POTEAT AND PSYCHOANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT

In this essay I will argue that Poteat clears post-critical ground for the discoveries of Freud the “humanist,” the practice of psychoanalysis, and for the legitimacy of Freudian psychological reflections on human development. I maintain that Poteat considered Freud to be a great genius, dimensions of whose work illuminate the human condition in a most profound way. Freud was a fascinating subject for Poteat because he exemplified many of the philosophical commitments of the Enlightenment that Poteat meant to critique. Further, I argue that several contemporary psychoanalytic theorists are allies in Poteat’s battle against the philosophically corrosive effects of Cartesiansim.

Part One: Poteat, Freud and the Freudeans

Sitting in a classroom on the Yale Divinity School campus 57 years ago, I asked Browne Barr, professor of homiletics, “What good are words?” Looking back, it was an impertinent, everybody knows the answer to that, question. Nevertheless, it was a question that troubled me because I had lost faith in the bearing of words on reality. Professor Barr, to his credit, suggested I needed to consult a philosopher.

It turns out that six years later the person I met who had thought deeply about this taken for granted commonsensical question was William Poteat. That meeting was considerably after I had, ironically, plunged into an exploration of counseling psychology based largely on the discoveries of Freud, the founder of “the talking cure,” whose
medium of exchange relies heavily on the power of words to reveal a certain kind of reality.

Regarding Freud, it was Poteat who said,

It is only because ‘believing,’ even ‘neurotic believing’…is a transaction that must occur in the interpersonal universe of speech and personal identity that psychotherapy, by means of talking and a form of acting out, can enable one who ‘owns’ his beliefs to come to ‘own-up-to’ them. It is all of this that makes the Freudian use of ‘cause’ so odd, so revolutionary, and so productive. *It is a cause that can be dissolved with a word* (PP, 227, emphasis mine).¹

When I first read these underlined words, tears of recognition came into my eyes. I felt the emotional power of their impact before I was able to articulate their meaning. What Poteat is referring to in this cryptic statement is that Freud’s use of the word ‘cause’ entails a rejection of the explanation that neurotic beliefs are “caused” by lesions in the central nervous system in favor of a use which refers to neurotically engendered beliefs as capable of being dissolved through first-person dialogue between patient and therapist, an interpersonal dialogue in which actions and reasons have cash value.

However, as soon as Poteat says these words about the healing power of words he points out that “…as valuable as words may be, the shape of the world in which we live is not given only, perhaps not even primarily, in concepts” (PP, 323). Characteristically he says the “shape” of our world “…is lived in and through our bodies, our choices as they are manifested in our actions, our movements routines, rituals, shapes, colors, sounds, joy, depression, anxiety, etc. Our way of feeling in the world, the rhythms of our being at home here have some kind of order and therefore may be thought of as having a kind of syntax” (PP, 328, italics his). Here Poteat footnotes Eric Fromm, a Freudian psychoanalyst whose *The Forgotten Language* speaks “unhesitatingly” (Poteat’s word) of the nonconceptual ordering of our world after the analogy of language. Poteat goes on to say, “These structures cause each of us to take hold of our world in one way rather than another” (PP, 323). This idea of taking hold of our world in one way or another is very important to Poteat. We will return to it later.

Continuing to emphasize the nonconceptual dimensions of being human, Poteat asserts that “Each man’s own existence is essentially the enactment of a drama having for its stage both the conceptual and the nonconceptual. If it were not so, deep personal disorientations of the sort with which psychoanalysis has to deal could quite simply be cured by bracing verbal clarification, an attempted translation of the symbolic into the verbal.” Poteat says, “There is a very strong hint of this in Freud’s theory (in contradistinction to his practice, of which he was a bad observer)” (PP, 323).
If “bracing verbal clarification” is not enough to overcome “deep personal disorientations,” then what more is required in the psychoanalytic process? Poteat hints at this when he says that psychoanalysis operates not only by talking but by a “form of acting out” (PP, 227). The reference is to the fact that the patient will “act out” in his/her relationship with the therapist, patterns of his/her disorientation, opening the process to the nonconceptual or feeling level in which tone, rhythm, mood, posture, gesture, facial expression, anxiety, fear, depression and all the tacit features of human interaction are present. Analysts call this process the “transference.”

