THE POLANYI SOCIETY
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THREE POLANYIAN PROGRAMS SCHEDULED FOR AAR

The December 19-22 meetings of the American Academy of Religion in San Francisco at the Hilton Hotel will provide three sessions in which papers dealing with the thought of Michael Polanyi and its implications will be discussed. These programs are as follows:

1. Polanyi Consultation, chaired by Dr. Phil Mullins. The continuing Polanyi Studies Consultation will again have a 3-hour session at the annual meeting of the American Academy of Religion. The time and location of the session are not yet available from the AAR but will be listed in the annual meeting program (published late in the Fall.) Non-members are welcome and may register for the meetings at the San Francisco Hilton Hotel. The theme for the Consultation is "Polanyian Perspectives on Imagination, Story and the Psycho-Social Dimensions of Religion." The following two papers with responses are scheduled for the meeting:
"The Circumscribed Poem of Passion: A Polanyian Description of Religious Meaning" by Dr. Walter Gulick of Eastern Montana College;"Religious Imagination and Theological Reflection" by Dr. Joseph Kroger of St. Michael's College. Abstracts of these papers are printed elsewhere in this edition of the newsletter. Persons who wish to have copies of the papers or who wish to be directly notified about the time and place of the Polanyi Consultation should write to Dr. Phil Mullins, Humanities Department, Missouri Western State College, 4525 Downs Drive, Saint Joseph, MO 64507. The papers will be available early in the Fall and will cost $1 each to cover the cost of duplication and postage.

2. Round Table Session on McCoy's WHEN GODS CHANGE: HOPE FOR THEOLOGY, led by Prof. Ben Reist.
Persons attending the December 19-22 AAR meeting in San Francisco may also be interested in the Round Table session (a 2-hour afternoon session replacing the AAR's much maligned Breakfast Session program unit) led by Prof. Benjamin Reist of San Francisco Theological Seminary and Graduate Theological Union. The session will focus on Charles S. McCoy's When Gods Change: Hope for Theology (Abingdon, 1980). Polanyi's thought is one of the key informants of McCoy's perspective. The time is Dec. 21, 1-3 p.m. in the Imperial Ballroom. An abstract of Reist's discussion starter paper is also printed elsewhere in the newsletter. Copies of the paper will be available at the Information Desk of the meetings.
is limited to the first fourteen persons who register. You may register early by writing to Scholars Press, PO Box 2268, Chico, CA 95927 or take your chance and register in San Francisco.

3. Round Table Session on "Cosmos, Science Fiction and Theology," led by Dr. Richard Gelwick

Though not an exposition of Polanyi's ideas, this discussion works from Polanyi's themes of the common ground of knowing in science and theology and the heuristic nature of commitment in universal intent to show how a new consciousness of science and of religion is appearing through science fiction and popularizations of science such as "Cosmos." Unfortunately, all thirty-two Round Table sessions have been scheduled at the same time, Dec. 21, 1-3 p.m. in the Imperial Ballroom. Only the limitation of each group to 14 participants besides the leader makes this situation tolerable. As mentioned above, copies of a specific Round Table paper will be available at the Information Desk, and space is limited to the first fourteen who register. As a familiar Polanyian at AAR, I (Richard Gelwick) would like to encourage my colleagues to join Prof. Reist until space is not available.

ABSTRACTS OF ABOVE AAR MEETINGS

The Circumscribed Poem of Passion
A Polanyian Description of Religious Meaning
Dr. Walter Gulick

Science and derivative philosophies such as positivism and behaviorism have fostered in our time heated forms of moral inversion or cool forms of narrow self-interest. From either perspective values and traditions have tended to be regarded as conventions or ideologies having no claim to truth. In particular, the plausibility of religious meaning has been eroded away in the eyes of many people.

Michael Polanyi's thought contains powerfully suggestive ontological and epistemological resources for the development of a notion of religious meaning that counters modern scepticism. Essential to his enterprise is an understanding of truth as a term appropriately designating qualities of experience rather than necessarily referring beyond experience according to some criterion of verification. Religious meaning belongs to the great family of meanings contrived through language (what Polanyi calls semantic meaning). In contrast to indications, which point beyond themselves to objects of interest, religious meanings involve us in symbols, myths and rituals which simultaneously reveal that which is of personal significance and ultimate value. We dwell in religious meanings as the consummate experience life offers.

Religious meaning is not something we dispassionately choose; we are carried away by religious meaning because it resonates with our emotional depths even as a poem or other work of art can. Religious meaning integrates seemingly incompatible emotional and intellectual experiences in a symbol or metaphor that orients us with respect to issues of ultimate concern.

Religious Imagination and Theological Reflection
Dr. Joseph Kroger

According to Polanyi all acts of tacit integration involve the creative activity of the imagination. The imaginative act consists in achieving and sustaining a coherence of subsidiary elements of experience which appear incompatible when focally observed
in themselves. Polanyi suggests there is a wide range of integrative acts differing in degree from the relatively effortless and spontaneous to the relatively difficult and creative. He has also made what seems to be a rather significant distinction between two different kinds of integrative acts (the "self-centered" integrations he calls "natural" and the "self-giving" integrations he calls "transnatural"). There may be an inconsistency (perhaps even a contradiction) between this earlier and later account of the structure and dynamics of tacit integration. Whether acts which achieve meaningful integration differ in degree of participation and imaginative effort or differ in kind is a question which has significant implications for an understanding—from a Polanyian perspective—of the relationship between religion (faith) and scientific reflection on religion (theology), as does the further question of the relationship, if any, between these two kinds of tacit knowing.

This issue can be clarified through an investigation of the myth constructing function of religious imagination and the demythologizing function of theological reflection, in as much as the former exemplifies the kind of integrative activity Polanyi calls "self-giving," and the latter exemplifies the kind he calls "self-centered." It is argued that Polanyi's distinction represents not two simultaneous and parallel ways of knowing but two successive moments of any truly human knowledge. The argument is supported by certain contemporary theological efforts (Wilder, Crites, Wiggins, etc.) to recover the role of imagination in theological reflection under the rubric of "story theology". Wilder's plea for a "theopoetic" which does more justice to the symbolic and pre-rational way reality is apprehended recognizes that theology, though primarily a (second order) conceptual enterprise, is grounded in a (first order) basic substratum of imaginative apprehension. Such a theopoetic endeavor represents a truly post-critical theology.

