QUAESTIONES DISPUTATAE

MICHAEL POLANYI’S
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
AND THE FUTURE OF LIBERALISM

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OF STEUBENVILLE

2022

Quaestiones Disputatae
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Vol. 11, No. 1

Spring 2022

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Editor’s Introduction
Charles Lowney ................................................................. 3

The Growth of Thought in Society as a Major Motif in Polanyi’s Philosophy
Phil Mullins ................................................................. 17

Liberty and Tradition: Michael Polanyi and the Idea of Progress
Eduardo Beira ................................................................. 43

Polanyi’s New Liberalism and the Question of Democracy
Struan Jacobs ................................................................. 69

Polanyi and Rawls on Higher Autonomy as the Basis for a Stable Liberal Society
Eric S. Howard ................................................................. 97

Three Freedoms and an Emergentist’s Hope for Social Progress
Charles Lowney ................................................................. 115

Confronting or Denying the Minotaur: “Moral Inversion” Today
Richard W. Moodey ........................................................ 171

Michael Polanyi and the Theologico-Political Problem
Jon Fennell ................................................................. 187
Confronting or Denying the Minotaur:  
“Moral Inversion” Today

Richard W. Moodey

“Doomsday predictions can no longer be met with irony or disdain.”
— Pope Francis, *Laudato Si’*, paragraph 169

“Thirty years ago, we could have saved the planet.” This sentence is written in white letters on the black front cover of *The New York Times Magazine* for August 5, 2018. There is just one article in this issue, Nathaniel Rich’s “Losing Earth: The Decade We Almost Stopped Climate Change. A Tragedy in Two Acts.” Rich’s point, a point he developed in even greater detail in a subsequent book, is that if the leaders of governments and corporations had made the right decisions thirty years ago, they might have been able to prevent the tragedy we are now experiencing. But because most holders of power made the wrong decisions, most kinds of living things are now threatened. We are living in the age of the sixth great extinction.

Michael Polanyi used the Minotaur as a metaphor for both totalitarian government and for what he called “moral inversion.” In this essay, I use the Minotaur as a metaphor for climate tragedy. The Minotaur was the mythical monster of the Cretan Labyrinth, who, either every year or every ninth year in some versions, devoured young men and women of Athens. This part of the story is apt, because climate tragedy will “devour” more of the young than of the old. What I only implied by citing Pope Francis and Nathaniel Rich I now state explicitly: it *is* too late to prevent climate tragedy. Saying that is controversial. I’m quite sure that some climate scientists, and

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readers of their reports, are sincere in denying that it’s too late. Others seem to believe, in private, that it is too late but refuse to say so publicly. This is another way of refusing to confront our Minotaur. But some of us are willing to agree publicly with Rich.

A British sociologist, Jem Bendell, agrees that it’s too late to prevent climate tragedy. In 2018 he published an online essay which he called “a map for navigating climate tragedy.” His “map” is also a description of a moral orientation with four key dimensions: "resilience," "relinquishment," "restoration," and "reconciliation." These terms describe an ideal type of moral orientation. So also does Michael Polanyi's "fiduciary program." These two ideal types are similar, and I contrast both with what Polanyi called “moral inversion,” an anti-ideal type of moral orientation.\(^4\)

1. Metaphorical Complexities\(^6\)

I use a way of “naming” metaphors proposed by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson: "Source Domain à Target Domain."\(^7\) The traditional names for the two terms of a metaphor are “vehicle” and “tenor.” I use Lakoff and Johnson’s terms because they correspond so well with Polanyi’s emphasis on the from-to structure of knowing.\(^8\) Polanyi used "Minotaur" as the source domain for two metaphors: (1) Minotaur à Moral Inversion and (2) Minotaur à Totalitarian Government." I am adding a third metaphor: (3) Minotaur à Climate Tragedy. Totalitarian government existed during Polanyi’s career, and was a monster to be confronted. Totalitarianism hasn’t disappeared, but climate tragedy now looms as an even greater threat to humanity.


\(^5\) George Lakoff, Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002). Lakoff points out that what liberals imagine as ideal types, conservatives are likely to regard as anti-ideal types, and vice-versa.

\(^6\) Chapter four of Polanyi’s last book is “From Perception to Metaphor,” in Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975).

\(^7\) George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 58.

