
Jonathan Haidt, now Thomas Cooley Professor of Ethical Leadership at New York University’s Stern School of Business, follows up his Happiness Hypothesis with this attempt to understand and overcome political and religious divisions in this country by means of insights drawn from contemporary research in moral psychology. As he puts it, “My hope is that this book will make conversations about morality, politics, and religion more common, more civil, and more fun” (xii). Whether he achieves that goal remains an open question. However, he does make an intriguing case that it is possible, although difficult, to overcome our evolutionary heritage which has given us a mind that is moralistic, judgmental, and critical. We can do so, Haidt contends, by attending to three principles that grow out of contemporary moral psychology.

Haidt organizes the book in three parts, each of which is devoted to one of those principles. Part I is devoted to the principle that “intuitions come first, strategic reasoning second.” To make the point, he compares reason to a rider on an elephant, an image developed at length in his earlier book. The elephant refers to automatic cognitive processes (intuitions and emotions) and the rider to controlled, conscious, rational thought. According to Haidt, the rider evolved to serve the elephant, such that moral reasons are best understood as post-hoc justifications of judgments that people have made on other grounds (40). All is not lost, however, for the rider does have some ability to nudge the elephant in some directions—at least once the rider gets the elephant’s attention. A subtext of this part of the book is that contemporary psychological research supports a view of the relationship between reason and emotion that is best described as a “social intuitionist model,” which is more in line with Hume than Kant or Plato (Ch. 2; also 83-92).

Part II is devoted to the principle that “there is more to morality than harm and fairness.” Here, Haidt suggests that just as we have taste buds, we also have six moral “taste receptors,” which he describes as six sets of polarities. We have evolved to be sensitive to care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, sanctity/degradation, and liberty/oppression. Unfortunately most moral theories center primarily on care/harm and secondarily on fairness/cheating while largely ignoring the other four sets of polarities (114-127). In support of the claim that there is more to morality than that, Haidt draws from a wide range of research, including student reactions to various scenarios, some true and some fictional. For example, he asks students to assess the actions of a cannibal whose “victim” (?) is a consenting adult, or those of a person who buys a dead chicken, has sex with it, then cooks it and eats it. Students uniformly think that there is something wrong, but struggle to articulate why, since there is no clear harm (e.g., 15-23). He also notes that perceptions of harm vary from culture to culture (Ch. 5). Haidt thus contends that contemporary moral psychology supports moral pluralism, i.e., the notion that there is a limited range of values that guide conduct that remains recognizably human. Different cultures may configure these differently, but there is a limit. In claiming this, Haidt distances himself from the naïve relativist view that anything goes or that one culture’s solutions are as good as another’s (113, 316).

At this point, Haidt makes his first connection to contemporary political and religious currents. He contends that liberals and conservatives differ significantly on two primary counts. The first is that liberals have a much less sensitive moral palate, as they operate mostly from a care/harm base, while on
occasion attending to liberty/oppression and fairness/cheating. Conservatives are much more attentive to loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, sanctity/degradation—thus Haidt ascribes the appeal of conservative views to the fact that conservative rhetoric activates more “taste receptors.” Haidt also finds that even when liberals and conservatives appeal to the same “receptors” they construe them differently. For example, liberals define fairness as equality, whereas conservatives define it as proportionality. When liberals appeal to liberty, they put it in the service of oppressed groups, whereas conservatives appeal to liberty on behalf of their own groups (131-138, 175-181).

Moreover, Haidt argues that these dispositions are to a large extent innate, i.e., a “first draft of a book” that is later modified by experience (130-1). These dispositions have evolved in response to certain “adaptive challenges” in our evolutionary history, but what triggers them changes in later environments. For example, the loyalty/betrayal receptor responds to the need to form cohesive groups and originally was triggered by a threat or challenge to one’s group. Today, groups have been replaced by sports teams or nation states. However, the emotional states, such as group pride or rage at traitors, remain, as do correlative virtues such as loyalty or patriotism (125). Thus, genes make some brains more reactive, for example to threat than others, which can lead people down different paths, with different experiences into different moral subcultures which are guided by different grand narratives (277-288).