Charles S. McCoy, When Gods Change: Hope for Theology (Abingdon, 1980)

Dr. Benjamin Reist

Throughout his distinguished career at Pacific School of Religion and the Graduate Theological Union, Charles McCoy has been developing his understanding of "federal" or "covenantal theology." His 1980 volume, When Gods Change: Hope for Theology (Abingdon), is the result of this long effort. Here he delineates "the federal paradigm" for theology, cogently demonstrating its critical significance for theological creativity in the midst of the transformations now taking place. Two key vectors shape his basic points—the well-known work of his mentor at Yale, H. Richard Niebuhr, and the trenchant insights of Michael Polanyi, a figure only now beginning to receive the widespread attention he deserves. McCoy's book is the pioneering attempt to develop a comprehensive theological perspective based on Polanyi's "account of knowing." His argument resonates with theologies in process modes of thought. Moreover, it makes significant contributions to the theologies of liberation. The federal paradigm is at home in the pluralistic context within which all serious theological efforts must now unfold. If McCoy is correct there is indeed "hope for theology" for theology in the federal mode presupposes the open future pluralism continually demands and generates.

"Cosmos, Science Fiction and Theology"

Dr. Richard Gelwick

Horace Greeley, sociologist of religion has observed that the Star-Trek motion picture and related literature is functioning as a liturgical or morality play within our society. At the same time Carl Sagan, well-known astronomer, has produced a popular presentation of modern science through the media of an imaginary voyage through the cosmos. Both Greeley and Sagan point to a new consciousness of science and religion that provides an experiential basis for theological reflection today. Science
fiction and the popularization of our scientific advances in the exploration of outer space are moving beyond the traditional wall of separation between science and religion and beginning a new mode of scientific and religious interchange. This new mode is significant because of the way it transcends the historic debates about Biblical literalism and the conflicts of science and religion. The common stock of science fiction and extra-terrestrial science today deals with questions of the plurality of worlds, the origins of life in the universe, the meaning of creation, the significance of eternity, and the status of values. Investigation of these issues shows a possibility of significant theological exploration without the hindrance of the science-religion conflicts. Science fiction and "cosmos" has the advantage of working from the assumptions of post-modern science consequently advancing the level of theological reflection to a world of Einsteinian physics, "DNA" biology, and anti-matter. By moving the context of discussion into the world of advanced science the significance of theological reflection itself is deepened as the doctrine of the trinity and the meaning of life and death are placed within this context. Science and religion become again more complementary partners in the sense advocated by Whitehead and Polanyi, one that encourages their mutual progress.

POLANYI SOCIAL GATHERING

Besides the above meetings of the Consultation and the Round Table sessions, Polanyi scholars will want to meet informally for discussion. An announcement on the AAR bulletin board will name a time and place for this purpose during the meetings there.

THE POLANYI ARCHIVES

A faculty research grant from Stephens College made it possible for me to spend recently four days at the Department of Special Collections, The Joseph Regenstein Library, The University of Chicato investigating the Michael Polanyi papers. Participants in the Polanyi Society will be interested in knowing about the nature of the collection of papers there.

First, the collection is well organized and catalogued by John M. Cash, a historian, who has provided a sixty-five page document GUIDE TO THE PAPERS OF MICHAEL POLANYI. The GUIDE is available at the Special Collections desk. Persons planning to use the papers can write to Mr. Michael Ryan, Chief Archivist, who is well informed on the Polanyi papers, to make arrangements for their visit.

Second, Cash's GUIDE provides a fourteen page biography, an index of selected correspondents such as scientists listed in the WORLD WHO'S WHO IN SCIENCE and key figures in Polanyi's career. The correspondence of Polanyi is arranged chronologically and reveals the extensive intellectual relationships of Polanyi's life. Four sets of correspondence are separated from the general chronology and disclose four major periods of Polanyi's philosophical development. One set is the correspondence with John R. Baker dealing with the organization and activity of the Society for the Freedom of Science. A second set is the correspondence with Joseph H. Oldham, convener of the Moot. This set is especially important for understanding Polanyi's development of PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE out of his concern for freedom and the crisis of the second world war. The third set is the correspondence between Polanyi and Marjorie Grene who appears clearly as the peer and collaborator in the development of Polanyi's philosophy without equal. Polanyi acknowledged this contribution in PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE and elsewhere, and the correspondence vivifies it. The fourth separate set of correspondence is between Polanyi and Prosch and shows Polanyi in his late years struggling to complete his final book vacillating and rejoicing about the
joint authorship of MEANING. Besides these special collections of correspondence there are also ones with Michael Polanyi's brother Karl and his mother Cecile, which will undoubtedly prove valuable in understanding better the larger background and context of his thought.

Third, the collection holds twenty-one boxes of manuscripts, there are a total of forty-six in the whole set, also arranged in chronological order. These sources help to see the revisions and direction of change that Polanyi made in his work.

Finally, the special collection also houses the library of Polanyi as it was in his study at Oxford. It is important to ask to see this collection because it is not included in Cash's guide. A few, but not most, of these books contain marginal notes.

The availability of this material is critical to furthering our understanding of Polanyi's thought. It is fortunate for north Americans that these resources are in Chicago, and that they are so well preserved.

ON PRESS

At the last word from Sam Watson, Jr., the special issue of PRE-TEXT: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF RHETORIC is still underway. The final deadline for submissions was June 15. Meanwhile, Sam writes that the first (double) issue of PRE-TEXT is available and includes a review by Walter B. Weimer that students of Polanyi's thought will not want to miss. A critique of Feyerabend, the review draws heavily, though not uncritically on Polanyi's thought; it will be especially of interest to those concerned with philosophy of science and those who view Polanyi from the perspective of politics and jurisprudence. PRE-TEXT is $6 ($25 sustaining subscription), Victor Vitanza, Department English, Eastern Illinois University, Charleston, Illinois 61920.

Also forthcoming is the ZYGON special issue on Polanyi now scheduled for March of 1982. Besides the papers of the Polanyi consultation at the AAR meeting in Dallas (See PS news letter 1 & 2, Vol. VIII) it will contain an introductory article by Phil Mullins and a concluding article by Bill Scott.

