A Teaching Philosopher: The Work Of Jerry Gill

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ABSTRACT Key Words: postmodern, teaching, scholarly productivity, post-critical, metaphor, language, embodiment, diagrams, interdisciplinarity, architectural thinking.
This is an overview of the publications of Jerry Gill, sketching his background, common themes in his work, and some strengths and weaknesses in that work. I note the accessibility of his treatments of postmodern philosophy, and the usefulness of these works for undergraduate classrooms. The “search for a post-critical philosophy” of religion, language, epistemology, and education has given direction to Gill’s career.

Over the last forty-five years, few if any scholars with an interest in Michael Polanyi and his concerns can match the productivity of Jerry Gill. Since completing his Ph.D. at Duke under Bill Poteat in 1966, Gill has published an amazing number and range of books (17 thus far, both authored and edited) and articles (well over 100) that extend the discussion of post-critical thinking into areas beyond philosophy, showing a special interest in introducing students to the perspectives that readers of Tradition and Discovery take for granted. His work can serve as a major resource for teachers of Polanyi’s thought.

While in the present essay I will not attempt a complete or exhaustive treatment of Gill’s work, I will sketch some of his general themes, look briefly at some of his books that illustrate how those themes are treated, and end with a consideration of his work’s strengths and weaknesses. I should confess that while I do not know Gill personally, and am certainly not familiar with everything he has done, I am not a neutral critic, having published a positive review of one of his books (On Knowing God, 1981), and urged that SUNY Press publish the manuscript that became The Tacit Mode: Michael Polanyi’s Postmodern Philosophy (2000). But before turning to his writings, let me mention a few things about Gill’s career, for he has long maintained that one cannot overcome the malign consequences of the objectivist ideal without rejecting its insistence that ideas are purely mental, having no relation to the rich, lived context of those who hold them.

After growing up in the Pacific Northwest, “both a ‘slow learner’ and ‘culturally deprived’ as a youngster,” Gill attended Westmont College, a small Evangelical liberal arts school in California, where he was “a proverbial ‘late bloomer.’” The point here is that it was only through sensitive, concerned teachers that Gill was able to move beyond his background, actualize his own potential as a thinker, and eventually become a teacher himself. A concern with teaching, and with introducing students to the excitement of intellectual life, remain primary throughout his career. After receiving an M.A. at the University of Washington, Gill went east to New York Theological Seminary where he extended his interest in philosophical theology and encountered one of the two “master teachers” who shaped him, Robert Traina. From New York, Gill traveled south to Duke University, where he completed his Ph.D. under William Poteat, his other “master teacher,” with a dissertation on Ian T. Ramsey’s thought. Both Poteat and Ramsey will remain great influences, as Gill’s intellectual perspective owes much to Poteat’s analysis of the trajectory of modern thought, and the time he spent studying with Ramsey in England produced not only a friendship, but several of his publications.

After this training, Gill began a career striking for both its geographical and its intellectual variety—(I have sometimes thought of him as a kind of “Johnny Appleseed” of post-critical philosophy. He has taught
at colleges as diverse as Seattle Pacific, Eastern, Eckerd, Rhodes, Saint Rose, and Pima Community College in Arizona, where he now lives in retirement. He has also taught in China, and in study abroad programs in Greece and Finland, and has been the academic co-ordinator of the Borderlinks project in Mexico and Arizona. His writings have included books and articles on art (Ingmar Bergman and the Search for Meaning, 1969), on Native American religion (Native American Worldviews: An Introduction, 2002), on language learning (If a Chimpanzee Could Talk, and Other Reflections on Language Acquisition, 1997), on education (Learning to Learn: Toward a Philosophy of Education, 1993), as well as individual volumes on Polanyi, on Wittgenstein, and on Merleau-Ponty, and volumes both edited and authored on introductions to philosophy and philosophical theology (The Enduring Questions: Traditional and Contemporary Voices, 7th ed., ed. 2001; Philosophy Today, No. 1 and No. 3, ed. 1968, 1970; Philosophy and Religion: Some Contemporary Perspectives, ed. 1968; and The Possibility of Religious Knowledge, 1971; Borderland Theology (2003); Toward Theology, 1982; and Mediated Transcendence: A Postmodern Reflection, 1989). His articles have appeared in organs as diverse as The Harvard Theological Review and Christian Century, The International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Mind, Metaphilosophy, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, and Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, among others. This partial recital of Gill’s publications is not simply a tribute to his industriousness, but shows the breadth of concerns that his post-critical perspective opened up for him, and the many resources he has made available to undergraduate teachers. Each of his books is enriched by the complex interests and experiences Gill brings to it, particularly his ability to communicate these ideas in clear and accessible fashion.