Erik Erikson says, “Freud, after observing some patients who in hypnosis suggested that he stop interrupting them with his authoritative suggestions, and that when he did they unearthed memories and affects he would never have suspected, he came to realize that if he treated them like whole people, they would learn to realize the wholeness which was theirs. He now offered them a conscious and direct partnership: he made the patient’s healthy, if submerged, part his partner in understanding the unhealthy part” (EER, 146ff, italics mine).

Poteat puts it this way: “There is a sense in which we may say that the neurotic is a creature of a world of his own ‘imagination’ to which he then becomes subject—incarcerated as a prisoner. The job of the therapist is, as an outsider, to invade that world and to enhance his patient’s wish to be free. The invasion is a kind of incarnation for the therapist enters the neurotic’s world from the outside and remains, while in it, an outsider, lest he, like his patient, becomes the subject of that world, powerless against it” (PP, 283, italics mine). Poteat expands this analogy saying that we are “prisoners of the picture each of us has of what the world is like.” We are “defensive” and “anxious” before any invasion of it. “We can be set free only when that picture is ravished by reality or by God” (ibid).

How could Poteat use Freudian concepts in good faith when so many of Freud’s ideas have been rejected as mechanistic, reductionist, etc.? The answer to this question for Poteat lies in the inherent difficulty which Freud had in his attempts to explain how neurotic beliefs could be caused by lesions in the central nervous system. Failing to find a satisfactory “cause” for “neurotic beliefs” in physiological terms, Freud found an alternative “cause” which turns out not to be, as Poteat was wont to say, “on logical all fours” with “cause” as understood in physiology. Based on self-observation and recurring evidence from his patients’ memories of sexual affects and fantasies and the transfer of an early father image onto later individuals, it is Freud the humanist who remembers Sophocles’ drama of the Greek tragic hero, Oedipus, and uses its heuristic potential to illuminate the neuroses of his patients. Freud chooses what for Poteat is one of the signal achievements of ancient Greek drama: the elevation of the human being to a position where he is seen performing an act of freedom from the world of necessity by playing “let’s pretend,” thereby intimating some sense of the pronoun first person singular, some sense of what it means to be a “person” (PP, 57).
Contrary to critical philosophizing, says Poteat, the Oedipus complex, shows us, that “mind is not just consciousness, but, as Augustine said, ‘man is a great deep.’ And the Oedipus myth reminds us that we are not only mysteries to ourselves but also we repress and rationalize painful anxiety producing truths about ourselves” (PP, 282f).

According to Poteat, with the Oedipus story as his model, Freud’s concepts like Oedipus complex, repression, infant sexuality, the “unconscious,” and “cause” were “in the same logical environment with persons, action, reasons, belief, assents, ‘owning-up-to,’ etc., albeit in an unusual but legitimate way” (PP, 225).

In a typically elegant way, Poteat affirms the stance of Freud the analyst when he says that,

even in the case of neurotically engendered belief there is an ‘ownership’ of the words and the acts. The person holding them is responsible or at least proto-responsible, for them: actually responsible in one way: potentially in another. He is taken by Freud the analyst as proleptically responsible. No account of neurotically engendered beliefs which lacks this built-in logical tension and complexity is Freudian. And I will say, neither is it really believable (PP, 226f, italics his).

With this linguistic analysis Poteat has preserved the post-critical legitimacy of psychoanalytic discourse in so far as it attends to its healing task and to a non-reductive understanding of human development.

Pursuing the dimension of human development, Poteat says, “The child who knows what it is to be securely and lovingly held, lives, moves and deploys his body, and expresses himself in action in a very different world from one who has never known this” (PP, 324, italics his).

Although he gives no specific reference for this assertion, elsewhere in a note Poteat makes reference to the illuminating work of Freudian psychoanalyst Erik Erikson (PP, 48). Erikson’s Pulitzer Prize winning book, Childhood and Society, elaborates and extends the insights of Freud the “doctor” as Erikson calls him, for understanding human development from childhood forward in its individual, social, and cultural manifestations. Poteat says of Erikson that his “psychological reflections” upon our ways of being in the world are of great import, that they are “cognate” findings of Polanyi’s tacit/explicit, proximate/distal poles being “primitively given” (PP, 48f).

The operative words here for our purposes are “primitively given” as in archaic, as in the natal matrix and infancy, the primitive linguistic substratum, the time in which the infant, for better or worse, is experiencing what it feels like to be alive in the world, to live in the world, to be in the world in one way rather than another. This is what Poteat calls the pre-reflective, pre-linguistic Eden out of which, for Erikson, and
Poteat also, human beings have an enduring sense of “paradise forfeited” (CS, 250). In Polanyian terms, for Erikson it is the primitive proximate of the “proximate-distal” poles, the tacit memory of which causes us to take hold of the world psychologically in one explicit way rather than another.

