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# REVIEWS

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Gregory R. Peterson. *Minding God: Theology and the Cognitive Sciences*. Theology and the Sciences. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003. Pp. xiii + 252. ISBN: 0-8006-3498-5. \$19.00, paper.

In this work, Gregory R. Peterson, Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Religion at South Dakota State University, explores the implications of the various cognitive sciences for Christian theology. By cognitive sciences, Peterson refers to an array of disciplines (especially those of psychology, linguistics, neuroscience, ethology, and artificial intelligence) that investigate topics such as language, perception, reasoning, and brain structure (7-8, 28). He argues that the cognitive sciences can both challenge traditional theological claims and provide ways of obtaining a richer understanding of ourselves, our world, and God (5). As such, cognitive sciences serve as both data and lens for theological reflection (21). As data, they provide evidence which might assist theologians in choosing between different theological options. For example, Peterson argues that evolutionary science provides warrant for preferring Irenaeus's account of the fall to that of Augustine (Chapter 7). As lens, the cognitive sciences might inspire theologians to see topics such as human freedom in fresh ways (Chapter 4).

Peterson develops his case in four steps. He devotes the first part of the book (the first two chapters) to introducing readers to his method, as well to the history and general findings of the cognitive sciences, highlighting insights into the workings of the brain. The second part of the book explores the impact of the cognitive sciences on the person by addressing several traditional areas of philosophical and theological dispute. In Chapter 3, Peterson discusses the problems of consciousness and the relationship between mind and body, concluding that the findings of the cognitive sciences largely converge

with biblical accounts of the unity of the person. In Chapter 4, Peterson discusses personal freedom and the unity of the self, concluding that the cognitive sciences suggest that whatever freedom humans experience is rooted in the structures of the brain and our biological heritage. In Chapter 5, Peterson examines religious experience, concluding that while the cognitive sciences can help us understand something of the biological facets of religious experience, they cannot tell us the import or truth of those experiences. The third part of the book wrestles with the impact of cognitive sciences on our understanding of nature. Peterson addresses the debate over human uniqueness (chapter 6) and original sin (chapter 7). On the former topic, Peterson argues that the cognitive sciences suggest that humans exist in a complex, interdependent web of life, in which uniqueness must be understood in carefully nuanced ways. On the topic of original sin, Peterson argues, that the cognitive sciences suggest that human nature is incomplete, not fallen from a prior perfection. The final part of the book discusses the impact of cognitive sciences on our understandings of God (chapter 8) and the future of life (Chapter 9). As to God, Peterson argues that the cognitive sciences serve as a useful reminder that references to God as person stretch human language significantly. As to eschatology, Peterson suggests that science can tell little about how the universe will end and instead calls people to live by the hope that traditional eschatology has nurtured by metaphor and poetry.

The strengths of this book lie in its clarity, breadth, and modesty. Peterson writes for an audience unfamiliar with the sciences and does an exemplary job of communicating the basics about the cognitive sciences, as well as the disagreements within. The book includes a helpful glossary of terms and is, overall, reader-friendly, except for the citation system employed. Peterson's conclusions about what can be learned from the cognitive

sciences are appropriately modest, given his sense of those internal debates. While he doubtless oversimplifies matters, Peterson provides a helpful primer on the state of the art in these particular sciences. He does expect a bit more familiarity with theology from his readers—this is not a criticism, merely an observation. His conclusions about insights to be gleaned from the intersection of theology and the cognitive sciences are likewise suggestive and open up areas for further investigation.

Although the work attempts to start a conversation between the sciences and theology, it seems that, as is often the case, the dialog goes one way. The cognitive sciences thus challenge theology, but only rarely does theology challenge the sciences. Peterson certainly does not uncritically appropriate the cognitive sciences, but rarely does he criticize them on theological grounds. Can the conversation go both ways? Put in Polanyian terms, Peterson dwells in the cognitive sciences in order to break out from traditional theological dead ends. Might it be possible to dwell in theology so as to break out from conundrums in the cognitive sciences?

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Barbara Forrest & Paul R. Gross. *Creationism's Trojan Horse: The Wedge of Intelligent Design*. Oxford University Press 2004. pp. 383. ISBN: 0195157427. \$39.50, hardback.