IN PRINT AND NEW CONNECTIONS

Dr. James A. Hall, Clinical Associate Professor of Psychiatry, University of Texas Health Science Center, Dallas, Texas has published a chapter in CLINICAL USES OF DREAMS, JUNGIAN INTERPRETATIONS AND ENACTMENTS (Grune and Stratton: New York and London, 1977) that applies Polanyi to psychiatric and psychoanalytic practice.

Dr. Phil Mullins, our co-ordinator of religious studies, read a paper at the Southwestern Region meeting of the AAR at North Texas State University on "Habits, Human Agency and Social Value." Mullins uses tacit knowing to show how all communities are communities of specialized habit and then shows the importance of appreciating this form of habit as also recognized by C.S. Peirce's pragmatism.

Prof. William E. Rhodes, Metropolitan State College, Denver, Colorado, continues his studies of the futurists with a forty-two page report on "The First Global Conference On The Future Through The 80's" held in Toronto, Canada. Rhodes found wide evidence of paradigm change in the outlook of speakers and particularly in the dominance of holistic themes.

Dr. Elizabeth Wallace, Department of English, Gettysburg College, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, who earned her Ph.D. at the University of Kent at Canterbury in 1974 has joined the Polanyi Society. She used Polanyi's thought in understanding the work of D. H. Lawrence. While her dissertation is not yet published, she welcomes inquiries, and she is reducing its size and preparing it for publication. Her work proposes to put in a better light Lawrence's understanding of the bodily roots of knowing.

Dr. Sam Watson, our co-ordinator of rhetorical studies, has published "Polanyi and the Contexts of Composing" in REINVENTING THE RHETORICAL TRADITION (L & S Books, 1980). His paper "Polanyi's Philosophy of Good Reasons," given at the American Philosophical Association meeting in Chicago in 1977 will be published by Scott Foresman in EXPLORATIONS IN RHETORIC: STUDIES IN HONOR OF EHNINGER.

THE RELEVANCE OF MICHAEL POLANYI'S THOUGHT FOR CHRISTIAN FAITH AND LIFE
A REVIEW BY JOAN O. CREWDSON

(The following review is copied by permission and is from CONVIVIUM, Newsletter No. 12, March, 1981. CONVIVIUM is the British counterpart to the PS newsletter. Joan Crewdson is the general co-ordinator of CONVIVIUM.)

The title of this article is the sub-title of the book, Belief in Science and the Christian Life, edited by Thomas J. Torrance (The Hendrickson Press, 1980, $5.50) and the contributions that make up this book have their origin in a conference held in November 1978 at St. Catherines, Cumberland Lodge, Windsor. This article is an extended review of this volume of conference papers, which I found of quite exceptional interest, particularly in view of the basic difference of conceptual outlook which has given rise in America to a debate between Richard Gelwick and Harry Proesch about how Polanyi should be read with regard to religion.

Again and again throughout these conference addresses comes the reminder that the purpose of Polanyi's epistemological programme was not only to restore the role of faith to all knowing and to free us from the scientific ideal of detachment, but also to renew our ability to believe in the reality of the living God of the Judaeo-Christian heritage. Polanyi's intention shines through the pages of this book to establish the continuity of our knowledge of reality in science, religion and the humanities generally. It is, according to Polanyi, by the powers of imaginative thought seeking the truth about reality that man has progressed in the spheres of both science and religion. It also becomes clear that knowing rightly depends upon acting rightly towards the environment, which in turn, depends upon the quality of indwelling through which the subject identifies with his world.
In the first paper, *The Framework of Belief*, Tom Torrance begins by outlining the way people have understood the relation of faith to reason from biblical and patristic times to the present. After a brief but masterly historical survey he develops the implications of Polanyi's teaching that all knowledge rests on faith and that this knowledge develops under the guidance of an objectively grounded framework of belief. We are reminded that Polanyi regarded beliefs as personal acts, held within the framework of a commitment to reality. Truth is the external or objective pole of belief of which the subjective pole is the knowing person. Although there are significant differences between religious and scientific beliefs, Polanyi's account of the structure of scientific belief is shown to be appropriate for an account of the pattern of Christian belief.

Both arise compulsorily yet freely under the constraint of a reality that will not let us go. Torrance reminds us of Polanyi's stress on the inexhaustible novelty of reality, and since belief in the reality of God is characterised by an infinite capacity for self-disclosure in yet unthought of ways in the future, it follows that the reality of God is something far greater and more profound than the reality of nature or of the universe itself.

Christian faith operates within an interpretative framework created by our encounter with the reality of God in Jesus Christ. It is this encounter which provides Christians with the mode of rationality through which the word of God addresses them.

In the last part of his paper Torrance discusses the relation of implicit and explicit beliefs and how they bear on one another in a circular way within a fiduciary framework. Behind this lies the question of working beliefs and their relation to the ultimate beliefs in which they are grounded. In view of the inexhaustible novelty of reality we have to acknowledge the possibility of alternative formulations for our operative or working beliefs. These normative beliefs need repeated re-examination and have to be tested and reappropriated on the basis of our commitment to the reality which is the source of true beliefs. Ultimate beliefs are grounded upon the unalterable nature of things and are under constant pressure from aspects of reality which seek realization in our own minds.

Torrance ends his paper by considering Polanyi's account of the embodiment and functioning of a self-expanding system of belief within a free society. This, as he points out, has implications for the Christian doctrine of the Church and he makes three points. There is "First, the deep interlocking of faith, worship and understanding under the guidance of the ultimate beliefs imprinted upon the mind of the Church in its commitment to God's self-revelation in Jesus Christ" (p 24). Then, the Church's explicit beliefs are formulated within this interpretative framework of belief, although there is a continual expansion of the Church's understanding of the truth of God as he is in himself "within the framework of the compelling claims of Christ upon us and of our commitment to him." (p 24). Finally, "the interrelation between implicit and explicit belief.....helps us to appreciate genuine theological operations" which "are found to outrun the Church's formalizations at any specific time and to anticipate new and more adequate modes of thought." All this relies finally "upon the profound spirituality both embodied in the Church's trad-
ition and transcending it, a spirituality that is locked through ultimate beliefs into the inner intelligible relations in God himself as Father, Son and Holy Spirit." (p 25)

This highly illuminating paper provides an indispensable basis for the contributions which follow and the book would be worth publishing for Prof. Torrance's contribution alone. But there is just one question which it raises for me, one that could have considerable importance in the broader context of interfaith dialogue. If I have understood Prof. Torrance aright, he is not only saying that the Christian Church's working beliefs are governed by its commitment to God's self-revelation in Jesus Christ but that the Church's ultimate interpretative framework of belief is grounded in Christology, so that only within this interpretative framework can there be any expansion of understanding of the truth of God as he is in himself. Theologically speaking, this means that 'All theology is Christology'.