Part III is devoted to the principle that “morality binds and blinds.” In making this case, Haidt argues that we are “90% chimp and 10% bee.” In Durkheim’s words, we are *Homo duplex*, individual creatures who are, at the same time, participants in larger societies (233). Here, Haidt defends the existence of group selection to show why we are more “groupish” than selfish. We are, by this account, like chimps in that we are primates whose minds are shaped by competition of individuals with neighbors (Ch. 9). Success in that competition, however, favors groups that are more cohesive. Thus, while we are largely chimp, we are at the same time like bees, in that we can—at least under certain circumstances—transcend our individualism so that we come to see ourselves as part of a larger whole. In doing so, we switch on what Haidt calls the “hive switch.” He identifies some of the ways that we can do so: “biotechnologies” that produce altered states of consciousness, such as ritualized movement or drugs (224-236), transformational styles of leadership (236-240), politics (240-244), and especially religion, which according to Haidt, evolved to promote group cooperation and cohesiveness (Ch. 11).

If humans have evolved as he says, then how can we leverage these principles to overcome our innate dispositions to overcome our (self) righteous minds? Haidt does not provide a step-by-step guide, but does offer some suggestions along the way. First, “talk to the elephants,” i.e., develop and encourage the ability to see things from a variety of perspectives, thus re-educating intuitions (48-49). Moreover—and easier, he says, than retraining the elephant—is to design institutions that guide the elephant down the path toward understanding rather than division, so that good reasoning emerges from group processes (89-90). Third, we can strive to expand our moral palates. Thus, he suggests that conservatives need to learn from liberals that government regulations are sometimes necessary to restrain corporate excesses and dangerous externalities that markets ignore (296-300). At the same time, liberals need to understand the value of markets and realize that policies have to maintain the wellbeing of the hive (i.e., support social and moral capital) if one is to help individuals or subgroups (300-309). Haidt also recognizes how technology and residential patterns that sequester us with like-minded persons make it difficult to overcome these ideological divides (311-312). Finally, he suggests that utilitarianism is the moral philosophy that would best drive social policy, whereas virtue ethics is best for personal morality (272, 369).

In relation to Polanyi, one can find some thin affinities. Reminiscent of Polanyi, Haidt finds pattern recognition to be central to cognition (41). For Haidt, reason appears to rely tacitly on intuition and
emotions. Unlike Polanyi, however, reason does not automatically seek to understand and probe an ever more-intriguing emergent reality, although it can be made to do so, with the proper supports. Finally, Haidt and Polanyi would seem to have largely compatible views on markets and government regulation. Haidt is not Polanyian, but perhaps something of a kindred, progressive spirit.

Haidt is to be commended for his wide range of reading; he draws from moral philosophy, evolutionary theory, sociology, anthropology and moral psychology, to synthesize an account of morality. Although those readings are sometimes simplistic and his conclusions not entirely coherent (e.g., given his criticisms of utilitarianism, can he seriously mean it is the best we can do?) he strives for a comprehensive account of human morality. In fact, there is much to affirm about his definition of morality as “interlocking sets of values, virtues, norms, practices, identities, institutions, technologies, and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate self-interest and make co-operative societies possible” (270). Moreover, he makes compelling cases for moral pluralism and group selection.

At the same time, because the book is written to popularize research and advocate a point of view, it raises as many questions as it answers. Haidt does not address criticisms of his social intuitionist model (see, for example those raised by Darcia Narvaez, summarized in my review of her work in Tradition and Discovery XXXVII/3, p. 14). One also wonders if Haidt is a bit too certain about how certain moral taste buds evolved as adaptations for ancestral environments. To be sure, his accounts sound plausible, but they still come across as being “just-so stories” without more supportive evidence. Adherents of religion will find his account of the evolutionary origins and value of religion to be reductionistic and will be frustrated by his silence on matters of religious truth claims. To be sure, some of this can be excused because he writes as a social scientist, but given his generally positive account of religion (at least in relation to the “new atheists”), it is disappointing. Finally, one is left wondering if morality is as cross-culturally variable as he suggests. For example, the Defining Issues Test, an assessment of moral reasoning adapted from the work of Lawrence Kohlberb by James Rest, has been shown to be reliable and valid across cultures. Again, there is more going on than Haidt allows and one wishes he did more to acknowledge that.

Interestingly, the “heroes” of the book do not turn out to be who he suggests at the beginning. Early in the book, Haidt says that the takeaway message of the book is that, citing Jesus words from the Sermon on the Mount, we are all self-righteous hypocrites (xvi). By the end of the book, however, the message is less Jesus’ than Edmund Burke’s, for whom our partial loyalties are the basis upon which wider loves can eventually be built, so long as moral capital is valued and nurtured (290, 307).