This book, written by a philosopher and a zoologist, is a particularly interesting contribution to the growing body of literature that analyzes and criticizes the “intelligent design” movement. The main themes of the book are elaborated in minute detail in nine chapters. The title and subtitle of the book identify the approach taken here: the intelligent design movement is creationism disguised in order to gain a new foothold. But the authors want to make sure that the dangers of the disguise are reckoned with: “intelligent design” is a movement that has a carefully organized political strategy (the wedge) that has frequently not been recognized or, if recognized, is underestimated.

Forrest and Gross go to great lengths to show that “intelligent design,” despite the protestations of fig-

ures like William Dempski, is really no more than creationism recycled. They argue that if one looks closely at publications and papers that this is obvious, since it is easy to trace alliances and to see how the “intelligent design” case is presented when delivered to biblical literalist audiences.

“Intelligent design” is not science, although it presents itself as science and has successfully convinced many who know little about science and the operation of the scientific community that it is science. Much of the book carefully walks through the so-called “scientific” work of the major ID players or fellow travelers (Axe, Behe, Chien, Dempski, Wells, et. al.), showing that there is often much fanfare and public proclamation, but no scientific substance here. The movement longs for scientific legitimacy, but there is no serious research program and the major authors seem uninterested in matters fundamental in the scientific community such as peer review. There is no paradigm shift in the making in biology and allied sciences.

Forrest and Gross make a strong case that “intelligent design” is basically a complex, well-planned and somewhat secretive political movement, a Trojan horse designed to get inside the academic and cultural mainstream in order to effect cultural transformation. It is a conservative religious reform movement aimed at science and the culture that takes its worldview from science. It is a serious mistake to underestimate the commitment and influence of this movement. The authors outline the formation and unfolding of the so-called “Wedge Strategy” primarily associated with Philip Johnson, a Berkeley law professor who, along with several of the other figures in the movement, is affiliated with Seattle’s Discovery Institute. The Wedge Strategy is a strategic plan and it aims to shape popular opinion through public relations maneuvers. Slowly, the movement has tried to cultivate academic respectability and has also moved into state and national politics. For example, at the state level, the movement has entered into debates about science textbooks in Kansas, Pennsylvania and Ohio. At the national level, it supported the effort to add the so-

called Santorum Amendment to the “No Child Left Behind” legislation but this anti-evolutionary language was later deleted and is not part of Public Law 107-110.

In the mid-twentieth century, Polanyi’s thought made clear the fragile relation between the scientific community and larger society and culture. He warned that the notions of freedom in the French Revolution ultimately undermined the foundations of communities of inquiry like science because such notions—popular in the cultural mainstream—invite disrespect for structures of authority in such specialized communities. Insofar as “intelligent design” is a movement that exploits popular sentiments about fairness and tolerance, using all the sophistic tools of public relations campaigning, it represents the same sort of threat to science that the social planning movement did in Polanyi’s time.

As perhaps most readers of this journal know, the attempt at Baylor University to set up “The Michael Polanyi Center,” an academic center linked to the “intelligent design” movement, was abandoned in 2000. On the Polanyi Society web site, there now is a brief statement about the move to establish this center and the circumstances that led to the removal of Polanyi’s name from the center. This addition to the web site is an effort to apprise all who come to the Polanyi Society web site that Polanyi’s name should not be associated with the “intelligent design” movement. The authors of *Creationism Trojan Horse*, in fact, maintain a web site ([http://www.creationisms-trojanhorse.com/#Special\\_Features](http://www.creationisms-trojanhorse.com/#Special_Features)) that includes information about and reviews of their book as well as other interesting materials tracking the “intelligent design” movement. Included is Richard Gelwick’s “Polanyi Scholarship and the Former Baylor Polanyi Center” as well as links to articles by Gelwick, Apczynski and Gulick that were in *Zygon* 40: 1 (March 2005) which discussed Polanyi’s evolutionary ideas and “intelligent design.”

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Struan Jacobs and R. T. Allen (eds.). *Emotion, Reason and Tradition: Essays on the Social, Political and Economic Thought of Michael Polanyi*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Co. 2005. ix + 172. ISBN 0-7546-4067-1. \$69.95, hardback.

