the concept has been transmitted into a plethora of devices; as such it is often taken as a tangible, and rather overpowering, whole: the communications industry.

In short, part of the crisis of the old concept of rhetoric is quite like that of humanistic enterprises generally in a time when science dictates the dominant epistemology and technology dizzily transforms the physical world. Today the most immediate referents for *rhetoric* are advertising and political campaigning. The Ciceronian formula – to inform, to please, and to move – has been finely honed in pleasing and moving until the word *rhetoric*, generally appearing in conjunction with *mere*, is now used mainly by some practitioners of the art to condemn others, or by persons who consider themselves, deceptively, above rhetorical art, to denounce the entire parcel.

I do not mean to imply that old rhetoric is an innocent victim of science gone awry and naughty technology. That is far from the case. The earliest

formulations of precepts of rhetoric invited a separation of word and deed; further, one of the earliest, and by far the most effective defenses of rhetoric against those who attacked it for its abuses, pictured it as simply an amoral technique (Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1354-b, 21-24). Thus, the value functions of rhetoric were left, as it were, dangling. Rhetoric, if I may personify, has asked for the trouble it is in.

Rhetoric is among those disciplines that must re-approach the problem of meaning in order to found itself afresh. But *meaning*, as an English word, is ambiguous in an important way. As Charles Morris has put it, "In many languages there is a term like the English term 'meaning' which has two poles: that which something signifies and the value or significance of what is signified."⁶ I do not enter Morris' name here because I think we must look at the problem from his angle, but rather to suggest that the scientific study of signs (what some call "semiotics") does continually encounter the stumbling block of value in a reductive procedure, which is fundamentally associationalism, and that one of its foremost practitioners has recognized well that difficulty and made some imaginative and concerted efforts to deal with it.

In their book *Meaning*, Polanyi and Prosch approach what seems to me to be a central problem in a very promising manner. The distinction of indication and symbolization provides a clearer and more consistent basis for further work than the vocabulary of sign, signal, and symbol with the problematic relationships among those terms. In explaining indication and symbolization by way of subsidiary and focal awareness, Polanyi and Prosch involve the value functions of language immediately rather than leaving them as embarrassing appendages. Explained as appendages the general tendency is then to excise them in a sort of prophylaxis or to celebrate them in carefully restricted confines, poetry after hours, perhaps.

One of the major burdens of the book to which I am referring is to give an account of aesthetics that will be satisfactory in terms of the general philosophy Polanyi has built. In building that philosophy, he had to deal with the dominant role of a scientific epistemology, which, as a scientist, he was in an excellent position to do. The result, however, until *Meaning*, was to leave insufficiently challenged the prevailing notion that aesthetics is either a tangential or an altogether mysterious concern.

Rhetoric has always engaged aesthetic values, as the Ciceronian formula indicates. Further, the abuse of those prepotencies gave Plato his entree for stinging criticism of rhetoric. In spite of the continuing popularity of rhetoric, by whatever names it is known in practical affairs throughout western history, the art is still quite inclined to the abuses and open to the criticism.

Currently, rhetorical theorists seem inclined to re-conceptualizing rhetoric as meaning-creating, or, to use Polanyi's expression, meaning-achieving. For that task, a theory of meaning that takes seriously integrating aesthetic values within its structure is especially appropriate.

In what sense is rhetoric meaning-achieving? Starting with the assumption that, whatever else being human means, that humans are persuaded and persuading,⁷ just what being persuaded and persuading means specifically for people is a basic task for rhetoricians and philosophers to disclose.

