Comments on Polanyi’s “Visual Presentation of Social Matters”

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ABSTRACT

In this brief essay, I discuss some interesting elements of Michael Polanyi’s provocative 1936 lecture outlining the potential of diagramatic film to transform social thinking about the economic order. A few years later, Polanyi more carefully and convincingly returns to some themes identified here, as he articulates his criticisms of and reconstruction of liberalism.

Introduction

Thanks are due to Eduardo Beira for discovering in the Papers of Michael Polanyi the unknown 1936 lecture “Visual Presentation of Social Matters,” delivered only three years after Polanyi came to Manchester. He has written a superb introduction in this TAD issue which analyzes this lecture and links it to a variety of other early Polanyi materials. Beira, some readers will remember, came to the 2012 Polanyi Society Loyola Conference to show and talk about Polanyi’s 1940 film Unemployment and Money, The Principles Involved, which he had recently digitized. There was an illuminating conversation about the film involving Beira, Mary Jo Nye, and Marty Moleski, S.J. The film is now accessible on YouTube through a link on the Polanyi Society website. The same link also provides access to an array of other material that is concerned with Polanyi’s economics education film and, more generally, Polanyi’s thinking about economics, some written by Polanyi and some Beira’s commentary.

I suspect that I speak for many who have taken a serious interest in Polanyi’s later philosophical thought in saying that Polanyi’s ideas about economics and particularly his film have been for me a puzzle. I knew there was a book, Full Employment and Free Trade (1945), and the statistical study of the early Soviet economy published first in 1935, again in 1936, and incorporated as a chapter in The Contempt of Freedom (1940, hereafter cited as CF). I had studied some of this material and was also familiar with Polanyi’s other comments on economic matters in The Contempt of Freedom and with Polanyi’s important 1941 essay “The Growth of Thought in Society” (hereafter cited as “Growth”) which discusses the economy as a “dynamic order,” an analog of the “dynamic order” of science (“Growth” 1941, 435-445). I knew that ideas about economics and social policy are at the heart of the discussions in Part II of The Logic of Liberty (1951, hereafter cited as LL). Nevertheless, I acknowledge that I have found it difficult to integrate what I knew about Polanyi’s ideas about economics with later matters I considered more straightforwardly philosophical: the “fiduciary program” and Polanyi’s “post-critical” perspective, his “theory of tacit knowing,” and his analysis of the problems of meaning in late modernity.

Eduardo Beira’s work on Polanyi’s economics education film has re-opened the study of Polanyi’s ideas about economics. Others, of course, have earlier done work on this topic. But I think Beira’s investigation of the background of Polanyi’s 1940 film significantly illumines ways in which Polanyi’s concern with economics led to the making of his film. His investigation suggests, more generally, how ideas about economics are linked to Polanyi’s effort to reconstitute political liberalism. Polanyi’s reformed economic liberalism is a central component of his reformed liberal political philosophy. And this liberal political philosophy, hammered out in the thirties and forties, led Polanyi to an even broader philosophical inquiry.
in the late forties as Polanyi began to prepare his Gifford lectures. He recognized that the Enlightenment support structure of liberal political philosophy had to be extensively recast in the mid-twentieth century. Polanyi’s economic ideas are thus not a strange “fifth wheel” produced by a polymath, but are a stage on the way to Polanyi’s later mature philosophy of science, his epistemology, and his Lebensphilosophie.

“Visual Presentation of Social Matters” is a provocative early Polanyi reflection, one that is tightly organized. Polanyi makes very bold claims, which perhaps were designed to hold an audience’s attention and challenge them to think. Many ideas briefly touched upon in this lecture are developed in later writings in more careful and convincing ways. My discussion treats a few points that I find of interest in this regard.

Polanyi’s Effort to Reform Economic and Political Liberalism

Polanyi’s effort to rehabilitate political liberalism was focused in part on developing a more penetrating, public understanding of economic life. His film Unemployment and Money is an effort to educate ordinary citizens. “Visual Presentation of Social Matters” shows clearly that Polanyi early believed economics education was a necessary and a promising project, given the possibilities he saw in film as a medium. Polanyi’s own understanding of economics seems also to have become deeper in the period in which he was making and promoting his film. As Beira reports, Polanyi’s correspondence reflects his excitement in reading Keynes’s 1936 book soon after delivering this lecture and in discovering that some of Keynes’s ideas were akin to those he was already beginning to develop. On February 6, 1940, Polanyi wrote Keynes, advising him he had been “during the last three years working at a presentation of monetary circulation and its disturbances by a diagrammatic film” (Box 4, Folder 3, RPC). He sought Keynes’s advice on the soon to be completed film and offered to arrange a showing of an earlier version of the film. But Keynes indicated that he was too busy to see Polanyi’s film (Keynes to Polanyi, February 8, 1940, Box 4, Folder 3, RPC).