For both Poteat and Erikson the primal ground, the bodily beginning, the progenitor of human being is the natal matrix and infancy. The implications of this point for infant language acquisition are spelled out in some detail by Poteat, where he cites a number of empirical studies of language learning among human infants as confirmation of his own findings (PM, 94-197).

Erikson rejects the narrow positivist approach to psychology and the separation of psychology from biology and from the social sciences, preferring instead to study the “process” of “human life” (CS, 36). This approach bears great similarity to Poteat’s view when he speaks of the “inherent interest for us of psyche, socius and polis as the arena of human action” as “manifestations of our human, personal context” from which we “mindbodily demand” a larger meaning (PM, 249). It is a human meaning which Erikson gives in an incredibly persuasive way in his elaboration of the “Eight Ages of Man.” Working developmentally, Erikson presents eight contrasting pairs of ways of being in the world which are primitively given. They spring from the primitive, archaic, tacitly given natal matrix and infancy to articulate ways of being in the world, and Erikson ties each age to this primitive given. The eight stages, spanning the life time of the individual and incorporating the social and cultural implications and consequences of each age are as follows: Basic Trust vs. Basic Mistrust, Autonomy vs. Shame and Doubt, Initiative vs. Guilt, Industry vs. Inferiority, Identity vs. Role Confusion, Intimacy vs. Isolation, Generativity vs. Stagnation, and Ego Integrity vs. Despair.

I will give just one of many examples in which Erikson relates the parent/child nexus to its communal/institutional manifestation. Discussing the Age of Basic Trust vs. Basic Mistrust, Erikson says, “The parental faith which supports the trust emerging in the newborn, has throughout history sought its institutional safeguard (and on occasion its greatest enemy) in organized religion. Trust born of care is, in fact, the touchstone of the actuality of a given religion” (CS, 250). In a footnote to this section Erikson is careful to point out that he is referring only to the communal and psychosocial side of religion and not, for example, it’s spiritual aspect. He is not a Freudian reductionist!

Poteat was very critical of the Freudianism of some of Freud’s followers whose rigid views he characterized in his last book as various expressions of critical absolutism: including “abstraction,” which is identifying thought as such with its embodiment in language; “ecumenism,” which is certainly seeing an object as a finite totality; and “ontological monism,” which decontextualizes its object (RG, 155ff). Although Poteat does not criticize Freud himself for such rigidity, he (Poteat) recounts a beautiful story
of family tragedy and triumph in which he points out that Freudian categories, as important as they may be for psychotherapy, cannot encompass the full meaning of the richly complex lives and histories of persons (RG, 154). Poteat affords a very important illustration of this point with regard to the psychoanalyst himself in a discussion of the relationship between Freud's theory and his practice when he says that between Freud's theory and Freud's practice there is a tacitly supplied tertium quid: the practitioner himself with all his complex life and personal history, most of which he, in this case Freud, is only tacitly aware, i.e., subsidiarily, but which has some bearing on his interchange with patients, a dialogue which explicitly stated theory does not and cannot exhaustively explain (PD, 38-40, 53ff.).

Poteat's most pointed critique of Freud is as follows: "Even so great a genius as Freud, the contemporary articulator of the profound importance of the no conceptual world and what we have rather simplistically called the irrational, betrays the power of rationalism over his own imagination by repeatedly implying that the norm for human existence is the power which man has to conceive, that the rational or conceptual grasp of the etiology of one's past is that by which man becomes human rather than the far richer notion that man becomes human through the capacity for assuming responsibility, for taking his past upon himself, for speaking in his own name, for saying 'I'" (PP, 324, italics his).