Stepping back now from a simple listing, can we discern common themes in all this work? Let me attempt a sketch of the ideas that seem to connect these disparate activities that shows the personal center of thought that unifies the years and the writings.

(1) Fundamental it seems to me is Jerry Gill’s pre-occupation with the postmodern or post-critical situation of western culture. In many of his books, Gill begins with a sketch of western thought since the time of Descartes—sometimes a few paragraphs, sometimes several chapters—in order to set up the problem which he is addressing, which usually deals with the weaknesses of modern philosophy, and the need to consider postmodern alternatives. He is not an intellectual historian, and so these treatments do not attempt a thorough argument for the dominance of critical thought since the 17th century. One could easily fault such sweeping “set pieces” for their brevity and generality, particularly perhaps in his later books, but in this case as in others, we need to keep in mind that many of Gill’s books are written primarily as introductions for students or interested intellectuals who do not have extensive backgrounds in Enlightenment thought or phenomenology. It is also the case that trying to write with enough rigor to satisfy the Academy’s “experts” tempts one to bend one’s thought to the rules of critical philosophy, which would prevent any radical alternative to that tradition ever arising.

A strength of this repeated narrative is that it locates Gill’s own work in a much longer story that tries to make sense of a number of problems in modern intellectual life, a story that helps to answer Walker Percy’s question, “Why does man feel so sad in the twentieth century? Why does man feel so bad in the very age when...he had hoped to see the dawn of universal peace and brotherhood?” It’s a good question, and it seems to me that telling and re-telling a story of modern thought’s decline is an effective way to situate readers so that they can hear Gill’s attempts at answering it. Though this perspective appears to owe much to his time with Bill Poteat, there have been many others working in a similar vein, though perhaps not “connecting the dots” as obviously as Gill: for example, the work of Charles Taylor, who names Wittgenstein, Merleau-Ponty,
and Polanyi as men who shared a frustration with the malign effects of much of modern philosophy. See also the work of Marjorie Grene, who has a somewhat different list, but essentially tells the same story.

What has happened, Gill argues, is that modernity’s obsession with finding certainty through an indiscriminate application of the perspective of science to all of life led major thinkers from Descartes, Hume, and Kant to the logical positivists to build up a picture of human knowledge as purely mental, the property of an individual mind severed from any physical body, a mind that is passive, atomistic, and reductionistic to such a degree that its very effort to understand the world is vitiated. Critical philosophy is objectivist, focusing on the logical analysis of reality into discrete particulars, reducing the rich complexity of human experience to abstract parts that can be made explicit and quantified, in the never-ending effort of the modern person to find certainty, and to banish doubt. Gill focuses primarily on epistemology in telling this story, stressing the dualistic, visual bias in critical thought, and its tendency to reify the fact/value distinction in an effort to shore up its claims to a firm empirical foundation, safe from the eroding threat of symbolic, metaphorical language, and its natural corollaries, ethics and metaphysics.

(2) After situating his work in the postmodern attempt to overcome modernism, Gill stresses in numerous ways the centrality of language in human cognition (“Linguisticality is, along with embodiment, one of the primary dimensions of the human way of being in the world”) and the need to overcome the critical tradition’s misunderstanding of speech. His edited books on Ian Ramsey; his book on language acquisition (If a Chimpanzee Could Talk); his books Merleau-Ponty and Metaphor (1991), and Wittgenstein and Metaphor (1996); chapters in several of his other books on language; and a number of articles discussing different aspects of language, from myth to symbol to the first person personal pronoun--all of these indicate the importance of seeing human beings as preeminently speakers, and thought as always deeply implicated in language.