Overall, Haidt takes the reader on an entertaining journey that is part intellectual autobiography and part summary of research. It is quite apparent that his career has centered around communicating difficult ideas to undergraduate students. With its end-of-chapter summaries, lack of jargon, and conversational tone, this book would be a useful and provocative book for undergraduates, especially if it is supplemented in ways that address the weaknesses identified above.

Paul Lewis
lewis_pa@mercer.edu


Within five years of receiving his Ph.D. in theological ethics from the University of Chicago, Michael S. Hogue, who is now an Associate Professor of Theology at the dominantly Unitarian Universalist Meadville Lombard Theological School, published two valuable books in the broad area of science,
The Tangled Bank: Toward an Ecotheological Ethics of Responsible Participation was released in 2008, to be promptly followed by The Promise of Religious Naturalism in 2010. The strong ethical focus that is obvious in the title of the first also provides a defining element of the “promise” explored in the second. While the first engaged primarily the work of Hans Jonas and James M. Gustafson, The Promise of Religious Naturalism is structured as an elaborate counterpoint discussion of the arguments of Loyal Rue, Jerome A. Stone, Ursula Goodenough, and Donald Crosby. Hogue engages these four contemporary theorists because “[t]hey are thinkers who illustrate especially well the constructive potential of religious naturalism as an important contributor to religious ethical thinking amidst . . . the heretically immanent post-traditional religious conditions of the ecologically vulnerable moral present” (ix).

Firmly seated in the tradition of theological liberalism (though worried about its continuing vitality and viability), Hogue considers “religious naturalism” to be an emerging religious movement that is particularly well fitted to address the problems of our times—most notably the moral challenges associated with our threatened ecosystem, the problem of negotiating “religious and cultural differences” (x), and the need to find “new forms and ways and modes of being religious” in response to “the forces of modernization” (xxi).

The argument hangs on just what Hogue means by “religious naturalism,” and Hogue’s most convincing response is simply to point to what Rue, Stone, Goodenough, and Crosby (different as they are) are doing. Hogue operates with a fairly standard understanding of naturalism as the view that “nature is all that there is and all that can be known and all that is necessary for . . . purposefully moral lives and communities” (37). What he rejects is the conclusion that naturalism is the enemy of religion because it is “opposed to supranaturalism as well as to supernaturalism” (38). On the contrary, he identifies a rich and growing literature that displays a variety of productive ways in which naturalism and religion can be brought together. The four authors whose work he examines represent four exemplary approaches (see Table 1 below).

The phrase “religious naturalism,” however, suggests much more than the possibility of studying religion scientifically or developing less mechanistically reductive forms of naturalism, and Hogue’s own position seems to be that a new this-worldly form of religion is emerging in the West as part of a broad cultural trend toward regarding “immanence as a primary frame of religious meaning and belief” (38). It is a religious stance in which “naturalism’s basic metaphysical and methodological chords are religiously thematized. It is a form of naturalism that interprets nature in whole or in part as an object of religious concern, devotion, and reverence” (203, italics original). It is, moreover, a religious stance offering a distinctive ethics, or at least a distinctive ethos. Hogue’s own position does not always emerge clearly from his complex mapping and comparison of his four chosen theorists. He also tends to blend religion and ethics (except when he is discussing the work of Crosby, who very sharply differentiates the two). Historically, of course, naturalism does tend to reduce the religious to the moral, but I don’t think that is actually Hogue’s intention—although he does acknowledge that “religious naturalists blur traditional boundaries between metaphysics and morality” (202). Near the end of the book Hogue writes, “I have argued that religious naturalism can be interpreted as one of these new forms and vital modes of religious ethics” (226), and he has indeed represented in detail the disparate ethical postures of Rue, Crosby, Goodenough, and Stone. Nonetheless, his own religiously naturalistic views about what should be done and what is required remain oddly elusive.