This thin volume offers twelve essays plus the editors’ brief biographical and interpretative essay outlining the significance of Polanyi’s thought. Almost all of the essay writers are familiar names to those who follow Polanyi scholarship.

The introductory essay is a remarkably concise review of Polanyi’s life and thought. In five pages, Jacobs and Allen sketch Polanyi’s time in Hungary, Germany and England. They summarize Polanyi’s non-scientific writing by dividing it into two different periods. Writing from 1935 until 1950 they dub “the defence of freedom,” outlining the kinds of political, economic and sociological themes that emerge as Polanyi gradually left his life as a physical chemist. The period from 1951-72 was a time in which “deeper and more specifically philosophical interests” (4) became central. Jacobs and Allen focus the discussion here around the criticism of objectivism and working out ideas about tacit integration. Although it seems likely that most readers of this book already will know much about Polanyi and Polanyi’s ideas, this introduction provides a helpful general organizing scheme and is the sort of précis that teachers might give beginning students.

As its title suggests, Endre Nagy’s “The Hungarian Context of Michael Polanyi’s Thought” aims specifically to discuss “whether there are any elements of Polanyi’s theoretical edifice that can be brought into particular causal relation to some elements of his Hungarian background” (8). As a sociologist, Nagy is also interested in how Polanyi (as well as other Hungarians) “mastered and transcended” (8) his socio-cultural milieu. Nagy contends that such transcendence is the result of conversion that involves intellectual illumination and transformation of life. He suggests that Polanyi’s own description of “dwelling in” in order to “break out” is a useful way to

capture such changes in a life. After noting that the Polanyi literature (Charles McCoy excepted) has not much thematized the concept of “breaking out,” Nagy reviews the discussion of “breaking out” in *PK*. He points out that when discussants do not have a common framework of superior knowledge, they are fundamentally separated, as if they spoke different languages. This was in fact the case with Polanyi: “The young Polanyi did not participate in reverence for the same superior knowledge as those belonging to the ‘official’ Hungary” (12). Polanyi was a member of the Galileo Circle and this group was a part of the countercultural opposition in Hungary that favored scientific views and social change. The Galileo Circle, and Polanyi in particular, was especially influenced by the poet Endre Ady who represented a more progressive Hungary. Nagy argues that both Karl and Michael Polanyi were idealists by 1920 and that this was at odds with the dominant disposition toward materialism in European intellectual culture. Finally, Nagy suggests that both Polanyis were influenced by the Hungarian intellectual and socialist leader Ervin Szabó (one of Polanyi’s cousins) who spoke of an ethical or moral revolution. Although the argument in this essay is far from straightforward, this is an insightful and interesting effort to link Polanyi to Hungarian roots.

Lee Congdon begins his “Believing Unbelievers: Michael Polanyi and Arthur Koestler” with reflections on Koestler’s philosophical writing, outlining Polanyi’s awareness of it and suggesting ultimately that Koestler was, in his own words, a “crusader without a cross” (22). He then moves to a further discussion of Polanyi’s friendship with Koestler and what they shared:

Both were deeply troubled by the spectre of nihilism haunting Western civilization, both were convinced that a return to orthodox Christianity was neither possible nor desirable, and both were searching for some new and more acceptable “religion”—both, in a word, were unbelievers (in the orthodox Christian sense) who believed in a reality, in particular a moral

reality, that could not be reduced to material existence (22).

It is this motif, the “believing unbelievers,” that Congdon uses to hold together this most illuminating comparative discussion of the lives and work of Polanyi and his friend Arthur Koestler.

Congdon sees Polanyi, like Koester, as on a quest. He succinctly and adeptly lays out Polanyi’s philosophical themes, presented as the saga of Polanyi’s ongoing search. He ends this discussion with comments on Polanyi’s dissatisfaction with orthodox Christianity which nevertheless was combined with the persisting search for and embracing of some “truer form” (23) of Christianity. Although his discussion is but a few paragraphs, Congdon’s treatment of Polanyi’s personal religious beliefs (much ink has been spilled on this topic) is among the best.