It is difficult but important to distinguish Polanyi’s economic liberalism and his political liberalism; he called for reforms in both economic and political liberalism in his early writing. I suggest that “political liberalism” points to the more encompassing social and political philosophy Polanyi is hard at work articulating up until about the time of his Gifford Lectures. But “economic liberalism,” his critical and reformist ideas more specifically about economic policies which aim to re-ground older economic liberalism, is a main plank of Polanyi’s broader political liberalism. Polanyi’s “economic liberalism,” for example, offers sharp criticisms of nineteenth and early twentieth-century economic ideas that idealized market mechanisms and refused to entertain any policies that intervened in markets. Polanyi also promoted constructive economic proposals about, for example, how the money supply could be expanded or contracted to moderate unemployment. Polanyi himself suggests the distinction that I am drawing here. In an unpublished 1945 proposal for a new journal of liberal thought called “Civitas,” Polanyi contends that for the last hundred years liberal economic policy was not effectively guided by liberal theory. It was merely “a series of disjointed concessions from a theory of laissez faire to the claims of humanitarianism and the obvious demands of the public interest” (“Civitas” 1945, 6). He saw “the exiguous political theory of liberalism” as a nineteenth century hand-me-down which “requires to be rewritten” (“Civitas” 1945, 6). The maxims of J. S. Mill were “a going concern” in his day, but they “answer none of the searching objections which modern totalitarians and planners have raised. For this we need a new radically sharpened theory of democracy and civic liberties” (“Civitas” 1945, 6).

Polanyi’s reformed political liberalism is, in the final analysis, soberly grounded in acceptance of the free market system as the way a complex, highly differentiated modern industrial society must handle production and distribution. As he makes clear by the late forties, he simply did not believe that socio-economic complexity could be reasonably addressed in any other way than in a system in which there
is heavy reliance on individual desire and initiative, money as a measure of desire which can facilitate exchange, and profits: “While the State must continue to canalize, correct and supplement the forces of the market, it cannot replace them to any considerable extent” (LL, 138). By the late fifties, Polanyi discussed, in significant detail, complexity in the economy (as well as in other complex orders such as the specialized community of research scientists) in terms of “polycentricity” and the nature of polycentric tasks.\(^6\) In “Visual Presentation of Social Matter,” Polanyi notes, but has little to say about, economic complexity other than that it made the economic system for the ordinary citizen incomprehensible and aided in the spread of economic fallacies (hereafter, quotations to this work will be cited parenthetically as “VP” using the page numbers from this issue of Tradition and Discovery). But in this early lecture Polanyi certainly had great hope for the economic enlightenment of ordinary people through the diagrammatic writing he thought film made possible. Complexity is a matter Polanyi came to consider more carefully in later reflections.

Looking back from twenty-first century digital culture, Polanyi’s optimism about the positive potential of economics education realized through film seems naïve. Polanyi presses his case, claiming “the need of the present social crisis is the invention of new tools of the mind” (“VP,” 16). What he says about the discovery of graphic symbols needed to present economic life in motion, that is, life on the circular stage of the changing economic drama, is indeed imaginative and insightful. He seems to have understood the need for a synthetic overview of economic activity and perhaps anticipated what we today call “simulation,” an important analytical tool in digital culture. Polanyi was confident that if society adopted a graphic approach to understanding the relation of elements of economic life, then “fallacies would vanish, paradoxes would be unraveled and the moral conflict of self-seeking and social purpose would be resolved in a synthetic view of both” (“VP,” 16). Surely he overstates his case here for both the potential of a graphic approach and his estimate of future enlightened human action. But it is worth noting that his interest is not just in the emotional power of symbols but in the ways that diagrams aid reasoning. In this, he reminds me of Charles S. Peirce, who developed a diagrammatic method for understanding logical relations.\(^7\)