This ambitious, complex book is organized into an introduction and five chapters, with notes and an index. In chapter 1, “What’s Going On?” Hogue examines our contemporary context in relation to which the value of religious naturalism is to be assessed, introduces the unnecessarily idiosyncratic notion of “religious and ecological heresies,” and conducts
For good or ill, Hogue’s organization of the book is no doubt deliberate. He identifies his “methodological compass” as “appreciative criticism,” and it matters to him that the reader should grasp the importance of this approach and, ideally, adopt it. Appreciative criticism, offered as an alternative to “deconstruction,” is characterized by “a charitable regard for and interest in the work of other thinkers . . . and the traditions out of which they work” (xxiii). It “entails considerable contextualizing,” which means primarily starting with the Niebuhrian question, “What’s going on in the world?” (2). It proceeds comparatively, and it grounds its critical component in a “generative impulse” aimed toward constructive, creative work with a bearing on practice (xxiv). Appreciative criticism aims to “bring to life” (xxiv) the work being discussed, and this is to be accomplished in (at least) two ways: (1) by generous engagement that emphasizes the appealing strength and value of the works discussed, and (2) by explicitly and creatively connecting the author’s contribution with the vital problems of our life in common. Hogue places the scientific and moral challenges associated with our threatened ecosystem at the top of the list of such problems, and this book in praise of religious naturalism is written to show its promise in yielding a form of religious ethics with the potential to “enable us to perceive and respond—individually, collectively, and institutionally—to our interconnected ecological and cultural vulnerabilities” (21) and “orient life in commerce with a changing, vulnerable world” (226). This is certainly a noble intention, and the texts in question do offer promising resources. Unfortunately, because they are so different, no cohesive ethical platform or singularly forceful moral program emerges here—nor is it quite clear what actual community is to be galvanized by this “movement” that founds no churches and grounds no specific practices. Still, in charity, perhaps it would be unfair to expect so much so soon—we are all feeling our way forward, burdened by an urgency we are not sure how to meet in a situation that is without precedent.

Diane Yeager
yeagerd@georgetown.edu
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of religious naturalism</th>
<th>Variation 1 LOYAL RUE</th>
<th>Variation 2 DONALD CROSBY</th>
<th>Variation 3 URSULA GOOD-ENOUGH</th>
<th>Variation 4 JEROME STONE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Understanding of religion</td>
<td>Religion is a natural system that has “emerged by natural causes in the creative process of cosmic evolution” (91).</td>
<td>Religion “phenomenologically integrates personal and cosmological meanings and meets the demands for an examined and relevant life-orienting faith” (134).</td>
<td>Religion offers “a cosmological account of how things are and a correlate ethical vision of what matters” (123); accent on “the affective or felt dimensions of religiosity” (137).</td>
<td>Religion constitutes “a quality of experience and a kind of being in the world” (99).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship of religion to the author’s naturalism</td>
<td>Naturalized Religion: the “morphology and function of religion” can be explained “in evolutionary biological terms.” Religion has an adaptive function that science can understand, and ultimately it is “about” the requirements of the human organism.</td>
<td>Religion of Nature: “Nature as a whole [is] to be experienced as a religious object of reverence and devotion” (107). Reverence for nature as a whole includes moving beyond an anthropocentric focus, breaking worship free of morality. The focus is on “the transmoral generativity of nature naturing” (136).</td>
<td>Naturalistic Religio-poiesis: a fully modern scientific understanding of nature has religious potential and can stir distinctively religious emotions.</td>
<td>Religious conception of naturalism: “there are religious aspects of this world which can be appreciated within a naturalistic framework” (99). The aspects worthy of reverence are those that are “creative of good” (135).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activist intention</td>
<td>An “apologetic [and] justificatory” intention to advance religious naturalism as superior to traditional religions.</td>
<td>An apologetic intention to encourage forms of “collective piety” (121) that is free of “anthropocentric hubris” (120).</td>
<td>To present a scientific cosmological vision that “will support a kind of collaborative ethos that she deems planetary moral challenges require” (136-37).</td>
<td>“to advocate for religious naturalism as a religiously legitimate and meaningfully naturalistic expression of the criterially religious concerns with scope, orientation, and disposition” (133).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethics</td>
<td>Federated Eco-Morality—a naturalistic metaethics yields a “layered interdependence of [conflictive] values” (189); the moral life is presented with overtones of tragedy.</td>
<td>Ethics of ambiguity—a “deeply tragic” and conflictual treatment that severs “religious rightness” from “moral goodness”; religious reverence does not yield “matching normative principles or duties for the moral life” (197).</td>
<td>Ethics of mindful reverence—“anaturalistically grounded virtue ethics” (193).</td>
<td>Ethics of openness—a naturalistic metaethics yields “action-guiding general principles and disposition-shaping imperatives” (193).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalist intention</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Victor Lee Austin states his thesis in the first sentence of the book: “[W]e need authority to be ourselves…we cannot have a flourishing human life…without the functioning of authority in the multiple dimensions within which we live.” Austin divides these dimensions into four areas: freedom, truth, power, and God. These areas correspond, respectively, to society, epistemology, politics, and the church, which are given a chapter each.