Next Congdon reviews Koestler’s unsatisfactory search for spiritual bearings in India and Japan. He then turns to the major ideas (about science and about science and religion) that Koestler’s publications show he was developing and traces similarities and differences with Polanyi’s views; his judicious quotations from the archival Koestler-Polanyi correspondence allow Congdon to make clear how these figures were themselves aware of both differences and common sympathies. The job Congdon does on Polanyi’s views is very much on target, although I would quibble with one small point: Congdon discusses Koester’s interest in and sympathies for parapsychology. He notes that Polanyi likely had Koestler in mind when Polanyi noted his own respect in *PK* (158) for those who go against the tide in giving credence to extra-sensory perception. While this may be the case, it is also good to point out that Polanyi himself came to think that the theory of tacit knowing as it was developed after *PK* was an account that satisfied some of his own early questions and sympathies for parapsychological explanations. Polanyi’s discussion of his own developing ideas in the 1964 introduction (“Background and Prospect,” p x) to the reprint of *SFS* make this clear.

R. T. Allen has earlier written about the contributions of several twentieth century thinkers (including Polanyi) to understanding the importance of emotions. His essay in this collection (“Polanyi and the Rehabilitation of Emotion”) is an expansion of this work that looks in greater detail at the role of emotions as a theme in Polanyi’s thought. Allen argues that Polanyi’s “rehabilitation of the person” (41) is integrally tied to his account of emotions. He makes his case by analyzing the discussion in chapters 6 and 7 of *PK*, chapters treating intellectual passions and conviviality. In a very systematic fashion, Allen reviews Polanyi’s ideas in terms of a building sequence of four topics: the structure of emotion, the functions of emotion in the life of science, the generalization from science to other areas of life that Polanyi offers, and Polanyi’s description of “the rootless emotions of the modern age” (50—e.g., moral inversion). Allen’s account is remarkably clear and incisive; he is a careful Polanyi reader and one of the most articulate spokespersons for these themes that were dear to Polanyi. Yet there is a kind of bitterness toward modernity in Allen’s Polanyian critique (see particularly the final paragraphs of his essay), a bitterness that I find in some tension with the hope that pervades even Polanyi’s most devastating criticisms of his time.

Stephen Turner’s essay, “Polanyi’s Political Theory of Science,” looks carefully at Polanyi’s ideas about the operation of science and the link between the scientific community and the larger political setting in which science is nested. Turner examines Polanyi’s ideas as a part of the history of political theory by situating their emergence in the social-political context of the years preceding and following World War II. He outlines the case of the planners of science, with generous quotations from Bernal. Turner argues that the novelty of Polanyi’s work as a political thinker was to reconcile his appreciation of tradition “with its Tory, Christian, Anti-enlightenment, Romantic, and fiduciary tinge, with the idea of science, to which it had hitherto been opposed”(86). The key to this reconciliation, Turner suggests, is the way in which Polanyi affirms both the importance of the Influentials

( the “benevolent elite”[87]of science)and the autonomy of the individual scientific researcher, while claiming that this is the most efficient model for science. Turner thinks that Polanyi’s case that maximal co-ordination of scientific activities happens spontaneously (by mutual adjustment) rests only on analogical grounds (i.e., the famous jigsaw puzzle analog that appears several times in Polanyi’s writing). The last section of Turner’s discussion turns to the problematic relation of science and society after the war and particularly in the last quarter century. Certainly, Polanyi did not see foresee many aspects of the emergence of “big science” nor did he anticipate how capitalists would become major shapers of science, but his case for science as a “specialized and traditional form of truth seeking” (95) that belongs within the tradition of liberal democracy remains a strong one. Turner thinks that Polanyi was never narrowly interested in questions about funding for science, but instead provided

a meditation on fundamental politics . . . that is still relevant today. There is still, and perhaps more pressing than ever, the question of whether the practices of institutions and institutions of science are up to the task of dealing in the light of their fundamental commitments to truth with the novel political circumstances in which they operate (96).

Struan Jacobs, one of the editors of this collection, has two essays in the book. “Polanyi on Tradition in Liberal Modernity” is a succinct and clear discussion of why Polanyi thinks tradition is important in the contemporary period. Jacobs reviews Polanyi’s major distinction between articulate lore and the art of creative practice and lays out Polanyi’s account of pre-modern and modern dynamic societies that are free and those that are totalitarian. He sets forth the Polanyian distinctions between civic and individual culture and discusses Polanyi’s notions about innovation or renewal in culture. Jacobs reviews Polanyi’s discussion of science as the paradigm case of a domain in which tradition functions both as a ground and a source of renewal or transformation. Jacobs con-

cludes by pointing to the theoretical value and the historical importance of Polanyi's comprehensive account of tradition: he was the first to make clear and to analyze in detail the traditional dimension of science. Many interested in science, including Edward Shils, have followed in his wake.