Polanyi's vocabulary should be useful. "Just what am I doing when I undertake to persuade?" has ordinarily been answered by attending to the details of the obvious, formal elements: a speaker making a message for an audience. The *making* becomes key: what devices are available? Traditionally, rhetoric has meant the tool kit, or, as Samuel Butler put it in the unforgettable couplet, "All the rhetorician's rules / teach him but to name his tools." However, if in each act (each choosing of a tool, e.g.) we begin to take account of the subsidiaries necessary for the act, the very meaning of "tool" begins to shift: we see ourselves differently. To adumbrate, we may glimpse the loyalties out of which flow our notions of the proprieties of our choices and may begin to understand the multiple values of our symbolizing, e.g., of our choosing a vocabulary that signals our belonging to certain groups as well as that may enable others to identify with these groups. That in any act to persuade a skein of loyalties abide may be an obvious assertion. I am suggesting that rhetoric should enable us to go beyond that obvious assertion in specific cases. The concrete creation of loyalties may be taken as a traditional task of rhetoric, but that task seen alone gives an incomplete picture of the potentialities that the rhetorician must struggle to make actual. Understanding what one creates (in the class of examples I have been referring to, understanding the personae, the roles, the institutions, and the bonds of affiliations one necessarily creates in being loyal, that is, in persuading and being persuaded concerning loyalties) is a neglected task of rhetoric.

Could we become aware of loyalties by means other than undertaking to persuade? Obviously the answer is "yes." But, in addition, the willingness to act as an agent is itself reality that may be known.⁸

There is in what has been said here, taking the quite traditional angle of the speaker's devices, a rather fresh dimension for rhetoric: what does it mean to be persuaded? I hope to have suggested that in undertaking to persuade others we act on the basis of ourselves having been persuaded. Now I am trying to suggest a departure from old rhetoric. We can take a different angle, not starting with the speaker at all, but rather starting with the auditor. How do we open, or refuse to open, ourselves to persuasion? What are our sources and resources as persons who have developed loyalties to institutions, roles, and values of our associations?

These questions prompt attempts to understand the patterns of persuasion one is a part of, not simply as initiators with some preconceived projects to influence the decisions of others but as constant interpreters of messages. The very notion of *message* may be transformed from including only discrete pieces of discourse conventionally known as speeches, and the like, to the mosaic a person creates as a more or less distinct interpretation of the persuasive influences of the contest — in short, a focal act.⁹

Throughout its long history, rhetoric has been seen as preeminently the speaker's art. Criticism from a rhetorical point of view has been subsidiary, that is, flowing from an art designed to guide speakers and useful in assessing their efficacy as speakers, a by product being the vitalizing of the art itself. My analysis here, and it is an analysis quite consistent with much that is occurring in late twentieth-century theorizing, is that criticism is

primary.

Much shifts with this point of view. Take, for example, the question of the ethics of communicating. Predominantly the problem has been seen as justly discharging the role of influencing others. Suggesting solutions for that sort of problem may be important, but is also covers what may be more salient questions for the survival of a humane democracy: Do we open ourselves to being persuaded? If so, on what basis? And to what sorts of sources? Listeners may be victimized, and exploiters should be called to account; but listeners active in making meaning in social contexts, i.e., in forming a public rhetoric, are themselves accountable.

The fresh temper of the emphasis on rhetoric as a critical or interpretive act suggests a rigorous pedagogy quite different from the vapid list of rules informed by a commercial mentality that now finds its way into popular teaching: seven tips for effective listening.

As an interpretive art, rhetoric begins with the assumption that persons are persuaded. Put differently, we can say that our specific identities as social and political beings are to be found in our characteristic focal awareness. To name these well we must trace out the subsidiaries integrated into them. In short, Polanyi's language seems highly appropriate to the interpretive task.

I am not arguing that rhetoric is the master key to understanding culture, only that to some degree the binding of subsidiaries in many instances cannot be completely understood without seeing others and ourselves as persuaded and persuading. I used the problem of loyalty as a general illustration because it seems to me to give a class of cases in which the binding force, call it in these instances *affiliation*, is readily seen as rhetorical.

In discussing "Works of Art," Polanyi and Prosch strive to make clear the characteristic of aesthetic experience. They write, "We do not have to recreate A.G. Bell's imaginative vision of the telephone in order to use it, nor do we have to do this in order to know and use Newton's laws. But we do have to achieve an imaginative vision in order to 'use' a work of art, that is, to understand and enjoy it aesthetically" (*M*, p. 85). I find in the essay from which I have quoted, and elsewhere in Polanyi's work (e.g., *PK*, chap. on "Conviviality"), a suggestion of what I have come to call the active audience. Polanyi and Prosch argue that the history of modern art requires a different, I would say a more active, sensibility than that required previously in Western art (see *M*, pp. 93-94).