In *Wittgenstein and Metaphor*, for example, Gill discusses approaches to metaphor by Tillich, Langer, Colin Turbayne, Max Black, Philip Wheelwright, Monroe Beardsley, Percy, Ricoeur, Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer, Barfield, and the philosopher Nelson Goodman, giving the reader a brief, but helpful tour through the varied notions of metaphor which he classifies as substitutionary, as interactionist, and as constitutive, with the ultimate aim of clarifying Wittgenstein’s understanding of metaphor. Though the list above is quite varied, and Gill perhaps pushes too hard to make them all fit into his tripartite schema, the different explanations of how metaphors work, and how they are inextricably related to assumptions about the nature of language and knowledge, are helpful, and handled deftly by Gill. The reader is then prepared for a novel account of Wittgenstein’s metaphors in his major works, and a discussion of his understanding of metaphor and its overall place in his view of language. In his discussion of the *Tractatus*, for example, Gill shows how the very “picture theory” which summarizes the abstract, visual, mathematical view of language Wittgenstein is developing has no place within that view because metaphor itself has no place within his theory; this is one of the important limitations of his early philosophy that is addressed later in the *Investigations*. While I do not think that Gill makes his case that “Wittgenstein views philosophy as an essentially metaphorical activity” (p. x), which is the argument of Part III, the careful description in Part II of his use of metaphors in the *Tractatus*, the *Investigations*, and in *On Certainty* I found fascinating. I admit that though having read Wittgenstein extensively through the years, I had never focused on the role metaphors play in his thinking, and how such a consideration enriches one’s view of his philosophy of language. Gill’s use of metaphor as a vehicle for getting at important features of a postmodern understanding of language is more convincing, it seems to me, than the details of metaphor itself which are presented in the book; but it is a fresh and interesting way to read Wittgenstein.
(3) In the quote from Gill in the last section, another of his common themes is mentioned, namely the importance of the body in human knowing, and how the neglect of this basic fact has distorted most of modern philosophy. This theme is to be expected, of course, in the work of one influenced by Merleau-Ponty and Polanyi and taught by Bill Poteat, but the consistency of Gill’s employment of this theme is impressive. In Learning to Learn, for example, Gill shows quite convincingly that the educational philosophies of A.N. Whitehead, John Dewey, Paolo Freire, and Carl Rogers pay virtually no attention to the embodied nature of knowing, so that their views remain intellectualistic and abstract, inevitably distorting their accounts of teaching and learning. While he shows us how each of these men introduces important reforms into traditional education—Whitehead’s organicism and contextualism; Dewey’s emphasis on the experience of the learner responding to the environment; Freire’s appreciation of the political context of knowing, and the need for liberating students from a “banking” model of education; and Rogers’ attempts to involve the learner in all aspects of her education—each view is weakened by its blindness to the bodily basis of thinking and doing. As a counter-example, Gill employs the image of dancing, where dancer, dancing, and the dance all have a necessary bodily dimension. Though it seems to me Gill could have made more use in this book of Poteat’s concept of the mindbody (which appeared some eight years before Learning), he does apply Polanyi and Merleau-Ponty’s emphases on embodiment, and even suggests concrete ways in which this characteristic can be reflected in the classroom (pp. 216-224); he also repeats this theme in The Tacit Mode (“The Cruciality of Embodiment,” pp. 44-50), in Mediated Transcendence (pp. 59-66), and in On Knowing God (pp. 70-72). It does seem that Gill acquires this emphasis in mid-career, for his earlier books (especially The Possibility of Religious Knowledge, 1971) do not elaborate the embodiment theme, perhaps because he also does not use Merleau-Ponty as much in the earlier work.

(4) Another feature of Gill’s work on which one can depend is his innovative use of examples, images, and vocabulary to illustrate his points. This is readily seen in Learning to Learn, which devotes a chapter in each Part of the book (“The Knowing,” “The Knower,” “The Known”) to practical applications for the classroom, but is also true of most of his other works. To consider just one, we find in Mediated Transcendence not simply the discussion of standard examples to illustrate a point (Kant on lying, 98ff.; abortion, 106ff.; William James’ image of “total reflexion,” 20ff., etc.), but also illustrations of “mediation” that I found quite helpful: the way in which emotion is mediated by the notes, beat, and key of a musical score (pp. 32, 150); the way in which the mind is mediated by, but is not reducible to, the brain (p. 44); the way in which persons are mediated by, but are not reducible to, their bodies (p. 45); the Polanyian example of the way in which language is mediated by speech, alphabet, words, and style, without being reducible to any one of these (pp. 123ff.); his use of examples of “signifying” in the black community of Memphis, or in popular music (pp. 135-136). When he applies mediation, then, to the idea of transcendence, claiming that God is mediated to believers not by taking them “out of the world,” but by showing the divinity immanent in -- mediated by -- various aspects of the world, one has a clearer, more concrete sense of what he means.