As a Christian, I am committed to God's self-revelation in Christ and I hope to share with others in this tradition a growing knowledge of the things of God "as through Christ and in the Spirit we are given ever new access into the truth of God". (p 25). But my question is whether the Christian interpretative framework should be given the status of 'ultimate' or whether it functions more as a working belief? The issue is, in what sense can God in Christ be viewed as the ultimate interpretative framework for all men? There can be no doubt that God is the ultimate framework of belief for all mankind and that Jesus, the Lord and Christ of Christian faith, operates as the Christians' interpretative framework, but can the Christ of Christian faith be viewed as the ultimate framework of belief for all humanity in the same sense that we all understand that God provides that framework?

My question in no way casts doubt upon the need to affirm that, in some mysterious way, the Gestalt or pattern of Godhead is trinitarian, that is innerly relational, because God in himself has to be understood as the ultimate 'Form of the Personal', and humanity must, as Karl Barth has said, be understood to be already in God. But can we go so far as to identify the Messiah of God with God in his unique unity? As St. Paul once wrote:

He (God) has put all things in subjection under him (Christ's) feet. But in saying 'all things', it clearly means to exclude God who subordinates them; and when all things are thus subject to him then the Son himself will also be made subordinate to God who made all things subject to him, and thus God will be made all in all.

(1 Corinthians 15:27/28. N.E.B.

I believe a time will come when men of all faiths will enjoy a relationship with the suffering and glorified Messiah (Christ) of God. But I suspect that they may discover this relationship within a modified framework of their own particular tradition and, as such, it will fit into a different conceptual framework than that which controls the thinking of the Christian Church. If this is true it will have major implications for Christian mission, though
It will not affect the universal and unique significance of Jesus for the whole of mankind. It may mean, however, that the Christian Church will have to come to terms with the possibility that the ultimate framework of belief which all men will share will be a theological rather than a Christological one. Prof. Torrance's paper itself suggests that the ultimate framework of religious belief will be expanded and enriched by the clarifying and deepening of men's normative beliefs. As he points out, genuine theological operations are bound to challenge our human modes of thought and outrun our particular formalisations.

If confidence in the Judaeo-Christian tradition is justified, the day will come when the Messiah of God will be given a central interpretative role in the traditions and beliefs of all genuine world faiths, though this will not necessarily be articulated in the traditional Christian way. The issue I have raised is a purely theological one and does not affect the validity of Prof. Torrance's exploration of Polanyi's thought and its relevance for Christian faith and life. Polanyi's own religious faith had a theological breadth which embraced the christological dimension and I myself think that he might have approved the idea that the Christian tradition stands in relation to faith in God as a working belief stands in relation to that ultimate ground which Christians share with Jews and those of other world faiths, who are bound in a common commitment to the Creator and Lord of history.

The second paper by John Puddefoot, entitled, Indwelling: formal and non-formal elements in faith, aims to show that the non-formal experiences and knowledge achieved by the Christian Church collectively provide a reliable ground for the re-interpretation of the Church's formal texts (its Bible and necessary doctrines). Puddefoot locates the authority of the Bible and of Christian doctrines, not in the formal texts but in the shared accrediting of these by the Church, the community of interpretation viewed as a conviviality. (p30)

The problem he explores is that formal texts and doctrines are inadquate as an articulation of our non-formal experience of the living God. Our focal intention as Christians is to communicate the real meaning of our faith. To do this, we indwell the Bible and our credal statements/subsidiaries. In Polanyian language, it is our non-formal perceptions which control our formalisations. The relationship between the Church and its formal documents is one of dual control; the Church imposes constraints upon the range of interpretations allowed, and the Bible and other records of the Church's past lay boundary conditions upon the range of the Church. The uniformisability of the relation between concepts and the Church's articulation of them, (which is a skilful, tacit, personal co-efficient), rules out the possibility of one unique system of interpretation. It is only a thought-world acquired with integrity and a sense of responsibility to the reality of God that can protect and sustain Christian truth convivially as a living 'Way'. In the end, the life of the Church is a life of the disciple dwelling in the person of his Lord. Christianity is commitment to a relationship, not to any set of formal texts or doctrines. It is about dwelling in one whom God resolved all the theological problems of saying many things at once, one in whom men saw a life combining perfectly unity.
of form and inner conviction. I can assure those who attempt to
dwell John Puddefoot's paper that they will be repaid with many
rewarding insights.

The third paper entitled Conversion and Penitence is by
John Barr, who begins by asking what light the work of Polanyi
throws on conversion and develops an answer which shows how important
are his teaching on discovery, tacit knowing and communication for
this subject. The fourth paper by Daniel Hardy has the fascinating
title of Christian Affirmation and the Structure of Personal Life.
Hardy draws attention to the serious gap in modern thought and life
concerning the dynamics of personal life and thought. How many of
us, for example, can conceive what it means to be able to fulfil
the possibilities of full personal existence in God? How does
Polanyi's work help us to make inroads into the vacuum in our under-
standing of the personal? One way in which Hardy tackles this
question is to examine Polanyi's account of the dynamics of knowing
which shows that we discover our own significance through the dis-
cernment of significant form in the other. Reality is perceived
in the relationship between knower and known. I must confess that
I found this paper difficult to follow, perhaps precisely because
of the importance of the subject and because it was breaking new
ground in the area of personal being. I hope that Hardy will
offer us a further opportunity to become more 'at home' in his
thinking on this important matter.