### Polanyi’s Analogical Thinking

Only a few years after this 1936 lecture, as noted above, Polanyi discussed the economy as a “dynamic order,” a term he adapted from the Gestalt psychology of Wolfgang Kohler (“Growth” 1941, 435). He compared the dynamic economic order to the dynamic orders of science and the system of common law case interpretation, showing both similarities and dissimilarities between different kinds of orders. Liberal society, Polanyi suggested, had an array of dynamic orders, which have a family resemblance but are not identical. All such orders rely on what he calls “supervisory” authority and all operate through processes of mutual adjustment of relatively independent agents exercising their “public” liberty (“Growth” 1941, 438-440).

Polanyi’s 1941 essay represents, I suggest, a more nuanced reflection concerned with the organization and character of social life than his 1936 lecture, which, as Beira notes, is strictly focused on (1) a diagnostic identifying economic fallacies causing serious modern social problems and (2) the potential for symbolic representation of economic ideas using film. At the end of this lecture, Polanyi sketches the anticipated social impact of diagrammatic film as a medium for economics education. He suggests that diagrammatic film can produce economic enlightenment that can fulfill the “promise of liberalism—freedom associated with complete co-ordination” (“VP,” 23). The “new economic consciousness” will launch a “spirit of enquiry” that makes transparent all economic activities and this will bring “a true fundamental change in the nature of our economic life” (“VP,” 22-23). Polanyi here outlines his case analogically for what he calls “the promise of liberalism—freedom associated with complete co-ordination” by pointing to the cooperation among scientists functioning as a community of inquiry (“VP,” 23). Scientists cooperate and
the organism of scientific ideas grows because scientists have an effective communication network—they rely on what Polanyi in this early lecture calls “publicity” (“VP,” 23).

Polanyi’s use of analogy, and this particular analogy in his 1936 lecture, is worth pondering. Much later in his 1962 essay “The Republic of Science” (KB, 69), Polanyi points out, as Chris Goodman (Goodman 2001, 18) has emphasized, that his discussion has not assimilated the pursuit of science to the market but “the emphasis should be in the opposite direction. The self-co-ordination of independent scientists embodies a higher principle, a principle which is reduced to the mechanism of the market when applied to the production and distribution of goods” (KB, 9). It is Polanyi’s experience as a research scientist, which in this 1936 lecture supplies the background for an analogical link that illuminates the economy. As Mary Jo Nye has argued (Nye 2011, 37-85), Polanyi’s research experience for thirteen years in Berlin from 1920 until 1933 in one of the world’s best scientific research centers shaped much Polanyi had to say about science and society as he moved into economics and philosophy.8 By 1941, Polanyi describes the economy as a “dynamic” order which is exclusively competitive, while the “dynamic” intellectual order of science is competitive, but operates by relying upon tradition and professional opinion. Tradition and professional opinion are perhaps somewhat akin to what Polanyi in this early lecture broadly designates as “publicity” in science. Polanyi does seem to anticipate in his 1936 lecture that the diagrammatic writing made possible by film will allow “publicity” to function for ordinary citizens in regard to the economy as it does in science; it will produce common understanding and commitment to ongoing inquiry (“VP,” 23). This seems to be in part what the anticipated economic enlightenment is all about.

Polanyi’s 1941 essay, which is a broader theoretical effort to conceive society and science’s place in society, clearly sets forth a series of analogs, some which he discusses in some depth and others which he simply references. Society seems to be a network of overlapping and sometimes coincident dynamic orders.9 Although less developed, an analogical approach is also central to Polanyi’s thinking in this 1936 lecture in his discussion of the importance of “publicity” in scientific and economic affairs (“VP,” 23). Marjorie Grene, in “Tacit Knowing: Grounds for a Revolution” (hereafter “TKGR”), published just after Polanyi’s death, notes that PK also proceeds analogically:

Polanyi’s method, as it developed in Personal Knowledge, consisted essentially in broadening and stabilizing the interpretative circle through a series of analogies, by showing that human activities of many kinds are structures in the same hopeful but hazardous fashion of science... The development of this analogical foundation Polanyi called “the fiduciary program”, a programme supporting, by extending, his view of the role of commitment in science. (“TKGR” 1977, 167)

Grene points out that the analogical approach she saw as central to Polanyi’s thinking in PK she later came to understand was grounded in tacit knowing whose structure and pervasiveness Polanyi works out only in his thought after PK: “The point is, I now see, that the fiduciary programme is supported, not so much by its expansion through analogical reasoning, as by the foundation common to all its instances, the foundation of tacit knowing” (“TKGR” 1977, 168).