\(^8\) Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009 [1966]). In Meaning, Polanyi and Prosch use a similar kind of notation, but put a loop in the arrow as a way of emphasizing the emotional aspects of metaphors.
What I mean by Minotaur à Moral Inversion is more complex than what I mean by the other two metaphors. Totalitarian governments and climate tragedy are external threats that will not go away, even if lots of people don’t believe them to be real. Moral inversion, as an anti-ideal type of moral orientation, consists of dispositions internal (skin-in) to each “moral invert.” “Moral inversion,” however can also point to external (skin-out) cultural symbols that both express and legitimate having and acting upon the internal dispositions.

2. Yeager’s Three Essays

Three essays by D.M. Yeager have influenced my interpretation of the meanings Michael Polanyi attributed to "moral inversion" and "the fiduciary program." In “Confronting the Minotaur: Moral Inversion and Polanyi’s Moral Philosophy,” she says that Polanyi’s social objective, from 1946 to 1975, was to diagnose moral inversion and to devise a remedy for it. A good part of her essay consists in answering some harsh criticisms by Zdzislaw Nadjer. Yeager says she had been unable to find any previous responses to Nadjer’s criticisms, even though they were published in 1968, in an important collection of essays about Polanyi’s work.

In her second essay, “The Deliberate Holding of Unproven Beliefs: Judgment Post-Critically Considered,” Yeager clarifies Polanyi’s stated alternative to moral inversion. The quotation in her title is from the section of Personal Knowledge entitled “The fiduciary programme.” In that section Polanyi sketches the historical development of moral inversion, even though he doesn’t use the term in this section. He describes how the accumulation of repeated denials of traditional

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9 What I say about these essays are my interpretations of Yeager’s interpretations of Polanyi. She might not agree with all the meanings I attribute to her words. Indeed, as she admits to having changed some of her interpretations of Polanyi, there a sense in which she came to disagree with things she had written earlier.

10 D.M. Yeager, “Confronting the Minotaur: Moral Inversion and Polanyi’s Moral Philosophy,” Tradition and Discovery 29, no. 1 (2002-3): 22-48. In a footnote to this essay Yeager provides an exhaustive list of all the texts in which Polanyi wrote about moral inversion.


12 See Ibid.

morality resulted in an unstable condition. The “moral passions” of modern humans reasserted themselves, but "in objectivist disguise," leading to the birth of "the scientistic Minotaur." Polanyi’s next sentence contains the phrase in Yeager’s title: “The alternative to this, which I am seeking to establish here, is to restore to us once more the power for the deliberate holding of unproven beliefs.” 14 What I understand Polanyi to have meant by “the scientistic Minotaur” is moral inversion, not totalitarian government. It makes no sense to say that the power to hold unproven beliefs could be the alternative to the Soviet government, or, indeed, to any form of government, totalitarian or not.

In Yeager’s third essay, “Exploring the Underground: Silent Assumptions and Social Pathologies,” she points to two changes in her thinking since she wrote her first essay on moral inversion:

I now think that Polanyi’s notion of moral passions is both more complex and more central than I suggested in that essay, and I am now less inclined to argue that Polanyi understands his critique of totalitarian government to rest on nothing more than his commitment (expressed with universal intent) to a competing worldview. To put this another way, I am now less sure that Polanyi is a social constructionist “all the way down.” 15

Polanyi isn’t a social constructionist all the way down, because he held that there is a universal human “core” in the skin-in tacit dimension of all men and women—the metaphorical underground. The alternative to moral inversion isn’t “the power for the deliberate holding” of just any unproven beliefs. It’s the power to believe in the content of this universal human core, a core that Polanyi links to conscience. Yeager says that Polanyi held that this core includes deep

commitments to such "transcendent" things as "truth, justice, and charity." Different collectivities have expressed these using different cultural symbols. These symbolic expressions are socially constructed, but Yeager says that Polanyi held—at least when he wrote *Science, Faith and Society*, published in 1946—that the deep commitments they express are in the human “underground” in every time and place. Yeager notes however, that Polanyi might have modified this later. She quotes from the new preface Polanyi wrote for the 1964 edition of the book: “In *Science, Faith and Society*, I interpreted this [what upholds the creative life of a community] as a belief in a spiritual reality, which, being real, will bear surprising fruit indefinitely. To-day I should prefer to call it a belief in the reality of emergent meaning and truth....” and comments that “It is not clear from this how much of those last five pages of *Science, Faith and Society* he later wished to disown.”