Dr Colin Gunton's impressive paper, The Truth of Christology,
aims to answer the question: What do problems of Christology look
like when seen through the instrumentality of a mind that has
immersed itself in the philosophy of Michael Polanyi? He deals
with this question by examining two critical areas which Christology
has to face, subjectivism and historicism. Since Schleiermacher
transferred from object to subject the primary reference of theo-
logical assertion, Christology has had to contend with a radicalising
of Melanchthon's dictum that 'To know Christ is to know his benefits'.
Of course, says Gunton, this is true, but although faith feels the
rightness of attributing God's name to Christ - by experience, it
is a mistake to confuse a Christology that has existential relevance
with one concerned only with subjective experience. Polanyi offers
good reason to suppose that theories of knowledge on which subject-
ivist Christologies are heavily dependent are false. Just as scientific
knowledge is not objectivist, nor is theology subjectivist in
the modern sense, and the best way of approaching this question is
through indwelling theory. Gunton points out that the theory of
indwelling is the reverse of the theory of tacit knowing. The former
concerns a logical relationship that links life in the body to our
knowledge of things outside and the latter illustrates the irreducibly
personal nature of knowing. Indwelling presupposes a real relation
of mind and body, person and world, concept and reality and the
key to it all is that there is a genuine interaction of mind and
reality. If this is the case, Gunton concludes, there is good reason
to think that it could be the case for Christology. So he claims to
have established the necessary (though not the sufficient) conditions
for believing that theological doctrines about the Person of Christ
may properly be held to be true.
In discussing historicism, Gunton reminds us that Polanyi places the study of history in the panorama of the sciences by means of an extension of the theory of indwelling. If one accepts the view that the distinctiveness of history differs, not in principle but only in degree, from the distinctiveness of nature, - "Every pebble is unique, but... Great men are more profoundly unique than any object in nature." (p 103 quoting from The Study of Man) - then it is possible to consider the meaningful uniqueness of particular events in past history. Since Christology is bound up with a divine history mediated through documents recording both a history and its significance, Gunton finds it helpful to deal with the problem of modern relativism by discussing the thought of Polanyi in conjunction with that of H.G.Gadamer, who shares Polanyi's concern to break with the Enlightenment's view of rationality. Gadamer argues for the objective meaning of a text over against the interpreter, but he lacks Polanyi's understanding of the emergence of linguistic meaning from lower levels of meaning. Having established that tradition has a place in all types of scientific inquiry and that texts from the past can be meaningful to us and to our own time, Gunton concludes his paper with an examination of the Chalcedonian definition in order to find out how a classical christological text comes out of analysis in the light of Polanyi's view of the hierarchical structure of reality. He finds that the text bears "some of the marks of Polanyi's account of how the mind works in making a discovery", but, not surprisingly, he also finds that this unique theological formula "does not fit easily into a Polanyian mould." (p 105). This is because "the logical levels of Chalcedon do not reflect levels of reality related to each other in a hierarchy." (p 106). Needless to say, this paper is a sophisticated and thorough piece of work of a very high standard.

The last paper is on Providence and Prayer by Peter Forster, and aims to see whether Polanyi can help to throw light on our understanding of those problems which arise in a consideration of any possible relationship between the infinite God and a finite world. Forster finds some illumination for providence and prayer by using Polanyi's concept of a stratified ontology and by reminding us that while one can speak of God as occupying the level immediately above man's consciousness and will, he is also present to all levels of our universe transcendentally, holding them in being. This means that when we speak of a transcendent level, we are saying something about the mode of God's presence to his creation. Forster also suggests that when Polanyi speaks of a field or gradient of potential meaning, we can identify this with the living God who is the one who evokes and sustains ever more meaningful organisations of matter, though God is, of course, far more than the fields of meaning present in and to
creation. Forster applies the same kind of argument to Polanyi's analysis of the asymmetry of success and failure in the ascending hierarchy of levels of living beings. Just as with a machine, there are only causes of failure, no reasons, and conversely, there are only reasons for the successful operation of a machine, so when one arrives at the human level of behaviour, man cannot regard God as the Author of evil, but the good he does can be ascribed to the level above him - God.

The risk of distorting Forster's arguments are considerable, so I will say no more about his paper, except that it is a profound and sensitive exploration of a very mysterious subject. Forster does not claim to offer 'answers'. "The mystery remains," he says, "as it is right that it should. My aim has rather been to show how we can dwell more deeply in this mystery and paradox." (p 119). I found most helpful those parts of his address which allowed one to think of God's interaction with this 'personal' universe in terms of the operative principles which govern personal relationships. For example, he links the thought of Polanyi, St. Paul and St. John closely when he points out that the Christian "dwells in" his Lord. (p 123). He concludes that the key to understanding the doctrines of prayer and providence lies in our doctrine of God who is the source and standard of all that is real. "God is richer and more personal than we are in his life as Father, Son and Holy Spirit." (p 130).

Since this is not a technical book but is designed for a wide public untrained in theology or science, the editor has wisely included notes at the end on some forty terms and concepts which could present difficulties for the non-specialist reader. On the flyleaf, this book is described as an exciting contribution to creative thinking which will be widely acclaimed. I very much hope that it will receive such wide acclaim and believe that it should do so.


ALSO FROM CONVIVIUM

Dr. Magda Polanyi has drawn my attention to a book by Patrick Grant entitled Six Modern Authors and Problems of Belief. Macmillan, 1979. £10. It has chapters on Aldous Huxley, Tolkien, Robert Graves and David Jones, but the one of particular interest in on Owen Barfield and Polanyi. The context of the discussion is the crisis for the literary imagination brought about by the rise of science.
A NOTE ON THREE VIEWS
Richard Gelwick - SCIENCE AND REALITY; RELIGION AND GOD: A REPLY TO PROSCH.
Ronald L. Hall - MICHAEL POLANYI ON ART AND RELIGION: SOME CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON MEANING
John V. Apczynski - TRUTH IN RELIGION: A POLANYIAN APPRAISAL OF PANNENBERG'S THEOLOGICAL PROGRAM.

These three papers were read at the Consultation on the Thought of Michael Polanyi at the Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion last November. The Consultation followed up Harry Prosch's controversial interpretation of Polanyi's views on religious truth in its relation to scientific truth. This interpretation was stated in Professor Prosch's review of Professor Gelwick's book The Way of Discovery (in Ethics 89, Jan. 1979) and at the American Academy of Religion discussion of Meaning in 1979 (reported in the Polanyi Society Newsletter, Winter 1980).