I believe that we may be witnessing a similar change in the sensibility of theorists and critics to the role of an audience in rhetorical discourse. The question is less that of the second persona, that is, what sort of person would the ideal listener be,¹⁰ than a recognition that the audiences are making ideals of which a particular piece of discourse at hand may be a bit, but functions differently in different audience systems. Struggling to reconceptualize "the public," as Bitzer and McGee have done,¹¹ and seeing the way that embryonic bits may function in the continual interacting of communicating persons and social environment, for example, with fantasy themes or ideographs,¹² could benefit from an explicit consideration of the

terms of Polanyi's tacit dimension. Doing so may help free the rhetorical critic from a domination of a preconceived physical reality being the ultimate standard of judgment in evaluating discourse and yet avoiding the cost of sheerly stubborn and seemingly solipsistic assertion that reality is social.

Those interested in rhetoric have very often tried to distinguish *scientism* from *science*,¹³ arguing that the domination of culture by the former, taking its efficacy from the ethos of the latter, is ironically rhetorical while it contributes to a dominant mode of thought that makes a constructive rhetoric impossible.

Although the work I allude to accomplishes a great deal, an attempt to delineate how one may respond rhetorically, as Polanyi has worked to clarify aesthetic responses, might contribute markedly to the project of founding rhetoric afresh. The term *active audience* suggests an aspect of what it means to be persuaded, but it offers only a glimmer. Polanyi's method of working, as illustrated in the essays on aesthetics in *Meaning*, could illuminate the central vision that a great deal of contemporary writing on rhetoric seems to be struggling to attain.

The common element in the rhetorical and the aesthetic experiences may be imagination. Polanyi examines art and myth in order to open the concept of imagination to a fresh role in achieving human meaning. He understands that his effort flies in the face of what has come to be accepted as common sense, that is, the destruction of participation in rites and ceremonies in the name of authenticity. "It is not that we do not have myths," he writes, "but rather that those reductionistic, scientific myths which we do have tend, because of their nature, to destroy the meaning of all rites and ceremonies" (*M*, p. 119).

Recently, Donald Phillips Verene, in participating in the strong revival of interest in the work of Giambattista Vico, has insisted that Vico's concept of "imaginative universals" found a humanistic rationality badly needed in an intellectual world that more and more is finding itself left bereft of human scale by the evolution of Cartesian thought. Verene concludes that "rhetoric is that activity in which thought is made. It, like imagination, does not occur at the beginning of consciousness but instead remains present as an element in any act of mind."¹⁴

The rhetorical element in thought is vital in understanding *tradition*. Polanyi has written eloquently of the mistake that free societies make in failing to recognize that freedom "*rests upon a traditional framework* of a certain sort . . ." (*M*, p. 184; italics in original). Essays grappling with the phenomenon of individualism gone sour in an extreme reduction of human knowing to scientism begin and end his effort, with Prosch, to revitalize the concept of *meaning*. The sourness to which I refer is totalitarianism in its astoundingly various modern packages.

The power of tradition lies in its tacitness. In spite of all the appeals for or against some named aspect of tradition, it remains an integration of subsidiaries into some focus. As such one may experience tradition as an invidious trap, that is, rationality may seem to demand an openness that will justify action on the basis of what is demonstrably factual.¹⁵ To say that a policy or an action is "traditional" may be easily interpreted as saying that

it has nothing to recommend it and, unless it is so trivial as to be uninteresting, that it should be held suspect, to say the least. Such an attitude encourages us to destroy tradition. Polanyi seems to argue that that impulse is self destructive.

A constructive attitude toward tradition will involve bringing out the subsidiaries from which its integrations issue. The re-focusing necessarily must include learning in what ways and to what degrees one is persuaded and persuading. Traditions are lived, whether one likes particular styles of living or not. Human freedom demands first that one understands the rooting of the self in a particular social milieu and, second, that one accepts the concomitants of that rootedness. One may take these statements as a prescription for historicism, but that term need not carry the pejorative thrust of rigid determinism. Our alignments can be experienced as persuasions. As persuaded beings we can seek out, and indeed do actively seek out, fresh persuasion from which we may re-align ourselves. That seeking is rhetorical. In understanding ourselves as persuaded beings, we may undertake to persuade others; and such undertakings are quite conventionally rhetorical.