Yeager modified her earlier interpretation of Polanyi, and an older Polanyi modified some of the things he had said when younger. These modifications, however, must not be taken to be *conversions* to an entirely different way of thinking, writing, and talking about moral orientations, about the content of the core of human nature, or about the linking of that core to conscience. They are instead further explorations of the implications of their thought.

### 3. Conscience

In “Authority and Conscience,” chapter two of *Science, Faith and Society*, Polanyi described a science student’s slow acquisition of a scientific conscience. The beginning student has to submit to the authority of his teachers and textbooks, but as he matures, he relies less on authority “and more and more on his own responsible judgments.” Polanyi drew an analogy between the attitude of the beginning science student and that of a toddler learning a language. The science student “is urged on by the belief that certain things are as yet beyond his knowledge” but are “on the whole true and valuable.” This is similar to the attitude of the child “listening to its mother’s

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voice and absorbing the meaning of speech.”\textsuperscript{19} The maturing of the scientist’s conscience is analogous to the maturing of conscience in other domains of society.

“Good conscience” is central to a paragraph Marjorie Grene says sums up \textit{Personal Knowledge} “in a nutshell.”\textsuperscript{20}

It is the act of commitment in its full structure that saves personal knowledge from being merely subjective. Intellectual commitment is a responsible decision, in submission to the compelling claims of what in good conscience I conceive to be true. It is an act of hope, striving to fulfil an obligation within a personal situation for which I am not responsible and which therefore determines my calling. This hope and this obligation are expressed in the universal intent of personal knowledge.\textsuperscript{21}

This paragraph shows both continuity and change compared to what he wrote over a decade earlier in \textit{Science, Faith and Society}. The connections between commitment, conscience, truth, and hope remain. In the earlier book, he connected good conscience to a core constituted by deep commitment to “truth, justice, and charity.” In the “nutshell” paragraph of the later book, he omitted “justice” and “charity.” The omission isn’t confined to this paragraph. The index to \textit{Personal Knowledge} has a long list of page references for both “truth” and “commitment,” a shorter list for “calling,” but there are no entries for “justice,” “charity,” or “love.”\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{19} Polanyi, \textit{Science}, 45.


\textsuperscript{21} Polanyi, \textit{Personal}, 65.

\textsuperscript{22} Books that explore the nature of conscience include Walter Conn, \textit{Conscience: Development and Self-Transcendence} (Birmingham, AL: Religious Education Press, 1981); Darcia Narvaez, \textit{Neurobiology and the Development of Human Morality} (New York: Norton, 2014); Patricia Churchland, \textit{Conscience: The Origins of Moral Intuition} (NY: Norton, 2019). [Editor’s note: In a similar vein, Edwardo Beira, in “Liberty and Tradition: Michael Polanyi and the Idea of Progress,” (in this issue of \textit{Quaestiones Disputatae}) recognizes the shift in emphasis in Polanyi’s \textit{Personal Knowledge} as “later Polanyi” attempting to better ground his social and political views in tacit knowing and a deeper metaphysics, so this omission is neither a repudiation of transcendent ideals such as justice, or a “conversion” as Moodey puts it, but a shift in focus that would better ground those ideals.]
One way of characterizing moral inversion is that it is a morally passionate refusal to follow conscience. In Romans 7:19, Paul the Apostle confessed: “For the good that I would I do not, but the evil that I would not, that I do.” He was admitting that he didn’t always follow his conscience, but he wasn’t describing a state that exemplifies what Polanyi would call “moral inversion.” That’s because he wasn’t passionately self-righteous in saying that he had refused to follow his conscience. Paul was a sinner but neither a moral invert nor a psychopath.

4. Moral Inversion and Psychopathy

Moral inversion and psychopathy are different anti-ideal types of moral orientation. Robert Hare has conducted some of the definitive research on psychopathy and reported his findings in Without Conscience: The Disturbing World of Psychopaths Among Us.23 One of the defining characteristics of psychopaths is their lack of emotional empathy. In Confessions of a Sociopath, M.E. Thomas says that sociopaths call those unlike them “empaths.” She isn’t a morally inverted person. She is a wife and mother, a lawyer, and a Sunday school teacher. She knows, obeys, and teaches traditional morality. But she also knows that because of her lack of emotional empathy, she could break any of those moral imperatives without feeling any guilt or shame.24 Psychopaths of normal verbal intelligence can understand moral rules and can conform to them. Hare says: “Psychopaths are very good at putting on a good impression when it suits them, and they often paint their victims as the real culprits.”25 Their public self-righteousness is thus quite different from the self-righteous, and explicit, rejection of traditional morality of the morally inverted, though both are willing to use immoral means toward their goals.