Another interesting aspect of his effort to apply his ideas in concrete ways is Gill’s use of diagrams to convey relationships between ideas. In The Tacit Mode (p. 39) and Deep Postmodernism (p. 122), Gill illustrates the structure of tacit knowing with essentially the same diagram, and, in Learning to Learn, he illustrates connections between his four major thinkers with another diagram (p. 35), and shows relationships between enrollment and curricula with another (p. 222). While one could criticize the specific features of such diagrams, their point, it seems to me, is simply that relationships exist between Polanyi’s terms (explicit/tacit; subsidiary/focal) that will be seen more easily by some by being pictured. I have not felt that these diagrams were essential, but then I am familiar with Polanyian terms. I also note that Gill acknowledges...
diagrams are not for everyone: he comments that his teaching mentor Poteat “was uneasy with my own penchant for diagrams” (p. 237)!

Finally, we should note here that Gill is fond of a particular vocabulary in discussing Polanyi or Polanyian themes. He argues that “axis” is the most appropriate term for the orienting center of a conceptual system, and that dimension the best word for the various aspects of experience -- social, moral, aesthetic, etc. Similarly, we find him using “vortex,” “fulcrum,” “vectors,” “symbiosis,” “relationality,” and “poles” or “polar” repeatedly -- all in an effort to escape the vocabulary of critical thought that emphasizes more static, isolated, atomistic models of knowing and being. This effort is not always successful. Consider, for example, this sentence: “The overall contours of my perspective are best projected by the image of a revolving and movable bipolar axis at the center of a horizon,” which seems to pile on the images a bit too much. The impulse is admirable, namely the desire to write in a way that escapes the discarnate abstractions of critical thought, and stresses the dynamic, relational character of the knower’s involvement in the world, as revealed by post-critical philosophy. But while the vision he conveys in his books considered as a whole is salutary, Gill’s specific formulations of this vision are not always successful.

Beyond the themes already mentioned, we can just mention Jerry Gill’s interdisciplinarity (art, film, psychology, literature, theology, as well as philosophy), his emphasis on intercultural understanding (seen especially in Borderland Theology; and in Native American Worldviews), and the incessant curiosity that leads him into new areas of interest, and provokes him to develop new competencies (his teaching in China, Greece, Finland, and Mexico; his taking up sculpture; the book If a Chimpanzee Could Talk on language acquisition). One could come up with a different list of the themes that thread through Gill’s work, but these should serve to indicate the protean, stimulating character of that work.

Having pointed you positively, in a brief sketch, to certain distinctive elements in Gill’s work, let me mention also weaknesses in that work which certainly do not destroy its usefulness, but which are problems nonetheless. First, looking at Gill’s books and articles as a whole, one sees a certain amount of repetition of subjects, approaches, and formulations. This is not surprising or unique to Gill, of course; perhaps anyone writing so much would inevitably do the same. But in describing the tacit, mediation, postmodernism, or human language, we sometimes find the same thinkers, the same examples, and the same discussions used to make his points (for example, the work of Alan Pasch; the example of three men on a bridge witnessing a drowning, etc.). While Gill is obviously marshaling these resources for somewhat different purposes each time, the degree of repetition in how these resources are used occasionally causes the discussion to lose its freshness.

A second way in which his work sometimes suffers is in the brevity of his treatment of various thinkers, especially in the historical sections. For example, in Mediated Transcendence, Gill discusses the history of transcendence in western theology in nine pages, but deals with fourteen different thinkers in those pages, which means that his treatment is necessarily somewhat superficial (pp. 5-14). In Learning to Learn, we find these sentences: “The two traditional models of experience within Western thought are reductionism and dualism. Empiricism tends to be reductionistic and rationalism leans toward dualism” (p. 40). While this is not all he says about these models -- and some of it is quite sound -- such opening sentences convey a sense of over-simplification, of lack of depth, that does not help Gill win over his reader. Though I have not the slightest doubt that Gill is capable of conveying the complexities and nuances of philosophical history with precision and accuracy, his use of such quick sketches of schools of thought as quoted above weakens his
effort. Perhaps this occasional problem is best conveyed by an example from *On Knowing God*, where Gill writes: “This interpretation of Kierkegaard may or may not be correct. If it is not, it is difficult to maintain a high level of respect for him, since he failed to see the inconsistent and one-sided character of his own work” (p. 109). This verdict is delivered after just over three pages of discussion of Kierkegaard and his interpreters, and it seems to me presumptuous for Gill to claim that if his interpretation is not correct, then Kierkegaard is at fault!