The very important corollary of the assumption of responsibility for oneself is that in the wider verbal culture it is the antecedent "non-conceptual openness and responsibility of persons to one another" (PP, 326) that is the common ground of their relationship, a relationship which must be acted out. This is also the ground of genuine psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. Concluding Part One, I quote a few lines from WH Auden's poem, "In Memory of Sigmund Freud," written on the occasion of Freud's death in 1939 (Poteat liked and sometimes quoted this poem): 2

He wasn't clever at all: he merely told the unhappy
Present to recite the Past like a poetry lesson till sooner
or later it faltered at the line where
long ago the accusations had begun,
and suddenly knew by whom
it had been judged, how rich life had been and how silly,
and was life forgiven and more humble,
able to approach the Future as a friend
without a wardrobe of excuses,
without a set mask of rectitude
or an embarrassing over-familiar gesture.
Part Two: Poteat’s “Philosophical” Therapy

Considering the influence of Freud and psychoanalysis on Poteat’s thought, two questions come to mind. First, does Poteat’s notion of the insanity of modernism agree with a psychotherapeutic/psychoanalytic notion of insanity? Insanity is a word almost never used in contemporary psychoanalysis/psychotherapy. “Mentally ill” is the more often used term. My understanding of mental illness includes suffering from highly problematic emotions and/or behavior which affect one’s way(s) of being in the world, usually accompanied by an underlying sense of anxiety which manifests itself in a wide variety of guises including depression, feelings of isolation and hopelessness, which, if severe enough, can lead to suicide and/or murder.

Poteat’s contention is that modernism, philosophically speaking, is “mad” or “insane” because it is profoundly unsettled and disordered, having lost the sense of form and order in the cosmos. With regard to knowing and being, modernism has lost the primacy of the personal, surrendering it to the impersonal. These losses have gone unnoticed. In *A Philosophical Daybook*, Poteat puts it in psychoanalytic terms: “It [Cartesianism] functions at a tacit level like a repetition compulsion; it is ubiquitous and pervades the atmosphere of our life like a chronic depression” (*PD*, 5). As a result, modernism harbors a pervasive sense of unease which Auden characterized as “The Age of Anxiety.” The madness of modernism leads to personal hopelessness and despair. (Note: a “repetition compulsion” is a psychoanalytic term which refers to the compulsion to repeat negative patterns of behavior even though they continue to be counterproductive.)

A second question concerns how Poteat’s “philosophical therapy” for his students/readers/interlocutors corresponds to actual psychotherapy. The analogy holds in general yet important ways. Both “therapies” are devoted to curing/healing, to self-knowledge. Both rely on trust, mutual respect, ongoing dialogue and the uncovering of “hidden” assumptions which affect ways of being in the world. Both rely heavily on the provision of a “safe” place to explore ideas/feelings without fear that one will be shamed for mistakes or misspoken words. In my experience Poteat was a master in creating such an atmosphere in his classroom. “Mistakes” were prized opportunities for learning!

In both “therapies” a “good outcome” is the assumption of responsibility for one’s previously hidden beliefs and actions and the ability and desire to deal with new experience in light of insights, skills and self-confidence one has developed in “therapy.” Both therapies give rise to hope in situations of despair. Of course they differ with regard to matters related to the reasons for seeking help, number of clients/students engaged at a time, frequency of meeting, dream work, analysis of transferences, etc.
Part Three: Poteat’s Psychoanalytic Allies

Some of Poteat’s staunchest allies in “recovering the ground” lost to the Cartesian mind/body split and consequent idealist/materialist reductionisms are to be found in the ranks of contemporary psychoanalysts and psychotherapists. They are explorers of the “philosophical/psychological” primal ground which Poteat sought to recover. Their concerns in many ways are his. I believe Poteat sensed accurately the heuristic potential that the Freudian enterprise, especially as elucidated by Erik Erikson, held not only for confirmation of his (Poteat’s) own findings but for the extension and elaboration of those findings.

Let’s look at some examples: First with regard to Cartesianism, in a remarkable work titled *Worlds of Experience* (published 2002) three prominent analysts (Robert D. Stolorow, George E. Atwood and Donna M. Orange) launch a frontal assault on Cartesian influences on psychoanalytic theory with these words: “Our aim is twofold: first to expose and deconstruct the assumptions, largely a legacy of Descartes’ philosophy, that have undergirded traditional and much contemporary psychoanalytic thinking; and second, to lay the foundations for a post-Cartesian psychoanalytic psychology grounded in an intersubjective contextualism” (*op. cit.*, vii).

In this work, Stolorow *et al.* mount a thoroughgoing, devastating critique of Cartesian “isolated mind” thinking beginning with Freud and extending through contemporary psychoanalytic theory. Drawing on philosophical resources found in Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Wittgenstein, William James, C.S. Peirce and H.G. Gadamer they fashion a post-critical philosophical stance not unlike that of Poteat and Polanyi which they call “perspectival realism,” seeing truth as gradually emergent in dialogic community.