As a dedicated Nazi, Heinrich Himmler’s moral orientation was probably very similar to that of the anti-ideal type of a moral invert. He probably wasn’t a psychopath. Polanyi tells this story:

23 Robert Hare, Without Conscience: The Disturbing World of the Psychopaths Among Us (New York: Guilford, 1993). Churchland, Conscience, 130, notes that those who favor the term “sociopath” generally do so as a way of stressing the importance of the social environment as causing this antisocial disorder.


25 Hare, Without, 114.
It is on the record that Himmler, desiring to test the technique of extermination at first hand, ordered the killing of a hundred Jews in his presence, he came near to fainting at the sight. In spite of deliberate training to merciless cruelty, upheld by a firm conviction of its rightness, the horrible sight of their deeds proved a serious difficulty to the persons charged with mass exterminations.\textsuperscript{26}

If Himmler had been a psychopath, he would not have almost fainted at watching the extermination of a hundred Jews. He did experience empathy and suffered because of it, in spite of his commitment to the ideology that legitimated moral inversion.

Polanyi focused more on Marxism than on Nazism as an ideology that fosters and legitimates moral inversion as a personal state. In “The Magic of Marxism,” he lists some ideal virtues that, paradoxically, Marxism appears to champion by claiming that the societies that claim to endorse them are hypocritical. “And indeed,” Polanyi says, “it is not \textit{in spite} of this contempt for justice, equality and liberty, but \textit{because of} it that Soviet Russia is accepted by many as the true champion of these same ideals in the fight against the very nations openly professing them.”\textsuperscript{27} In this later list of traditional ideals, Polanyi includes again political ideals, but leaves out charity or love, which he had included in \textit{Science, Faith and Society}. This is the most important virtue in the Christian tradition. Polanyi doesn’t explicitly reject love as a virtue. It lurks in the background, especially in chapter seven of \textit{Personal Knowledge}, “Conviviality.” But "charity," “love,” and “altruism” aren’t in the indices of Polanyi’s important later works, such as \textit{Personal Knowledge} (1958), \textit{The Tacit Dimension} (1966), or \textit{Meaning} (1975).

5. Bendell’s “Map” and the Fiduciary Program

Resilience, relinquishment, restoration, and reconciliation point to ideals that Bendell brings together to define an ideal type of moral orientation that’s similar to Polanyi’s fiduciary program.

\textsuperscript{26} Polanyi, \textit{Personal}, 205-6.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 228.
Resilience. Bendell emphasizes personal, rather than collective, resilience. He quotes the American Psychological Association:

resilience is the process of adapting well in the face of adversity, trauma, tragedy, threats or significant sources of stress — such as family and relationship problems, serious health problems or workplace and financial stressors. It means ‘bouncing back’ from difficult experiences.  

A person can’t engage in the process of "bouncing back" unless she has the ability to do so. That ability is a virtue, a good habit, a skin-in learned disposition. Learning to adapt well to bounce back after difficult experiences requires both the kinds of skin-in dispositions we call "virtues" or "inner strengths" and social support. Bendell cautions against thinking that bouncing back takes the stressed individual back to where she was previously. All experiences are learning experiences that change the learner irreversibly. This is especially true of difficult experiences from which she has been able to recover and adapt.

Although Bendell focuses on individual resilience, he recognizes that the degree to which a person is resilient is related to the degree of social support that person enjoys. The balance here is between a kind of self-accreditation, an affirmation of my personal resilience, and the recognition that I cannot be resilient without the support of others.

Personal self-accreditation, a key element in Polanyi’s fiduciary program, is important for resilience. Polanyi says:

I have insisted on this before on diverse occasions: pointing out repeatedly that we must accredit our own judgment as the paramount arbiter of all our intellectual performances,

and claiming that we are competent to pursue intellectual excellence as a token of a hidden reality.²⁹

In this text, Polanyi uses “judgment” to refer to a power or ability, rather than to the act of judging. I relate this to Polanyi’s purpose for writing Personal Knowledge: “The principal purpose of this book is to achieve a frame of mind in which I may hold firmly to what I believe to be true, even though I know that it might conceivably be false.”³⁰ I believe that our current situation calls for extending self-accreditation to include affirming my ability to bounce back from difficult experiences. And just as affirming my ability to judge must be done in the face of knowing that I might be mistaken, so also affirming my resilience must be done in the face of knowing that some of the things that threaten me can result in injury, illness, or death.