More on Political Liberalism: Polanyi’s Historical Narrative

A few years after his 1936 lecture, Polanyi began to work out some details of an historical narrative (i.e., his cultural criticism) focused around the transformation of liberalism. Polanyi regarded his own liberal political vision of the good society as a revised version of an older liberal approach to social order that had worked reasonably well to produce gradual but important reforms up until World War I and the Russian Revolution, but now needed serious revision. In a 1944 paper published the next year as “Science and the Modern Crisis” (cited hereafter as “SMC”), Polanyi affirms that
History will view, I believe, the events which have taken place on the Continent during the last generation as one coherent process of upheaval. The rise of a totalitarian regime in Russia and the growth of Fascism in other European countries will be seen to arise from joint sources. These movements will then represent the breakdown of a previous system of public life and its replacement by a new one (“SMC” 1945, 107).

In his 1945 “Civitas” proposal, he similarly notes that

For 300 years, until the outbreak of the Russian Revolution, the new system of liberal principles was never seriously challenged. But when it was challenged it transpired that it possessed no sufficient foundations. The liberal order collapsed over wide regions of Europe (“Civitas” 1945, 2).

In the Preface to *The Logic of Liberty*, Polanyi suggests that the “individualistic formula of liberty” which earlier successfully promoted liberal social reforms, he now sees is a “formula [that] could be upheld only in the innocence of eighteenth-century rationalism, with its ingenuous self-evidences and unshakable scientific truth” (*LL*, vii). In his “Civitas” proposal, Polanyi proclaims, “The liberalism which took its foundations for granted has collapsed over wide ranges of Europe and it has been rendered generally untenable everywhere. We must replace it by a liberalism based on explicit profession” (“Civitas” 1945, 2).

Polanyi identified “a cardinal difficulty of liberalism” as the fact that

No set of principles—no matter how firmly and generally recognized—can govern men in society; simply because rules are generalisations and can be applied in each particular case only by an act of interpretation, and no rule can prescribe its own interpretation. Thus a set of rules always require supplementation by an act which is not itself prescribed; and therefore liberalism, when demanding government by knowable principles, also postulates that decisions be made which are not given by knowable principles (“Civitas” 1945, 3).

He suggested that opponents of liberalism turn this notion into the claim that any

attempt to govern society by fixed principles is meaningless if the interpretation of these principles is left indeterminate. If individuals are called upon to interpret principles, such as truth or justice, in the light of their own conscience, they can turn truth and justice into anything they please (“Civitas” 1945, 3).

This means, according to opponents, that effectively the common good is untended in a society in which liberal principles are said to govern: “A society (it is argued by the Planners who have succeeded Hobbes to-day) in which ultimate decisions affecting the public good are made by a set of independent individuals or centres is a society adrift; a chaotic society, at the mercy of mere chance” (“Civitas” 1945, 3).

“Visual Presentation of Social Matters” is focused on diagnosing and potentially addressing economic problems that Polanyi believed cause serious social instability. But, as these quotations show, soon after presenting this 1936 lecture, Polanyi began to sort out the details of an historical narrative that looked at more than the economy narrowly conceived as the source of the modern crisis. He suggests that political liberalism itself needs to be reconceived.
Some Nuances of Polanyi’s Economic Liberalism

Although it is not so visible in “Visual Presentation of Social Matters,” Polanyi’s early writing offers both praise and criticism of earlier economic liberalism. The praise often focuses on the way early capitalism was a liberating force, as the short 1946 essay “Social Capitalism” (hereafter cited as “SC”) makes clear:

For the true motives of the movement which led up to capitalism were generous and liberating. It had fought lawless feudal oppression. It had eradicated parasitical privilege and opened to each man access to economic opportunities. It had replaced a hierarchy of hereditary bonds by a network of voluntary responsible obligations. It had helped to discover and proclaim the Rights of Man (“SC” 1946, 341).