Donna M. Orange in *Emotional Understanding*, relies heavily on Polanyi’s concept of “tacit knowledge” for the foundation of her understanding of “emotional memory” which refers to the critical importance of the affective component of knowing which is sensorimotor and affective, present in infancy prior to language, and continues throughout life not as the precursor of representational or symbolic cognition but as “the core of our knowing” (*Ibid.* 8, 116).

The very title of a book of essays written by a group of eight prominent Canadian and American psychoanalysts, *The Embodied Subject, Minding the Body in Psychoanalysis* (hereinafter referred to as *ES*) should pique the interest of Poteat scholars. The title of this work was the theme of a yearlong seminar sponsored by the Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities of the Washington School of Psychiatry.

On the first page of the introduction, one of the editors, John P. Muller, says, “My basic premise is that only a speaking being can be embodied, in contrast to views of embodiment in which mind is ‘in’ a brain or a brain is in a body, as if embodiment is equivalent to physical containment” (*ES*, vii). And that’s just for openers!
One of the contributors, Roger Frie, who is co-editor of the *International Journal of Psychoanalytic Self Psychology*, in an essay titled, “The Lived Body: From Freud to Merleau-Ponty and Contemporary Psychoanalysis,” begins his essay as follows: “I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the ‘lived body’ has come closer than most to collapsing the Cartesian duality of mind and body. His philosophy of the lived body demonstrates the way in which understanding, awareness, and communication are all fundamentally embodied. For this reason, I suggest that his ideas are particularly relevant for helping psychoanalysts close the gap between intellect and soma” (*ES*, 55).

In another outstanding essay in this same volume titled, “That Subtle Knot,” Richard Simpson, a student of French psychoanalysis, addresses the subject of language and the body. Simpson begins by quoting part of John Donne’s poem “The Ecstasy,” the first lines of which are as follows:

- As our blood labors to beget
- Spirits, as like souls as it can;
- Because such fingers need to knit
- That subtle knot, which makes us man (*ES*, 17).

By way of a critique of what he calls “one dimensional” cognitive linguistics, Simpson maintains that in John Donne’s poem “what was born in the inarticulate language of the soul is transferred into a higher order of nature by means of the body. And, so the body is the location of a bearing across or transfer to a higher order, a meta-pherein, a literal metaphor” (*ES*, 26). Poteat would find this fascinating.

The work of British psychoanalyst D. W. Winnicott is particularly instructive for its heuristic value when contemplating what I have termed Poteat’s philosophical “primal ground.” The heuristic potential is enhanced by the fact that, in this instance, Winnicott’s ideas are advanced in a philosophically astute “Afterword” of a work that is considered to be the best criticism ever written of Robert Frost’s poetry, Richard Poirer’s *Robert Frost: The Work of Knowing*. In what follows, I have relied heavily on Poirer’s exposition of Winnicott’s ideas because he extends the implications of these ideas in such a persuasive way.

In Winnicott’s experience with infants and mothers he became aware of what he termed “transitional objects,” which refer more to “transitional states” than objects. He noticed that the child has an enormous subjective and creative investment in these transitions. The essential transitions are these: the infant initially has a sense of being merged with its mother; it then attaches itself to an external object, usually the breast, which is felt by the infant to be a part of itself; it then moves from this to an object even more external: anything soft fondle-able like a doll, a piece of blanket, a toy which is endowed with some associations attached to the breast. At all stages, including the last, the infant, though in transition from internal to external objects, may and should
be given a sense of omnipotence and of magical control of those objects. A sensitive mother who anticipates her infants’ needs and quickly responds to signs of tension gives the infant the healthy illusion of omnipotent (magical) control over the mother’s responses and a consequent sense of agency. By “magical control” Winnicott means the creative interpretation of experience. Paradoxically, the infant, who feels omnipotent, confirmed in its illusion that it creates and controls the object of its desire, has by means of this illusion the best chance to find its way to a more realistic kind of contact with the increasing number of things which call for its attention as it grows and develops. Conversely, the child who is denied a sense of creation and control grows up with a very limited self-confidence, creativity, and agency.

