CONVIVIUM

A six-monthly review of post-critical thought

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Contents

1 - News and Notes.

4 - Lived Time: A Polanyian Meditation on the Self and God in Augustine's Confessions. R. Melvin Keiser.


Book Reviews:

16 - Lesslie Newbigin: The Other Side of '84. By John Puddefoot.


21 - Dissertations on Michael Polanyi and other material from the American Polanyi Society Newsletter.

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NEWS AND NOTES

I hope you approve the new look we have given Convivium. We decided on this alteration at a meeting of the ad hoc committee which was formed after our decision to continue for the time-being as an independent publication. This decision highlights our need to increase the membership of Convivium which remains around the sixty mark. While I am sure we are right to aim at being a "Review of Post-Critical Thought" rather than a mere "Newsletter", this does mean additional expense and we have eighteen months, maybe two years, in which to discover whether Convivium has a future in this capacity, or whether our bank balance will dictate otherwise.

Subscriptions We decided it would be sensible to put the minimum subscription rate up from £2 to £3 per annum, since it now costs £250 (calculated at October 1983 prices, which have probably gone up) to produce one hundred copies, including typing and word-processing twice a year. This, of course, does not include postage and other overheads, so our estimated income is now appreciably less than our estimated expenditure. However, we still have a balance at the bank which will prevent us from going into the red for another three issues! I am not including a list of members in this Number of Convivium, since it has not altered much since October. We have two or three new members and, sadly, a few more have failed to respond to final reminders. Subscriptions are due in January of each year and I have so far received eighteen for 1984, which means that over half of you are overdue, but I hope this will be remedied before next October.

Promotions Officer If we could grow from the present sixty members to several times that number, it could make a great difference to our chances of survival. I see little future for us if we remain at our present strength. Even if we merged, we would probably lose our identity. This being so, it seems a matter of some urgency to find someone who would be prepared to act as 'promotions officer' for the next twelve months or so. I am told it is a job which someone could do effectively by giving a couple of hours a week regularly to writing to organisations, institutions, societies, educational publications, journals, conference secretaries, etc. enclosing suitable publicity in the form of a leaflet or poster containing information about our aims, recent articles, etc. I am not able to do it, in fact I would like to find someone to take on my own job, whatever that is! We need someone younger and more in the swim of academic life. Please think about this need for promotion and let me know if you have any good ideas.

News From The U.S.S.R. In November 1983, a letter arrived at Dr. Magda Polanyi's home for Prof. Michael Polanyi from a Professor R.M. Nugarov of Kazan State University enclosing abstracts of a paper he had written and asking for the opinion of the author of Personal Knowledge. This was sent to Prof. John Polanyi to deal with, and I think
It may be of encouragement to readers of *Convivium* to know that there are scholars at the present time in the Soviet Union who know *Personal Knowledge* and are able to give consideration to the thought of Michael Polanyi.

Prof. Bill Scott writes that nearly all the money for his biography project has now been raised. He finds the work very satisfying and is now engaged on the period of the First World War.

Echeverria: A Response to John Puddefoot's Review of his book. (See *Convivium* No. 17) Dr. Echeverria sent me an interesting but rather long and technical response to the above Review. As it may not be of general interest to readers, I suggest that anyone who wishes to see it should send me a stamped addressed envelope and 20p to cover the cost of a copy.

Francis Dunlop writes that his book, *The Education of Feeling and Emotion* (Allen and Unwin), should be out in February, 1984, and that he is now working on a book on Human Nature and Education, in which he intends to discuss Polanyi's idea of man in some detail and bring out the similarity between Polanyi's thought and that of certain continental writers such as Max Scheler and Arnold Gehlen. Other articles of his on moral education, educational theory, and human nature, which contain references to Polanyi can be found in the following journals:

- J. of Further and Higher Ed. Vol 1 No 1, 1977, pp78/92
- J. of Phil of Ed. July 1977, pp 78/97
- Downside Review April 1981, pp 79/96