Relinquishment. Bendell emphasizes voluntary, rather than involuntary, relinquishment:

It involves people and communities letting go of certain assets, behaviours and beliefs where retaining them could make matters worse. Examples include withdrawing from coastlines, shutting down vulnerable industrial facilities, or giving up expectations for certain types of consumption.³¹

Involuntary loss of material things might be termed “deprivation,” and involuntary loss of cherished beliefs, “disillusionment.” Both are different from relinquishment.

Consumerism is a major obstacle to this virtue. Tihamér Margitay says that consumerism is a kind of moral inversion. After reviewing the texts in which Polanyi wrote about moral inversion, he says that it is either a process or a personal state in which (1) “extrinsic values become intrinsic moral values,” and (2) "value-free things become – covertly and in a roundabout way – vested with values.” The result is that "morally neutral things become the object of moral passion."³²

²⁹ Polanyi, Personal, 265.
³⁰ Ibid., 214.
³¹ Bendell, “Deep Adaptation.”
³² Tihamér Margitay, “Moral Inversion: A Social Diagnosis,” in Freedom, Authority and Economics: Essays on
The moral invert doesn’t consume to sustain life, but makes consumption an end in itself, valued with moral passion. The contrast between “eating to live” and “living to eat” captures the spirit of consumerism. A morally passionate consumer will be less resilient when faced with the impossibility of persisting in her habits of consumption.

This kind of moral inversion is closely related to the ideology of perpetual economic growth. It’s said that the economist Kenneth Boulding said: “Anyone who thinks that you can have infinite growth in a finite environment is either a madman or an economist.” Whether or not Boulding actually said this, it resonates with the message of *Limits to Growth*. But the world seems to be full of the kinds of madmen and economists who are morally passionate in their advocacy of perpetual economic growth. This is a kind of moral inversion similar to consumerism.

The element in Polanyi’s fiduciary program that provides an antidote to these kinds of moral inversion is his notion of a calling. The first sentences in chapter ten of *Personal Knowledge*, titled “Commitment,” are:

> ‘I believe that in spite of the hazards involved, I am called upon to search for the truth and state my findings.’ This sentence, summarizing my fiduciary program, conveys an ultimate belief which I find myself holding. Its assertion must therefore prove consistent with its content by practising what it authorizes.

The title of the last section of chapter ten is “Acceptance of calling.” I think that Bendell accepted this kind of calling and has practiced what it authorizes by writing and talking about “deep adaptation.” My acceptance of it has led me to write this essay, and to include discussions of deep adaptation in all the courses I teach.

**Restoration.** Bendell is not advocating the restoration of the kind of industrial civilization that depends on, and produces, perpetual economic and technological growth. He says this:

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34 Polanyi, *Personal*, 299; Polanyi’s italics.
It involves people and communities rediscovering attitudes and approaches to life and organisation that our hydrocarbon-fuelled civilisation eroded. Examples include rewilding landscapes, so they provide more ecological benefits and require less management, changing diets back to match the seasons, rediscovering non-electronically powered forms of play, and increased community-level productivity and support.\(^{35}\)

Because of this aspect of deep adaptation, Bendell is not advocating apathy in the face of climate tragedy. The kinds of restorations he advocates are not going to stop global warming. They are, rather, restorations that *might* make it possible for to survive what it’s too late to prevent. Polanyi wrote that the alternative to moral inversion is to *restore* to us “the power for the deliberate holding of unproven beliefs.” I believe that climate tragedy is already here. This Minotaur has been born. That’s an unproven belief, because even some climate scientists deny, at least in their public statements, that it’s too late. I also believe that we are too late to stop global warming because of the moral inversion of too many of the corporate and governmental leaders thirty years ago. That’s also an unproven belief, because for all too many people, “restoration” does mean returning to valuing profits, perpetual economic growth, and ever-higher levels of consumption above everything else.