Jacobs' second essay, "Polanyi's Analysis of Social Orders," has as its chief objective "to clarify Polanyi's idea of spontaneous order and the place that it occupies in his social-political thought" (99). In passing, he notes that it is Polanyi and not Hayek who likely comes up with the term "spontaneous order" (see his "Michael Polanyi and Spontaneous Order, 1941-1951," *TAD* 24:2 (1997-98): 14-28) and Polanyi does not get the term from the Scottish Enlightenment. Working with Polanyi's early essays, Jacobs shows that Polanyi's ideas about freedom and the free society are bound up with ideas he develops about dynamic or spontaneous orders. Jacobs draws chiefly on "The Growth of Thought in Society" (1941), which was part of the "planned science" debate but this is an essay that goes beyond the case of science. This discussion is part of Polanyi's effort to set forth his broader pluralistic vision of society as a domain in which there are a number of dynamic orders (law, arts, religion, science, etc.) whose success depends on the willingness of persons to serve ideals preserved in each respective order. Polanyi's basic distinction is between dynamic or spontaneous orders that operate through the initiative of agents and mutual adjustment, and corporate or specific orders that focus on design and planning rather than relying upon agents' discretion. Where did Polanyi come up with his basic distinction? Jacobs argues it seems likely that he developed his ideas from study of Kohler, Lippman and Graicunas.

In an essay whose title "Beyond Nihilism" plays on a Polanyi essay title, C. P. Goodman tries very concisely to summarize Polanyi's account of values and situate this perspective in the longer history of western thought. This is a dense essay but a rich one and I can do no more than highlight the author's major claims. Goodman sees Polanyi as a figure who "antici-

pated the contemporary revival of an ethical approach based upon what it is good to be, rather than which rules we ought to follow" (55). Polanyi holds that humanity makes moral progress and believes "ethics is oriented by the self-set transcendent ideal of being a good person" (55). This transcendent ideal of the good person was created with the emergence of human beings and always bears upon a specific social context, yet it remains for persons something both objective and not fully realizable. The morally good has a reality that directs our choices: "Morality is not something you opt into; it accompanies what it is to be a reflective being" (60). Both ethics and science "draw upon our tacit awareness, and make judgments about realities whose truths exist independently of our subjective preferences" (55). In the case of the transcendent ideal of the good person, Polanyi "does not seek to derive what is morally good from descriptions of a natural order, nor does he seek to ground it in a local practice" (59). But, in Goodman's view, Polanyi does derive "values from purposes. It is the ends that determine value" (60-61). But Polanyi's teleology should not be misread as a teleology interested in final causes in a cosmological sense; Goodman holds that "when Polanyi talks about purposes he is talking about intrinsic purposes (i.e., purposes related to points of view)" (61). That is, he recognizes "internal teleological systems" (61). Finally, Goodman suggests that Polanyi's internal teleology and his account of transcendent ideals should secure us against the contemporary face of moral inversion:

Although totalitarian political systems are no longer fashionable, the assumptions that inspired them continue. Liberal nihilists recommend doing whatever you want, in pursuit of your own ends, so long as you respect the right of others to do the same. Polanyi opposes moral relativism and advocates a society in which liberty is defended on the grounds that it facilitates the pursuit of transcendent ideals (55).

"Polanyi's Conservatism: The Reconciliation of Freedom and Authority," by R. J. Brownhill, argues

that Polanyi presents “a restatement of British conservative philosophy” which “provides an updated Burkean concept of change.” (124) Brownhill contends that Polanyi emphasized commitment to truth in the scientific community, but this notion “is more problematic when applied to society as a whole or political activity” since such commitment “can have dangerous consequences for its believers, and society as a whole” (115). Such dangers are avoided in the case of science because “a statement concerned with scientific activity cannot be classed as scientific knowledge until it is recognized as such by the scientific community” (116). The tacitly accepted criteria of the community are thus the key to what counts as knowledge: “The word ‘knowledge’ then appears as a badge which is stuck on a theory when the criteria have been met but could eventually be withdrawn if it was shown the theory did not meet the criteria, the criteria changed, or the weighting of the criteria changed” (117) Brownhill contends that Polanyi’s “spontaneous coordination” is a “euphemism for the internal political wrangling that go on within the scientific community when a consensual decision is made” (117). To this reader, Brownhill underplays Polanyi’s realism and his reading of Polanyi seems dangerously close to a nominalistic social constructionist account.