As summarised by Gelwick in this paper - "Prosch claimed that while showing the structure of tacit knowing in all of our cognition, Polanyi had made a sharp distinction between science and religion with respect to their bearing on reality. In the case of science, meaning bears upon realities that exist independently of the knower, and consequently is subject to verification. In the case of art, myth and religion, meaning bears upon realities that are sustained only by our continuing creation of them. According to Prosch, Polanyi did not conceive of the realities of religion as existing independently of us in a way continuous with or parallel to the realities of science. The realities of religion are only works of our imagination."

There could be three ways of dealing with Prosch's interpretation, 1) to say it is true, 2) to say it is not true, 3) to say that it is not true of Polanyi whole work, but that in Meaning there are indications that to some extent Polanyi moved to such a position.

Richard Gelwick takes the second line. He defends his own interpretation of Polanyi against Prosch's arguments, and he defends all of what Polanyi says about religion as consistently demonstrating that there is no such sharp distinction between science and religion. He agrees that Polanyi has shown differences between them but not that difference. "Our most universal and compelling knowledge and standards share the same personal foundation as scientific knowledge; the difference in some areas such as art and religion is that we face the demand upon ourselves that these creative integrations make. These are not less true but more challenging."

Polanyi's distinction between the two realms, Gelwick says, is mainly in terms of the degree of personal participation, not in the denial of an external reality to religion. Prosch had quoted the distinction between verification in science and validation in mathematics, religion and art, as evidence for his view, but Gelwick counters with Polanyi's words - "both verification and validation are everywhere an acknowledgment of a commitment; they claim the presence of something real and external to the speaker." (Personal Knowledge, p.202).

Gelwick argues his case thoroughly and in general convincingly, and says that Prosch's view is essentially a positivist one which
would undermine Polanyi's whole aim and meaning. Polanyi's hierarchic structure of reality, his belief in the greater reality of the higher intangible levels, his understanding of the risk and daring involved in all knowing and discovering - all these would be made meaningless by Prosch's interpretation.

Ronald Hall takes the third line. He agrees entirely with Polanyi's main purpose, but thinks that in Meaning he drifted away to some extent from his earlier and most essential insight. This insight was of the oneness of knowledge. "By accrediting the power of the human imagination-to-make-cognitive contact with reality, Polanyi's epistemology seemed naturally to open out towards a new theory of meaning in art and religion, where imagination and creativity and other personal components are admittedly essential, though usually subjectivised and emptied of cognitive content."

Hall uses Kierkegaard's category of the aesthetic, contrasted with the existential, to make his point, saying that the aesthetic can be likened to Polanyi's idea of the 'frame' which isolates the content of a work of art from full everyday reality. The existential on the other hand is the historical field of human action in which we live.

Using these terms, Hall argues that in Meaning Polanyi makes science too existential, religion too aesthetic. In earlier works he had grounded science and art in the same structure of inquiry, arguing that the scientist, like the artist, is passionately and personally involved in creative, imaginative and novel integrations; that art like science makes its claims with universal intent, and that the grounds of both are neither objectivist nor subjectivist but personal. In Meaning, however, Hall senses a certain drift towards the old positivist assumptions about science and art, assumptions that Polanyi so much wanted to defeat. Polanyi's earlier writings, Hall says, had seemed to say that science is closer to the aesthetic than to the existential. In fact Hall would maintain that the 'frame' effect which Polanyi found in art is found also in the abstractness of science, while the scientist although passionately involved in his enterprise like the artist, is yet, like the artist, somehow detached from it, remaining hidden and anonymous. Thus both science and art are aesthetic enterprises.

About the treatment of religion in Meaning, Hall's criticism is the opposite. "Just as Polanyi does not seem to see the extent to which science is aesthetic, so he does not see the extent to which religion is existential". So he tends to turn religion into an abstraction, making it too aesthetic and not doing justice to the historical element, for instance in the Judeo-Christian tradition. "Religious encounter within history" says Hall "is not primarily an aesthetic experience ... has no artificial frame; it really does occur in the everyday experience of human action in concrete. Moreover, religious encounter does not lead to personal disappearance as in science and art; rather history becomes the very space of human and divine appearance in concrete revelation through word and deeds".
I think this is a just criticism of Meaning, and I cannot feel convinced that Gelwick can defend all the statements of Meaning from the charge that in making religion too aesthetic it undermines its reality. For instance, in the account of the rite of Holy Communion (Meaning, p. 152-3) it is said that the ceremonial eating and drinking together can serve as a metaphorical vehicle for men's feeling of oneness, and can then become sacred or religious - "with the addition in time of a myth describing how this ceremony was 'once upon a time' ordained by a god". This leaves out historical fact.

Both Gelwick and Hall are in deep accord with Polanyi's work, but I believe that Hall is right in thinking that in Meaning there is some wavering or dilution of his most vital insights.

John Apczynski's paper deals with the same question - is Prosch right in his interpretation? - but I cannot tell which of the three ways of answering he takes. He seems to say that Prosch is right - (way one) for instance - "There is evidence that what I have just characterised as Prosch's interpretation of the place of religion in Polanyi's thought may have been close to Polanyi's personal beliefs", yet by way of an application of Polanyi's ideas to the work of the theologian Pannenberg (which not knowing Pannenberg I find extremely obscure) he sums up his conclusions thus - "Religious meanings are thus creations of the human mind established responsibly on this tacit foreknowledge. In their primary sense religious symbolisations are accepted for what they are, and they are judged to be valid insofar as all the disparate aspects of our experience can be meaningfully integrated by them. Theological reflection finally was understood to provide a theoretical justification of the primary sense of religious symbols and to affirm their truth insofar as they were able to function as subsidiaries in a tacit inference revealing their primordial ontological ground."

This is an unsatisfying answer, I feel. Earlier in his paper Apczynski says "For Polanyi, then, the highest human achievements are our transcendent ideals, expressed as truth, beauty, justice, responsibility and religious devotion... Since our highest ideals are human achievements... their bearing on reality is not straight-forward." Yet Apczynski has set out to show how Pannenberg was concerned to demonstrate the truth of religion and how Polanyi's ideas could enable him to do it better. The whole argument, though, seems to have become very un-Polanyi-like.