The rhetorical implications of tradition are those that make tradition malleable. Traditions do hold us, but we can take hold of our traditions, and in living them, modify them. The instruments and skills for doing so include many that are rhetorical.

What I have been trying to express is deliberately reflective of Polanyi's analysis of conviviality (*PK*, pp. 203-45).¹⁶ In a fine sentence late in *Personal Knowledge* he says, "Such is man's relation to his ideals, he can only know them by freely following them" (*PK*, p. 377).

In his effort to reveal the sense in which all knowledge is personal, Polanyi must explicitly reject the construction given the notion that knowledge, deserving the name, must be public, that is, objective. Although the rejection is thoroughly warranted, it may be time for a reconstruction of the notion of public knowing as intersubjective. Indeed, that reconstruction seems to me well along.

What I am now suggesting is quite consistent with Polanyi's analysis of conviviality. This analysis leads to what he calls "The Logic of Affirmation." That logic cannot proceed, like Descartes', from radical doubt. Rather, Polanyi writes, "I must admit now that I did not start the present reconsideration of my beliefs with a clean slate of unbelief. Far from it. I started as a person intellectually fashioned to a particular idiom, acquired through my affiliation in places where I had grown up, at this particular period of history" (*PK*, p. 252). The crux of Polanyi's argument is carried in a statement he quotes from St. Augustine, "Unless you believe, you shall not understand" (*PK*, p. 266).¹⁷

A rhetorician might usefully see belief as a product of a process whose stages are conviviality, affiliation, and commitment (to use three terms from *Personal Knowledge*). Conviviality is both a natural condition in which human beings find themselves and a force that generates specific affiliation. Affiliations, in turn, generate commitments, for such a statement as "I am affiliated with such-and-such but feel no commitment to nor belief in it" leaves the notion of affiliation a husk. What tests the genuineness of

commitment? I doubt that there is a single answer to that question, but I would hazard that perhaps the most common is the willingness to advocate to others positions based on it.

The act of advocacy is bound up in conviviality in two ways. It is an urge to share; as such, it encourages conviviality to develop along lines advocated. But more primarily, at least if one focuses on knowledge as personal, in advocating one seeks to confirm what one knows – the confirming seal is the assent of others.

The test of genuineness in commitment, then, is a double test: affiliation necessitates acting to persuade others, and conviviality demands that the persuader stand ready to be persuaded, not simply by counter-advocacy but by the disbelief of others.

Throughout this paper, I have tried to stress the utility of Polanyi's concepts for rhetoric. In the last few paragraphs, I have been suggesting that rhetoric is tacit in much of Polanyi's discussion of human freedom.

A fundamental tension in the life of each person is that between the sense of self as private and the sense of self as public. Coming to understanding that tension is a never-ending personal task and one that rhetorical activity makes particularly intense.

ENDNOTES

¹I shall cite books by Polanyi in the text using the abbreviations indicated below:

M *Meaning* (with Harry Prosch). Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1975.

PK *Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy*. 1958. Rpt. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964.

SOM *The Study of Man*. 1959. Rpt. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, Phoenix Paperback, 1963.

TD *The Tacit Dimension*. 1966. Rpt. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1967.

²The issues, and much of the relevant literature, is nicely summed up in Michael Leff, "In Search of Ariadne's Thread: A Review of the Recent Literature on Rhetorical Theory," *Central States Speech Journal*, 29, No. 2 (Summer 1978), 73-91.

³The point is easily illustrated. Learning to play a musical instrument calls for focal awareness of rudiments, but one does not play the instrument until one can move one's fingers, adjust one's lips, and so forth, without awareness of their working so that the attention can be focused elsewhere. But even at the stage of learning rudiments, there are other tacit elements. Eye-hand coordination is sheerly developmental to some degree but is also learned, as demonstrated by the fact that children deprived of certain play opportunities develop basic coordination later than those who are not and, further, if deprived severely seem to reach a lower plateau of development.