**Reconciliation.** This term does not fully capture the scope of the kind of love that’s required for deep adaptation. In a 2019 blog, Jem Bendell and Katie Carr say:

Since birth we have been invited to “other” people and nature. We often assume other people to be less valuable, smart or ethical as us [sic]. Or we assume we know what they think. We justify that in many ways, using stories of nationality, gender, morals, personal survival, or simply being “too busy”. Similarly, we have been encouraged to see nature as separate from us. Therefore, we have not regarded the rivers, soils, forests and fields as part of ourselves. Taken together, this othering of people and nature means we dampen

\(^{35}\) Bendell, "Deep Adaptation."
any feelings of connection or empathy to such a degree that we can justify exploitation, discrimination, hostility, violence, and rampant consumption.\textsuperscript{36}

In this connection, I say that Polanyi’s fiduciary program, as he articulated it in \textit{Personal Knowledge}, also needs some restoration. What I believe needs to be restored was present in \textit{Science, Faith and Society}, where he said that “deep commitments” to “truth, justice, and charity” are elements in a universal human “core,” and that these underground commitments are elements in conscience.\textsuperscript{37} Polanyi, as far as I know, never explicitly rejected charity or love as a traditional virtue, or as one of those deep commitments constituting a human conscience. But he also had little to say about it explicitly in his later books.

Bendell and Carr say that “othering” makes it easier to justify hostility and violence. I don’t disagree, but I do say that this leaves out the way that scarcity generates hostility and violence. An ecological way of talking about scarcity is “loss of habitat.” Climate change is resulting in sea-level rise and more intense storms, making some low-lying areas unsuitable human populations. Loss of habitat also results from drought and the wildfires resulting from drought and extremely high temperatures. Loss of human habitat results in growing scarcity of suitable places for people to live, and subsequent migration. We have ample evidence, however, that too many immigrants generate hostile, and sometimes violent, backlash in the destination countries, or even in more suitable regions in the same country. The legitimation of this hostility and violence doesn’t come just from the “othering” of the immigrants, but also from the resulting greater competition for scarce resources in the destination country. Those who see themselves as "natives" blame immigrants for the scarcities and hardships they suffer. The immigrants become victims of “scapegoating.” Scapegoating almost always occurs in times of hardship, and immigrants are only one kind of category of relatively weak people who are turned into scapegoats.

I believe that it's inevitable that in times of hardship \textit{some} people will turn a category of others into scapegoats. To prevent scapegoating talk from turning violent, even to the extent of


\textsuperscript{37} Polanyi, \textit{Science}, 82-83.
ethnic cleansing or genocide, there must be a coalition of leaders and citizens who include the members of the scapegoated category within the category of “neighbors” whom they are committed to love. Bendell and Carr, however, say that we have to extend that love beyond the love of other people to the love of the natural world upon which human survival depends. I read Pope Francis' *Laudato Si’* as sending the same message to the world.

6. Conclusion

What Polanyi meant by “moral inversion” is complex, and what he meant by the antidote, “fiduciary program” is equally complex. His use of the image of the Minotaur makes the picture more vivid, but further adds to the complexity of his argument. He used “moral inversion” to point both to an internal personal moral orientation and to an external collective ideology. And he used “Minotaur” as the source domain for two target domains, “moral inversion” and “totalitarian government.” In my efforts to adapt Polanyi’s language for our contemporary situation, I have added to, rather than reduced, the complexity of his argument. One added complexity is my using “Minotaur” as the source domain for the metaphor Minotaur à Climate Tragedy. Another is my argument for restoring charity or love to the list of deep “underground” commitments that are both the "core" of human nature and the foundation for a good conscience. I included this in my discussion of Bendell’s notion of reconciliation. I can summarize my attempt to integrate Bendell’s "map" into Polanyi’s “fiduciary program” by modifying Polanyi’s statement of his calling into a statement of *my* understanding of *my* calling. Polanyi said: *‘I believe that in spite of the hazards involved, I am called upon to search for the truth and state my findings.’*[^38] I say:

I believe that in spite of the hazards involved, I am called upon to search for the truth and state my findings, and

1) to help others and myself to be resilient,

2) to help others and myself to renounce consumerism and the belief in

[^38]: Polanyi, *Personal*, 299; Polanyi's italics.
Confronting or Denying the Minotaur

perpetual economic growth,

3) to help others and myself to restore "the balance of nature," and

4) to help others and myself to love our neighbors and our natural environment.

One of the hazards involved is that to conclude a “scholarly” essay with this kind of personal statement is to violate the rule that scholarly writing should be “impersonal.” This is a hazard Polanyi faced in writing Personal Knowledge, and it's one of the hazards I face, given what I mean by saying that I am a follower of Polanyi. I believe that I am called to imitate his efforts to write in a way that was consistent with what he thought and said about thinking and doing. Personal knowing cannot be accurately expressed in impersonal language. “It is the act of commitment in its full structure that saves personal knowledge from being merely subjective.”

39 Polanyi, Personal, 65.