Drusilla Scott March 1981

HOLBROOK'S MISUNDERSTANDING OF POLANYI

David Holbrook shows insufficient respect both for his friends and for his supposed enemies. His critique of The Bullock Report was needed and many of his shafts go home but he is far too ready to shoot with bent arrows. English for Meaning is well worth reading but it contains some serious errors and some of these are at strategically important points. It is not of great consequence that, in building up Michael Polanyi as a great scientist, Holbrook describes his crucial discovery incorrectly - it was about the adsorption of gas molecules not 'absorption'. But there are other over simplifications and errors of greater moment.
Holbrook's attack on Chomsky and on linguistics is indiscriminate. It was unwise of the Bullock team to hitch their wagon so firmly to a linguistic animal. There is a good deal of current criticism - probably justified - of Chomsky's attempt to find a deep and common grammatical pattern underlying all languages. Polanyi's ideas which point to a many-levelled bio-psychological system seem to offer a more hospitable conceptual context for investigating the roots of language. Nevertheless we still have to be grateful to Chomsky for helping to turn the tide against behaviouristic psychology (his famous attack on Skinner), for making known among social scientists the depth and creativeness of language (N.B. Anthony Kenny's recent observation that Chomsky and St. Thomas Aquinas share an understanding of potentia) and for stressing that language, like culture, is both free and, inevitably, constrained. Real freedom, as Charles Taylor reminds us (Hegel and Modern Society), is 'situated freedom'. Polanyi's own qualified approval of Chomsky (Knowing and Being, p. 155-6) is both charitable and penetrating.

When David Holbrook comes to discuss tacit knowledge he shows himself to be distinctly wobbly. He appears to be drawn intuitively to Polanyi's concept but he only vaguely grasps its meaning. Here are some examples. On p. 26 of English for Meaning he tells us that 'the professional edifice of teaching relies on what Polanyi calls "tacit inference" and "personal knowledge" and he goes on to criticise Bullock for implying 'that progress lies with the explicit, with "focal awareness", and abstract concepts of rules ... such as emerge from the treatises of linguistics...'. There are several confusions in this passage but the central one which occurs elsewhere in the book is Holbrook's suggestion that 'focal awareness' has a similar meaning to 'explicit' or to Descartes' clear and distinct ideas. It should hardly be necessary to state that Polanyi's distinction was between a person's existential awareness of a creative, integrative, focussed and passionate task or achievement - dancing a dance, playing a violin - on the one hand and of that subsidiary awareness which comes when the performer stops and thinks about what he is doing. The latter is the analyzing rule-articulating, grammatical self-conscious mode of skilled action. Polanyi stresses that 'Focal and subsidiary awareness are definitely not two degrees of attention but two kinds of attention to the same particulars.' (Knowing and Being, p. 128). And he warns that '... it would be a mistake to identify subsidiary awareness with subconscious or pre-conscious awareness' (p. 194). The subsidiary components of a skilled performance are often hard to specify but they are not, in principle, inaccessible to scientific enquiry for 'the alteration of analysis and integration progressively deepens our insight' (p.122). The value of well-grounded theory and analysis in pedagogy or in improving the technics of an art may be great. (See my Born Curious, p. 5). But this does not alter the fact that when we wholeheartedly practice an art, believe a belief
In a letter to me, with commitment to a sense of emergent meaning. Our analyses and our doubts may still remain part of, subsidiary to, the main tacit thrust, but they will not be present in the primary focus of action.

Educational thought needs Polanyi's ideas. But his books will only yield their meaning to those who approach them both with sympathy and with a sharp probe.

Robin Hodgkin

Introductory Note to: Popper Versus Polanyi by Dr. J. Labia.

In November 1980, Dr. Labia sent me a cutting from New Science of October 1980, headed Popper and Frankfurt with a comment deploring the absence of any reference to Polanyi's contribution in this field, "a contribution which could well bridge the gap between the apparently irreconcilable views of Popper and the Frankfurt school". "What," asked Dr. Labia, "do others in Convivium, more knowledgeable than myself, think about such matters?" Since I know little about Popper and less about the Frankfurt school, I wrote back to Dr. Labia and suggested that he should write something for Convivium, which might provoke further discussion. This seemed the best way of discovering, amongst Convivium's membership, the connotative or conversational or connotatosaurian or conversationalism we were looking for in this area. I print below both Dr. Labia's contribution and the passage from New Science which provoked it. I hope this will lead to further discussion in the October issue of Convivium, since the differences between Polanyi and Popper are well-known but not well understood.

Extract from New Science, October 30th, 1980.

POPPER AND FRANKFURT

In 1961, at the German Sociological Association meeting at Tübingen, a heated argument ensued between the advocates of Karl Popper and those of the Frankfurt school. The argument continues to this day, and is examined by L.J. Hay (Philosophy of the Social Sciences, vol. 9, No. 2, page 149).

Popper's basic criticism of the Frankfurt school was that its propositions were unfalsifiable and that this put them in the category of pseudo-science, or even mysticism. The Frankfurt school reply was that Popper was a narrow positivist who neatly epitomised the dangers of "one-dimensionality." A reading of Hay's article suggests neither position is satisfactory.

Popper's position emerges as being more subtle and delicate - and therefore more vulnerable - than is often supposed. He strongly rejected the "positivist" label. His anti-verificationism was based on the conclusion that science applied interpretative models to the world rather than discovering "facts" through direct observation.

Any faith in scientific method was in the last analysis purely intuitive. Hence the importance of the "open society" where opinions are shared freely, because in the end that is what all science and knowledge are - agreed intuitions and interpretations.

This position is only arrived at, however, because of Popper's reluctance to abandon the positivist assumptions that objective knowledge must be value-free and the result of direct observation of the world. Because knowledge in the real world cannot be shown to be value-free, or the result of direct observation, Popper concludes there is no objective knowledge. However, if one subscribes to a rationalist model of objective knowledge, these positivist assumptions are rejected, enabling rationalists to postulate the existence of objective knowledge without neutral facts or direct empirical observation.
But it is not only that positivist assumptions underlie Popper's abstract model of knowledge. Two key notions, "truth-value" and "falsifiability" are deeply problematic in practice, using Popper's basic premises. If there is no objective truth, how do we know that, for instance, Einstein's paradigm has a better "truth-value" than Newton's? On the same basis, how do we know how to falsify a theory if there are no objective criteria for verifying and testing the criteria we are using to falsify? The answer is: only if verificationist assumptions of the neutrality of facts and the possibility of empirical knowledge return to the picture.