This thesis, that we need authority in order to be human, is contrasted in the first chapter with the faulty understanding of authority Austin identifies as most prevalent today: that it is a necessary evil, instituted—if one takes a theological view of the subject—after the fall to compensate for the imperfections of humanity. While Austin agrees that authority curtails, at least in part, the deficiencies of sin, his view of authority is not limited to its compensatory function; rather, he sees the essence of authority as *enablement*, not restriction. Proper authority enables us (1) to maximize our freedom, (2) to know more, (3) to preserve our traditions and exercise right judgment, and (4) to truly confess Christ in word and deed (this is a theological work through and through). Since authority enables us to do more and better things, our need for it, rather than gradually diminishing, actually *increases* the more perfect we become, since our capacity for achievement increases accordingly.

In Austin’s chapter on social authority, the authority of a conductor enables the skilled members of an orchestra to perform beautiful music. Her authority frees the members of the “mini-society” to exercise their skills in playing a symphony, something they would not be able to do without direction. In his analysis Austin relies heavily on Yves Simon, who sees freedom as “an increase in human capacity,” and so an increase in causality and intelligibility—things that can be done and known (25). This means that as humans grow so does their potency to act upon an ever-widening range of choices. The consequence of this “amplitude of being” is the increased complexity of a given society as a whole, such that the exponential increase in possible avenues toward human flourishing must be coordinated for the sake of the common good. An individual’s reason and goodwill are simply insufficient to determine the common good, and so there must be a “power in charge of unifying common action through rules binding to all” (26). What form this power takes is purposefully unspecified, as it depends on the needs of the society under consideration (e.g., conductor, majority vote, etc.).

In chapter three (epistemic authority), a judge deciding a case uses the authoritative rulings of her predecessors to make a true judgment of her own, thus simultaneously learning from and contributing to the tradition. But is she not stuck between two undesirable options—either arbitrarily to pick the precedents that suit her tastes, or to rely slavishly on authorities to dictate her answer for her? Either way she will fall short of what Simon calls the “victory of objectivity [that] is the perfection of knowledge” (46). According to Simon, while we need leaders in social authority, epistemologically we need only a witness, who will point at the thing and then stand back and let us see for ourselves. Any answer that relies finally on authority is ultimately a failure truly to understand the thing.

Austin turns to Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge to rectify Simon’s misunderstanding of epistemic authority. Knowledge is acquired artfully—even in the natural sciences—by apprentices from their masters, and much of this knowledge is transmitted subsidiarily, so that—as every reader of *TAD* is well aware—“we know more than we can say.” But apprentices are not the only ones who must rely on authority. Rather, “[b]ecause there is no knowledge that is independent of all other knowledge, there is no epistemic authority who stands apart from other epistemic authorities” (53). An expert in a particular field is just that—an expert in *a field*, who must rely on innumerable experts in other fields to accurately inform his own. Here Austin makes reference to Polanyi’s
notion of “conviviality,” or as Martin Moleski (whom Austin cites approvingly) puts it, “the social dimension of personal knowledge” (53). Since conviviality, the communal interchange of ideas and reliance upon one another’s expertise, is never outgrown but is rather something into which one grows, the need for authority increases the more we know.

The next chapter (political authority) begins with a critique of the political philosophy of Eugene Kennedy and Sara Charles, who identify the proper role of political authority as the “augmentation” of the individual, while any use of coercive force is a resort to power, which inherently diminishes a human being. Austin sees this unquestioning distrust of power as essentially consistent with the modern depoliticized imagination, and posits instead that the role of political authority, in this fallen world, includes the proper use of coercive force to achieve the common good. Indeed, “[w]e cannot speak of politics without speaking of power” (74). This statement is informed by the political theology of Oliver O’Donovan, who distinguishes authority from both persuasion and undue coercion as transcending the former (it does not merely reason with individuals, but also compels), and legitimizing appropriate coercion (since it coerces only when its citizens fail to obey its commands). The coercive function falls to political authority because it is the most encompassing social authority, and the one that takes action when the punitive functions of mini-societies cease to be effective. A string quartet can expel a member for his poor attendance, but what can it do when someone runs him over? That is outside its, and every other social authority’s, purview. And so it falls to political authority to cope with the problem—in this case, a court, which looks to and perpetuates tradition in rendering both its verdict and punishment. Important to note here is the coercive function is not the only role of political authority. As the authority for a society as a whole, political authority serves to coordinate and achieve the common good: “[w]ere there no sin, political authority would still exist but would not need in any way to coerce the support or cooperation of citizens” (71).