Brownhill extends the case he makes for the operation of the scientific community to the larger society and discusses in some detail more problematic matters such as education and particularly political education. Brownhill suggests that Polanyi holds that every society has “core moral values and other beliefs” that are foundational and therefore “decision-making arises from continual practice whilst being immersed with one’s own tradition” (117). Polanyi’s ideal of a free society is “the just and moral society where excesses of individual initiative are controlled by the operation of society’s conscience through the law, its institutions, and the process of socialisation whilst living in society and its process of education”(118). Brownhill holds that “society as a whole, although not possessing systematic ideas, will possess a body of coherent beliefs, and these beliefs will be used to judge and keep a check on innovations” (119). Polanyian

political education has as its objective to show that “the state’s function is to provide the necessary conditions for the development of the values of a free society, by nurturing the numerous intellectual disciplines controlled by their own authority” (122). Clearly, Brownhill reads Polanyi as a strongly Burkean conservative. In contrast to Nagy, he underplays Polanyi’s insistent call to seek the unknown, to dwell in in order to break out

“Polanyi the Economist” is a lucid five page discussion of Polanyi’s importance as an organizational and macroeconomic theorist by Paul Craig Roberts, one of Polanyi’s last graduate students. Roberts argues that Polanyi recognized “that tasks have inherent structures and cannot be organized by principles that do not reflect the inherent structure of the task” (128). In science, the economy and in other spontaneous orders, Polanyi clearly saw that mutual adjustments could not be replaced by organization through hierarchical principles. Roberts acknowledges that “Polanyi’s insights led to my explanation that the Soviet economy was organized polycentrically like a market economy” (128). He argues that Polanyi’s social criticism was more profound than the critiques of von Mises and Hayek. Polanyi saw that no modern economy can be organized without coordination among people achieved by mutual interaction and initiative. For Polanyi, liberty “is the way a free society organizes its pursuit of ideal ends”(129) and is not simply concerned with protection of the individual. In Roberts’ account, “Polanyi saw the logic in liberty. Polanyi’s goal was to communicate this logic in order to remove liberty’s vulnerability to inordinate collective passions” (129). A free society is a society of explorers constituted by overlapping spontaneous orders. Such a society has a dynamic authority structure: “Just as scientific authority cultivates discovery, the beliefs that compromise the authority of a free society cultivate debate and reforms” (129). Roberts is clear about the contours of Polanyi’s free society:

Polanyi defined a free society as one striving for self-improvement and motivated by the search for truth. It is a compromise between

Edmund Burke and Tom Paine. Freedom is rooted in a dynamic tradition and a dynamic authority that cultivates change and progress within the framework of a free society (129).

In the final sections of his article, Roberts turns to Polanyi's specific contribution to Keynesian economic ideas. Because he was an outsider to economics, Polanyi was able to provide a maverick explanation of the unemployment problems of 1945: he was able to see that the insufficiency of demand causing unemployment could be addressed by expanding the money supply. Polanyi did not, according to Roberts, recognize the originality of his own contribution: "He thought he was merely explaining Keynesian economics to a confused public that might be misled into accepting central economic planning as a means of ensuring full employment" (130).

Monia Manucci's "Observations on Michael Polanyi's Keynesianism" covers some of the same ground that Roberts' essay does, but both are certainly worth study since Manucci's focus is a somewhat different. She emphasizes that Polanyi's economic ideas are "deeply linked to the political theory of post-Marxist liberalism" (149). This means that Polanyi's "theory of full employment cannot be separated from the other aspects of Polanyi's thought." (161). What she wants to demonstrate is how Polanyi argued that economists have special responsibilities for certain fundamental aspects of social life and much depends on this.