Moreover, once one has learned to play the instrument — that is, to read notes "effortlessly" — that level may become tacit so that one sees and plays passages as wholes focusing on blending with other instrumentalists, if one plays in groups. And so integrations succeed one another, chain-like, as it were (*M*, p. 84).

⁴Here we must take care. "Tool" is a metaphor that may draw too heavily from our sense of mechanics, that is, that minor operations with realities are all that are at stake. Clearly a very deep sense of forming ourselves while we are forming our world is tapped in Polanyi's use of the word.

⁵*Truth and Method*, 2nd ed., 1965, eds. Garret Barden and John Cumming (New York: Seabury, 1975), p. 441.

⁶*Signification and Significance: A Study of the Relation of Signs and Values* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1964), p. vii.

⁷Here I am taking a cue from a contemporary philosopher, Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., "The Relevance of Rhetoric to Philosophy and of Philosophy to Rhetoric," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 52, No. 1 (Feb. 1966): "But the modes of human experience that the philosopher examines are necessary modes in that they must exist wherever man exists. For they are definitive of man. To be a man is to be a scientific animal, a political animal, a moral animal,

an animal capable of responding to art. It makes a considerable difference whether we add to this list 'a persuading and persuaded animal' " (p. 43).

⁸The propensity to do the sort of digging suggested has been discussed, and given an intriguing name, by Roderick P. Hart and Don M. Burks, "Rhetorical Sensitivity and Social Interaction," *Speech Monographs*, 39, No. 2 (June 1972), 75-91.

⁹I have borrowed the metaphor *mosaic* from Samuel Becker, "Rhetorical Studies for the Contemporary World," in *The Prospect of Rhetoric*, eds. Lloyd Bitzer and Edwin Black (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), pp. 21-43.

¹⁰My reference here is to Edwin Black's concept and functions as a contrast. This strategy is not to reject Black's valuable insight, but rather to emphasize an adjacent notion. See "The Second Person," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 56, No. 2 (April 1970), 109-119.

¹¹Lloyd Bitzer, "Rhetoric and Public Knowledge," in *Rhetoric, Philosophy, and Literature*, ed. Don M. Burks (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue Univ. Press, 1978), pp. 67-94; and Michael C. McGee, "In Search of 'The People': A Rhetorical Alternative," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 61, No. 3 (Oct. 1975), 235-49.

¹²"Fantasy theme" is Ernest G. Bormann's term, see, e.g., "Fantasy and Rhetorical Vision," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 58, No. 4 (Dec. 1972), 396-407; and see Michael C. McGee, "The Ideograph: A Link Between Rhetoric and Ideology," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 66, No. 1 (Feb. 1980), 1-16.

¹³The works of Kenneth Burke, e.g., abound with examples. A particularly amusing instance is in *Permanence and Change*, "When Scientists and Mystics Meet" (2nd ed., 1954) pp. 220-24; see also the work of Richard M. Weaver collected under the title *Language Is Sermonic*, eds. R.L. Johannesen, R. Strickland, and R.T. Eubanks (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1970).

¹⁴"On Rhetoric and Imagination as Kinds of Knowledge," Mimeograph, 16th World Congress of Philosophy, Dusseldorf, 27 Aug. - 2 Sept. 1978, p. 7.

¹⁵For a case study of the fruit of this impulse, see Robert L. Scott, "A Rhetoric of Facts: Arthur Larson's Stance as a Persuader," *Speech Monographs*, 35, No. 2 (June 1968), 109-21.

¹⁶See Robert W. Norton, "Conviviality: A Rhetorical Dimension," *Central States Speech Journal*, 26, No. 3 (Fall 1975), 164-70.

¹⁷A remarkable parallel, in rhetorical terms, of Polanyi's criticism of critical philosophy and his working out of knowledge as personal, may be seen in Wayne Booth's *Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent* (South Bend, Indiana: Notre Dame Univ. Press, 1974).