Therefore, there seems a good case that Popper's position is basically positivist and open to the attack of the big guns of rationalism and the new philosophy of science. However, the charge that the Frankfurt school sinks into obscure mysticism is hardly without foundation. In the search for truth which transcends both the empirical and interpretative models, they would seem to be at one with the mystic east.

Truth, they say, can only be apprehended directly through a process of self-emancipation and examination and a rejection of society - that is, a transcendence of self and society. True rationality consists of a grasping of the "identity of opposites" (the Hegelian Vernunft). Anybody with a smattering of mysticism, who has managed to reintegrate with the illusory material world sufficiently long enough to pick up this magazine, will spot the striking parallels with mystical discourse.

In conclusion, Popper's position does seem to be open to all the dangers of technocratic one-dimensionality, but the Frankfurt school's concept of truth seems totally intuitive and still steeped in German romanticism. The way between positivism and intuitionism still eludes us.

End of Extract from New Science.

POPPEL versus KULAYI

Popper's scientific truth consists in the postulation of empirically testable and falsifiable hypotheses.* For Popper, scientific truth is impersonal and detached. It is not overtly "objectivist" in that it does not exclude non-"material" reality (as does logical positivism). However, his "interactionism" - see "The Self and its Brain" by Popper and John C. Eccles, 1977, published by Springer International - leads to the following anomalies, necessarily attendant on his basically dichotomous stance.

His truth has as its touchstone, the material - "World 1" - to which "World 2" (conscious and unconscious states and psychological dispositions) and "World 3" (products of the human mind, e.g. stories, tools, theories, social institutions and works of art) owe, indirectly, their validity - see p.9. Worlds 2 and 3 form part of reality, because of their capacity to interact with World 1 objects. Now the reality of World 1 objects depend upon their being "able to exert a causal effect upon the prima facie real things, i.e. upon material things of an ordinary size". But he says that "these changes in the ordinary material world of things"
can be explained by "the causal effects of entities conjectured to be real". So World 3 (conjectured) realities determine World 1 realities, which are, however, Popper's touchstone for World 3 realities! This is surely question-begging.

Polanyi's approach to scientific (and other) truth seems to be free from such inconsistency. Also, his account tallies better with what is actually observable as taking place in the determination of truth. For him, all truth (enshrining as it does our limited degree of penetration into the ultimate mystery of reality) involves a particular experiential rootedness, whence truth-bearing, "gestaltist", meaning arises. He shows truth/knowledge emerges through personal commitment and heuristic achievement. It subsidiarily involves, and arises from a meaning-generating focussing from, the sensory clues drawn from several modalities and integrated

- For Popper, a single negative experimental instance suffices to falsify established knowledge (which, Polanyi stresses, is neither justified nor what actually happens).

with relevant previous experience and knowledge. Such commitment carries with it a clear obligation on the truth seeker and his colleagues to evaluate the evidence carefully and responsibly in the field concerned and in neighbouring fields of connoisseurship. They must, in Polanyi's terms, have the necessary degree of competence and be acting with universal intent. When they are satisfied, in the light of their own self-set standards, (including an expected coherence and consistency with other already well-established knowledge) the discovery in question can be accredited as true. Polanyi's "Personal Knowledge" requires also that the above obligation should go along with an openness to future, possibly revolutionary, innovations, which import yet deeper coherence to our understanding. His ultimate touchstone for the validity of a discovery is that it is subsequently confirmed in previously unpredictable and unexpected ways.

He also stresses, in the establishment and maintenance of knowledge, the inevitable participatory role of intuitive and tacit factors, complementing conscious ones. This ties up with what Chomsky's research reveals about the acquisition and use of language - that vehicle for, and depository of, truth, par excellence - as well as with the approach of intuitionistic philosophy. These tacitly operating factors make it impossible for knowledge over to be completely specifiable, whether expressed in sentences or mathematical formulae. Furthermore, the degree of active personal contribution (and Polanyi uses "personal" as opposed to merely subjective, i.e. idiosyncratic, arbitrary, haphazard and only privately concerned) whether at conscious and imaginative, or at tacit and intuitive levels, as greatest in those spheres of knowledge of the fullest human concern and highest significance (e.g. arts, humanities and religion).
On the ontological side, Polanyi considers reality as being coherently regulated by principles of successively higher order and significance.

For Popper, reality is more ambiguous and disconnected and certainly not ordered in any creatively directive way, which involves rising levels of significance or phenomena. His reality is rather one of quantitative disparities of differing complexity, which tangentially interrelate in patterns of non-qualitatively hierarchical parallelism.

Summarising, we might say Polanyi’s truth is characterised by an organicity of growth which involves a special type of personal, yet co-operative, and open commitment, i.e. to the outcome of a competently qualified search for the universally valid, the emergent discovery concerned to be subsequently responsibly, judiciously and collaboratively accredited, and eventually to be progressively confirmed in new and unexpected ways – with the accent on the underlying cohesiveness of all knowledge and an ever deepening coherence. However, for Polanyi knowledge inevitably involves a degree of unspecifiability, and of the participation of tacit and intuitive factors in its heuristic discovery. On the other hand, for Popper, truth is essentially physicalist, its constituents being unrelated apart from their common ability to exert materialistic effects. It is impersonal, remote and dissociated from its discoverer. In the scientific sphere, it consists in empirically tested, falsifiable hypotheses, which are pro tanto completely specifiable. In the non-science spheres, his truth shares the dangers of the “objectivism” of logical positivism and its underlying vulnerability to reductionist nihilism and the totalitarian, force-worshipping ideologies associated with such, especially moral nihilism.

Polanyi’s invaluable achievement is surely his bringing home to us the holistic and committed nature of truth/knowledge, and his clarifying thereby how only its constituent disciplines being appropriately disseminated, and balanced and integrated in relevant practical action (i.e. being widely and wisely used) can save us and our institutions from disaster.

Dr. J. Labia

NEXT PS NEWSLETTER

In order to get out the next Polanyi Society Newsletter in the early winter, please send information by the 15th of December. It would be also very helpful to others to avoid abbreviations and give careful attention to the facts of publication. Often the citation of publications is incomplete lacking dates, publisher, and full names of journals.

Richard Gelwick, General Co-ordinator