Manucci shows how Polanyi's account of economic development as a dynamic order is both akin to and different in important ways from the ideas of Keynes (and secondarily, Hayek). In Polanyi's account, "the essence of his theory, like that of epistemology and politics, is a continuous relationship between authority and freedom"(150). According to Manucci, Polanyi was a keen reader of Keynes who supported most of Keynes' views. While Polanyi supports mutual adjustment in the economic realm, he is not a doctrinaire *laissez-faire* economist but thinks capitalism and the free market "for their own exist-

ence. .. need a certain degree of state intervention" (152): Polanyi

accepts the fact that the state has the duty of maintaining a satisfactory level of monetary administration of economics. . . . Every year the government should actually make a very important choice: it should choose the level of monetary circulation necessary to get a desirable degree of employment and at the same time decide to accept a correlated share of residual unemployment (153).

Polanyi's liberalism thus was a liberalism "which roots out the evils of capitalism and tries to resolve them, without eliminating the patient." (155). Unlike Keynes, Polanyi thought that politicians ought to leave the solutions to unemployment problems to economists since politicians too readily link addressing unemployment with social reforms:

A policy of full employment can and must be carried out separately, because of what it is. In this context, the principle of neutrality demanded by Polanyi is simply the principle of separation between economics and politics. This principle was challenged by those who considered it an obstacle for the humanitarian aims of the state. . . (156).

Thus Polanyi ultimately offers a different vision of authority than Keynes:

Polanyi's 'moderate' liberalism admits a form of authority in society, but such authority is not the one described by Keynes, in which the state can decide what is right or wrong for the community, although respecting freedom, and does not hesitate to connect economics and social justice (157).

Polanyi's ideas about regulating the money supply thus need to be seen as "an instrument to defend the dynamism and freedom in a historical moment which saw them in crisis as new emphasis was given to

managerial authority.” (159).

Carlo Vinti’s essay, (“Polanyi and the ‘Austrian School’”) is a discussion of the significance and the limits of Polanyi’s relationship with Mises, Hayek and Popper. Vinti reviews the scattered published comments Polanyi made on the work of these figures; a few are affirmative but several are quite critical in *LL*. Nevertheless, Vinti argues, one should not lose sight of the fact that Polanyi and these figures have much in common; they all are critical of anti-liberal ideologies; they all are proponents of moderate liberalism and oppose political programs that promise too much through planning. They all make basic claims about the

centrality of the individual, of his original liberty and his personal responsibility, the consideration of the public not as a collective affair but as an inter-individual project, a project created by individuals located in an open universe, of limited subjects, capable only of designs and plans that are always partial, fallible, and revisable (136).

Vinti comments on what he calls “the very delicate, and as yet, unresolved historiographical question” (136) about influences of these authors on each other and then discusses what divides Polanyi and the members of the Austrian School. Polanyi uses his analysis of science as a paradigm that then gets extended to the domain of economics, unlike most of these figures. Polanyi seems to have a vision of liberal democracy in which liberty is not so concerned with individual choice as with preserving the possibility for the person “to realize individual liberties in the public sphere.” (137) Vinti reviews Polanyi’s criticisms of Popper’s “open society,” linking it to the tradition of critical thought. He then launches a more extensive comparison of Polanyi and Hayek, suggesting the points of contact and analogies between Polanyi and Hayek are much more than Polanyi and Popper. He points out that claims by Goodman, Mirowski and Jacobs in articles in *TAD* have dissented from the conventional wisdom that tries to show Polanyi and

Hayek as bedfellows. The essay ends by calling for more investigation of Polanyi’s relationship to the thought of the Austrian School, noting that Polanyi’s notion of liberty “as a *public-individual exercise*” (145) is the most interesting difference between Polanyi and these thinkers who adopt a more conventional Enlightenment radical individualism.

This is a very good collection of essays that complements older scholarly resources such as Langford and Poteat’s *Intellect and Hope*. All of the essays are interesting discussions by scholars thoroughly familiar with Polanyi. Particularly some of the essays that treat Polanyi’s economic ideas are helpful, since this area of his thought is often underplayed, at least in this journal. A few interesting but unanswered questions—such as how much emphasis should Polanyi’s metaphysical realism have and how Burkean is Polanyi—thread through these essays.

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