Polanyi often criticizes the economic liberalism of the nineteenth and early twentieth century as ideological, unable to understand unemployment, and unresponsive to human suffering:

Liberalism was misled to extremism mainly by its failure to understand unemployment. It believed that this evil could be avoided by the prevalence of free trade. This view arose as a vague generalization of the theory of maximum benefit which is provided by an economic equilibrium, freely established. It was thus held that all measures reducing the income of the rich and increasing that of the poor must produce unemployment; and most of the other proverbially dismal and inhuman conclusions of economic science arose from this central error (CF 1940, 58).

In his 1936 lecture, Polanyi makes a distinction between self-interested actions that serve the common good and those that do not. Economic enlightenment effected through film and “publicity” Polanyi hoped could guide ordinary citizens to make this distinction and to take the former but not the later kind of action (“VP,” 23). In some of his later writing, Polanyi seems to reconceive his early criticisms of the Invisible Hand. In his 1946 essay, he argues that it is the scientism of social thinkers that turns pursuing self-interest into an “unfailing principle.” Economic ideas became “laws [that] were inexorable, as they formed part of the great arrangements preserving the order of nature” (“SC” 1946, 341):

A great truth was here turned into false prophecy. For the discovery of the invisible hand allocating economic resources to a delicately adjusted, infinitely complex pattern was true. It was—and remains—a great vision of a harmonious human co-operation. But in demanding that the whole life of society be governed by the laws of the market, this vision was turned into its own travesty (“SC” 1946, 341).

This 1936 lecture does very briefly sketch Polanyi’s antipathy toward what he later more overtly identifies as a culturally pervasive materialist outlook. Here he notes that “utilitarian doctrine” (i.e., a strict market orientation) seriously misreads “the conditions of human contentment” by assuming that “people are content if they are given the means to satisfy their needs” (“VP,” 13). On the contrary, Polanyi suggests human beings need to understand their condition in order to be content; “protracted perplexity” upsets the “basis of moral relations” and lies behind “the twenty-two years of wars and revolutions” stretching back to the beginning of World War I (“VP,” 14). By the mid-forties, Polanyi’s writing had more to say about the negative cultural impacts of materialism which he linked to scientism. In 1946, Polanyi argues that Bentham, Ricardo, and Malthus offered “a new conception of society based on scientific pretensions” (“SC” 1946, 341) and that their largely materialist vision of society is prominent:

Whence this curious self-debasing deception [that sanctions a laissez faire system in terms of the operation of economic laws]? ... Bentham had jeered at the hollowness of the Rights of Man and promised to build a good society on the sci-
entifically secure grounds of the Desires of Man. Ricardo and Malthus followed with gusto, defining society in terms of greed and mathematically progressive breeding. The scientific travesty of society was complete; mercy banned as un-scientific; sympathy indicted as the true enemy of welfare... (“SC” 1946, 341).

Polanyi argues that Marx takes his cue for his ideas about class warfare and the eventual domination of one class from the “extreme laissez faire theory of capitalism:”

Marx’s prophecy was in fundamental harmony with the extreme laissez faire theory of capitalism—both when it insisted that social reform under capitalism was impossible, and also in putting forward its own combination of satanic and inexorable mechanical laws guaranteeing the automatic advent of a Millennium (“SC” 1946, 342).

Reformed Liberalism as a Middle Way

For Polanyi, his reformed liberalism was a social strategy that avoided the extremes, which received most of the attention in the thirties and forties: it was a strategy, on one hand, that avoided the rigidity and barbarism of what he calls “extreme liberalism” (CF 1940, 59) and, on the other hand, the misguided Marxist and socialist influenced program to centralize economies and “plan” endeavors like scientific inquiry. “Extreme liberalism,” Polanyi suggests, has failed to understand and address unemployment and this led to devastating errors in policy in the Great Depression, errors which promoted the rise of the Nazis in Germany. Orthodox liberals, Polanyi contended, are superstitious about the market and believe that unemployment is the inevitable result of any market interference. He compared such superstitious views to the myopic “obsessions of collectivists about the evil powers of the market” (CF, 59). He summarized his own middle way of rehabilitated liberalism in another interesting lecture (incorporated as Chapter 2 in CF) delivered four years after he delivered “Visual Presentation of Social Matters.”