The performance of an aria from Bach’s *Saint Matthew Passion* serves to illustrate the nature of authority within the church. Like the conductor and score that authorize the vocalist to sing, the priest and liturgy authorize a Christian to speak—while at the same time remaining dependent upon her actualizing her authority in professing her belief in Christ. In an ecclesiastical community, the individual exercises the authority she has received through incorporation into Christ’s body, which only comes through the preexistence of the community. Austin highlights this dynamic relationship: “The community is prior to the individual...And yet the community exists only in the individual to which it gives rise” (103). The paper and ink of a Roman missal (or Book of Common prayer—Austin is an Anglican) does not contain the authority exercised by the church. Rather—as Austin stresses throughout the book—authority is a *performative* concept; it requires the enaction of an individual or individuals to become a reality.

This chapter, Austin notes, differs from the previous three in that the church does not fit into any given categorical scheme, but is rather a congregation or synagogue, a bringing to together of those who are dedicated to the Truth (capital T) and who acknowledge God as the source of all authority. Authority in the church is legitimate insofar as the Christian shares in the authority granted by Christ through His Holy Spirit in His church:

To be under authority, to receive authority, to exercise authority—from none of these angles does authority have to do with willful command. From every angle, authority is a sharing. An aspect of communion, shall we say?

For, in point of fact, in what manner do we speak of the authorized individual, within the congregation of the faithful, as having authority? We do so by means of the Holy Spirit...The individual who arises from the congregation of the faithful, having been conformed to a life itself formed by the unmediated yet communal reading of
Scripture: she is under authority because by the Holy Spirit she has made a faithful response to God in Christ. (120)

Chapter six examines submission to errant authority, using Polanyi’s rejected theory of adsorption (which was eventually vindicated as a possible explanation) as a case study in what to do when authority makes the wrong call. Polanyi, rather than resenting the judgment of his peers, accepted their decision, recognizing that “[f]rustration with authority’s errors is not license to subversion” (129). To acknowledge that authorities err is to note—rightly—that there is no perfect authority on this earth; but to reject authority on that count is to reject what it means to be human: that is, to be a social animal living in a community that jointly (and imperfectly!) strives to achieve its ideals. Though it will always fall short of this goal, its progress depends inexorably on social, epistemic, political, and religious authority.

Austin closes the book by looking forward to authority in paradise. Contrary to the modern notion that absolute equality is necessary to true happiness, Austin uses Dante’s Divine Comedy to illustrate the notion that “happiness is found in our accepting our rank and place in a hierarchical world” (152). The inhabitants of Dante’s heaven do not resent the superior positions of others in heaven, but rather derive joy from the well-ordered society: “[t]he intrinsic differences in paradise are had by persons who are in close solidarity, so much so that the joy of each is the joy of all” (154). This difference-without-inferiority is grounded ultimately in the relational unity of the Trinity, in which the Son and Holy Spirit are subordinate to the Father, and yet not any “less God” than is the Father.

Polanyi’s thought, even when not explicitly cited, pervades the book—Austin’s treatment of political authority, for example, bears a strong resemblance to Polanyi’s thoughts in PK 222-233 on “Administration of Civic Culture.” Polanyi’s analysis of this issue may satisfy some who are looking for a philosophical supplement to Austin’s more overtly theological treatment.

Austin’s writing style is thoroughly engaging. His arguments are cogent and persuasive; taking his cue from Aquinas, he concludes chapters two through five with the statement and refutation of objections to his positions, and does not dodge difficult questions. His tone is genial, not imposing or doctrinaire—appropriate for one who hopes to persuade his reader, not enforce existing stereotypes of “that sort of person who would advocate authority.” In short, he accomplishes admirably his goal of presenting a thoroughly enjoyable and intellectually compelling vindication of authority for a world lacking in both due respect for authority and the intellectual ground for giving it.

Trevor Anderson
trevorstevenanderson@gmail.com