I should also say, however, that in other places where he surveys a number of thinkers in relatively brief fashion -- as in Part Two of *The Tacit Mode*, or in the discussion of language theorists in *If a Chimpanzee Could Talk* -- I found Gill clear, accurate (in those cases where I could judge), and concise. And in *Learning To Learn*, his extended treatments of Whitehead, Dewey, Freire, and Rogers contained both nuance and qualification, and stimulated an interest to read more about them. He also makes occasional brief but interesting observations about thinkers that show his engagement with their thought (e.g., his comments on J.L. Austin in *Mediated Transcendence*, pp. 136-137, or on Foucault in *The Tacit Mode*, pp. 75-76). This is not, therefore, a sweeping condemnation of all of Gill’s work, but points to an occasional lapse; given the quantity of his writing, such lapses are perhaps understandable. The problem of providing sufficient background to an introductory audience is a difficult one, of course, with which every author of such texts struggles. One solution is to provide plenty of references to more specialized studies which can supply the necessary detail, and such references would, it seems to me, strengthen Gill’s presentation.

More interesting than the issue of thoroughness is what I think of as the “architectural” bent of Gill’s mind, that is, his preference for developing sometimes elaborate structures to encompass a thinker’s system of ideas. In *The Tacit Mode*, for example, Gill places Polanyi’s personal knowing within the structure of “a fresh axis,” which he elaborates through discussion of “the awareness dimension,” “the activity dimension,” and the “cognitivity dimension” of experience (pp. 10, 31-50). This way of construing Polanyi may or may not be helpful to the reader, but it is not Polanyi’s way of presenting the knowing experience, and it seemed to me to need more explanation or justification than Gill offers. Another example of this “architectural” way of thinking can be seen in *Learning to Learn*, where Gill approaches his task of developing a philosophy of education with an elaborate structure based on the metaphor of dance: dancing/knowing, dancer/knower, dance/known. But then each of these three parts begins with a consideration of four thinkers, whose views are repeated each time in relation to the aspect of knowing being considered, and on top of that, each part contains a tri-partite structure looking at the perspectives of the thinkers used, the activity at issue, and the practical patterns or applications that result. (The “Contents” page suggests this pattern, though one would have to read the book to see how obtrusive it sometimes becomes.) Though I thoroughly enjoyed the book, this structure seemed to me unnecessarily complex for the subject matter. While there is certainly nothing wrong with complex structures per se, but perhaps something simpler would have served the reader better.

Rather than point further to quibbles with particular formulations or approaches in his books, let me conclude with a reminder that anyone who teaches undergraduates, and wants an accessible way to introduce them to the problematic of Enlightenment thought in modern philosophy and the alternatives to it developed by thinkers like Michael Polanyi, will find Jerry Gill a helpful, useful resource. He sees the “big picture” in which western culture as a whole has been affected by critical thought, and gives students a story, a framework, within which they can go on to build a more satisfying, healthier understanding of knowing and of living. For a teacher to have maintained such a dedication to useful scholarship over his career while working essentially alone, without the resources of research universities or graduate students to support him, seems to me to speak also of his character, and to be admirable. Let us hope for more by him.
Endnotes


4 Gill is aware that these terms are not synonymous, of course, but uses “postmodern” in deference to the majority usage today. See *The Tacit Mode: Michael Polanyi’s Postmodern Philosophy* (SUNY Press, 2000), p. 1. Here he also distinguishes between constructive and deconstructive postmodernism.

5 In *Learning to Learn*, there are several paragraphs in the Introduction; in *On Knowing God*, there are four chapters on critical thought, and in *The Possibility of Religious Knowledge*, Gill has three chapters that present his most detailed discussion of “The Problem.”


11 Mediated Transcendence, p. 111.

12 Susanne Langer seems to be an important representative for Gill. See “Langer, Language, and Art” in *International Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 34, no. 4 (Dec. 1994), 419-432, and ch. 1 of *Wittgenstein and Metaphor*.


14 Ron Hall does this in a review of *The Tacit Mode* in *TAD*: 27:3 (2000-2001): 30-34. Hall is an acute philosopher, but his totally negative, dismissive treatment of Gill in that article, in contrast to my comments here, may owe less to his philosophical acumen than to his different assumptions about the nature
of book reviews. Or, perhaps, as we all do occasionally, he was just having a bad day.

See, for example, ch. 2 of Learning to Learn; ch. 7 of On Knowing God; ch. 2 of Mediated Transcendence; ch. 3 of The Tacit Mode, etc.

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