I consider that the alternative to the planning of cultural and economic life is not some inconceivable system of absolute laissez faire in which the State is supposed to wither away, but that the alternative is freedom under the law and custom as laid down, and amended when necessary, by the State and public opinion. It is law, custom, and public opinion which ought to govern society in such a way that by the guidance of their principles the energies of individual exertions are sustained and limited (CF 1940, 59).

ENDNOTES

1The Papers of Michael Polanyi are in the Special Collections Research Center at the University of Chicago Library. Citations of archival material hereafter will use the foreshortened citation abbreviation RPC (Regenstein Polanyi Collection) that Eduardo Beira uses in “Visual Presentation of Social Matters As A Foundational Text of Michael Polanyi’s Thought” in this issue of TAD, plus the box and folder number for cited material.

2See, for example, Roberts and Van Cott (1999), Mirowski (1998), Mannuci (2005), Roberts (2005), and Vinti (2005).

3See my “An Introduction to Michael Polanyi’s Gifford Lectures,” included with the copy of the Gifford Lectures posted on the Polanyi Society website (polanyisociety.org). There I discuss Polanyi’s path to and preparation for his Gifford Lectures.
Polanyi gave this seven-page, unpublished journal proposal (cited hereafter as “Civitas”) to Richard Gelwick in 1962 (when Gelwick began collecting Polanyi’s unscientific writing). “‘Civitas’ 1946 (?)” appears in handwriting at the top of the proposal copy in the Gelwick microfilm collection on the Polanyi Society website; however, the date on the document at the end is March, 1945. The original title for the proposal has been crossed out and there are a few other minor editorial changes in the Gelwick copy. The same unedited proposal is included in Box 4, Folder 12 in RPC with its original title “Our Times.” There is also in Box 50, Folder 5 in RPC a copy with the title “Civitas.” So far as I can tell, the proposal was circulated to some friends Polanyi thought might support such a journal, but “Civitas” was never published.

In the 1946 essay that becomes Chapter 9 of *LL*, Polanyi clearly states his position:

I respect the moral resistance against profits as a great historical force, which has much humanized the system of money-making in the course of the past hundred years, and I think there is a great deal more to be done in that direction. But I consider the Socialist desire to eliminate commercial profits as the principal guide to economic activity to be profoundly mistaken. There exists no radical alternative to the capitalist system (*LL*, 138).

*LL*, 140 and 184, but see the larger discussion in “Profits and Polycentricity” (*LL*, 138-153) as well as Polanyi’s earlier effort to illumine such problems in “The Span of Control” (*LL*, 111-137).

See Ketner (1990) for an introduction to Peirce’s system and Roberts (1973) for an extended discussion.

Nye’s discussion of Polanyi’s historical experience is outstanding. However, at times in her discussion in Chapter 5, “Liberalism and the Economic Foundations of the ‘Republic of Science’” (145-181), she seems to suggest that it is the market and his economic ideas that promotes Polanyi’s understanding of science rather than the other way around.

See Mullins (2013) for a discussion of society as a network of dynamic orders.

Criticism of materialism is a theme Polanyi later develops in various ways, including clarifying his more general conception of the economy. In this 1936 lecture, he says “an economic system is, in general, a method to make a choice between the various uses of our materials and tools; a way to find out what we should do with things” (“VP,” 18). In “Civitas,” he elaborates, saying “the fundamental aims of society are of the moral and intellectual order; to foster charity, justice and truth among men. The main practical task of society, and its most prominent activity, is to provide a framework for its members to make a living.” The economic order is “the medium of moral achievement” (“Civitas” 1945, 1; see also *SFS* 1946, 83).

The emphasis upon understanding in this early lecture is also a theme Polanyi later develops. Polanyi’s mature philosophical thought promotes inquiry and the project of understanding the cosmos as the peculiar human vocation. Polanyi seems to envision a responsible society as a society of explorers always mindful that there is a deep connection between understanding and the good life. In “Visual Presentation of Social Matters,” the danger of social instability marked by violent conflict is the result of failure of ordinary citizens to understand unemployment (and, more generally the operation of the complex economy); this danger is at the center of Polanyi’s attention. Although he later broadens his focus upon elements promoting social instability in late modernity (i.e., Polanyi’s cultural criticism attends to more than unemployment and the operation of the economy), his concern with social stability and adjustment to change remains central.
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