In these “transitional states” the infant enters what Winnicott calls an “intermediate area of experience, unchallenged in respect of its belonging to inner or external (shared) reality, constitutes the greater part of the infant’s experience, and throughout life is retained in the intense experiencing that belongs to the arts and religion and to imaginative living, and to creative scientific work” (1989, 319ff.). In his “Afterword,” Poirier relates Winnicott’s findings to William James views expressed in “La Notion de Conscience,” one of James’ Essays in Radical Empiricism in which James says that “certain experiences can lead some to others by means of distinctly characterized intermediary experiences, in such a fashion that some play the role of known things, the others that of knowing subjects. The attributes ‘subject,’ and ‘object,’ ‘represented’ and ‘representative,’ ‘thing’ and ‘thought’ mean, then, a practical distinction of the utmost importance, but a distinction which is of a FUNCTIONAL order only, and not at all ontological as understood by classical dualism … Finally, things and thought are made of one and the same stuff, which as such cannot be defined but only experienced” (Poirier 1990, 320, italics mine).

Commenting on James’ and Winnicott’s views Poirier says, “Think for a moment what happens to ‘things,’ to ‘objects,’ in James’ ‘intermediary experiences’ or in Winnicott’s ‘intermediate area of experience.’ It is an area ‘unchallenged’… in respect of its belonging to inner or to external (shared) reality. It is precisely in this area, first created by the infant, that the adult creation also takes place” (Poirier 1990, 320ff., italics mine).

An example of the kind of adult “creation,” about which Winnicott and James speak, comes immediately to mind: Listen to Jonas Salk, inventor of the polio vaccine, describe his understanding of the process of discovery: “I do not remember exactly at what point I began to apply this way of examining my experience, but very early in life I would imagine myself in the position of the object in which I was interested. Later, when I became a scientist, I would picture myself as a virus, or as a cancer cell, for example, and try to sense what it would be like to be either. I would imagine myself as the immune system, and try to reconstruct what I would do as an immune system
engaged in combatting a virus or cancer cell. Before long, this internal dialogue became second nature to me; I found that my mind worked this way all the time.”

To sum up, what we have in Winnicott’s “transitional objects” is psychoanalytic confirmation of what I have described as Poteat’s “primal ground:” a mother “mind-ing” her child rocking to the rhythms of her body’s beating heart, the in and out of her breathing, intoning the child with her voice and the texture of her touch. This is the primal place where divisions of subject and object, intelligence and emotion, body and mind do not obtain. This is the primal source of metaphor, words spoken and unspoken. Out of this place, this Eden, the child playing “king of the world” later emerges as the adult who ‘becomes’ a virus and saves the world from polio!

So also for William Poteat: at dusk on an October evening in Athens, torn apart, dis-membered by the sight of a lusty, powerful, inspired statue of a bronze horse. Through that dancing figure he re-members himself as a brother to Vangelis (the sculptor) and heir of Orpheus who bids him sing, before and beyond his literacy, the music and lyrics of the Polanyian Meditations (PM, 2-10).

For myself, the question I once posed, “What good are words?” has begun to be answered. Words, especially metaphors, spoken and unspoken, call my world(s) into being. As my senses bring me to them, words bring me to my senses. For understanding this gift I am deeply indebted to William H. Poteat, my teacher and my philosophical therapist! In gratitude I leave you with this poem from another Orphic voice, that of Elizabeth Sewell:

Ideas

The coming of new forms
Is priestly and war-like: doubled they campaign,
Ringing, besiege the head with holy storms,
Till shouts and trumpets crack
The glassy air; fortifications spill,
And we lie open, to fury and to sack,

And then to all the expanses of the plain,
The World’s wide landscape suddenly appears,
And nine huge stars waiting above the hill
Will march through walls of clay-dust to the brain
And camp there, silent, leaning on their spears (Sewell 1971, 419).

ENDNOTES

1Abbreviations used in the text as follows: PP refers to Nickell and Stines Primacy of Persons. PM refers to Poteat’s Polanyian Meditations. RG refers to Poteat’s Recovering the Ground. PD refers to
Poteat’s *Philosophical Daybook*. CS refers to Erik Erikson’s *Childhood and Society*. EER refers to The *Erik Erikson Reader*.


3For a beautifully written insightful presentation of Poteat as teacher, which focuses on the “how of being both an intellectual and oneself, a whole person,” see Dale Cannon’s article “Haven’t You Noticed That Modernity’s Bankrupt? Ruminations on the Teaching Career of William H. Poteat,” *Tradition & Discovery* 21:1, 20-32.

4This quotation is cited in Clark Moustakas (1980, 15ff). This work by a co-founder of the humanistic psychology movement is devoted to first-person epistemology based explicitly on the insights of Michael Polanyi. See my review in *Tradition & Discovery* 38:3, 71-74.

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