I have just been reading this book and marvelling that a book which reflects so many ideas familiar to me from my reading of Polanyi could have not a single reference to Michael Polanyi in the index. Alasdair MacIntyre is writing about the failure of modern thought to justify morality and its attempt to reduce this to the status of personal preference, resulting in the rejection of conventional morality and in a culture which has increasingly come to embody emotive theory. This loss of objective moral standards constitutes a grave cultural impoverishment and, according to MacIntyre, the only way to recover a sense of the objectivity and authority of moral rules and to restore the language and practice of morality to an honoured place within our social life is to recreate forms of community within which objective moral standards can again become meaningful and sustain us through "the new dark ages which are
already upon us." (p 245) Since the Enlightenment, every attempt to find a new basis for the rules of morality has failed, whether it be the greatest happiness of the greatest number or the idea that man qua man has certain natural rights. The idea of human rights, like utility, has proved to be a moral fiction, but in our present culture of bureaucratic individualism moral debate continues with mock rationality between the individual who argues for his rights and the institution which argues for utility, a debate in which the preferences of arbitrary will and desire are barely concealed. As MacIntyre says, modern society represents a victory for emotivism while continuing to extend the range of moral fictions. One of these is that what MacIntyre calls the 'manager' class has an expertise and a bureaucratic efficacy which gives it authority to exercise social control and use vast resources in the interests of social change. This claim to authority mirrors the claims made by the natural sciences to have certain knowledge of a domain of morally neutral facts, on the basis of which law-like generalisations can be made and applied.

Legitimation of the institutional forms of twentieth century social life depend on the belief that the claims of 18th century philosophy have been vindicated, but as MacIntyre shows in some detail, the concept of management effectiveness based on a knowledge that gives predictive power is one more moral fiction. Apart from this, attempts to create a predictable bureaucracy committed to creating an equally predictable society is doomed to failure, since any organisation efficient enough to be able to render society predictable would itself have to be predictable and organisational success correlates, not with predictability, but with adaptability, individual initiative and a multiplicity of centres of problem-solving and decision-making.

MacIntyre suggests that our modern tendency to start from a concern with rules and then define virtue as the effective desire to act on right principles should be reversed. We should attend first to the question of what sort of persons we are to become. The self is a social creation and life is a hazardous progress, (Polanyi might say, a heuristic exploration), in which virtues are qualities tending to achievement and vices qualities tending to failure. Every life exhibits a certain narrative order, within which the self can win or lose, save itself or be destroyed. For us, in a post-Aristotelian world, certain questions confront us: What is our human telos? In what does human well-being consist? In a world without city-states, how can we function as part of an ordered community, seeking the human good together in friendship, understanding this term in Aristotle's sense, which is close to what Polanyi means by conviviality? What role can conflict be understood to play in human life, if it is to help us learn what our ends and purposes are? MacIntyre offers some suggestions of his own, but it is my hope that someone who reads this book will be tempted to take up these crucial questions and explore the kind of answers that a study of Polanyi's thought might yield. If MacIntyre is right, then Polanyi's vision needs to be brought back centre stage, the vision of a free society, structured in ways that can create interlocking centres of conviviality at every level of our social and economic life, able to function for the common good and for common ends under a firmament of self-set standards of excellence such as have inspired and ruled men's lives in every age.
This is a critique of the way in which theology has been influenced by the inheritance of the Enlightenment. It stresses the need for theology to take note of such writers as Gadamer and Polanyi and to use their insights appropriately. The book is reviewed in Theology, Jan. 1984, by Maurice Miles, who concludes it as having important things to say, although it betrays an uncritical dependence on the patristic tradition.

Since the publication of Andrew Louth's book, two others have appeared, also applying Polanyi's thought to theological issues. Both are reviewed in this issue of Convivium. I would welcome offers of further review for our October issue.

Finally -- please do not wait to be asked for offers of articles, information, notices of books, reviews, and anything of interest to our readers. I would also like to ask all of you to do a little 'promoting' and try to get some new subscribers in the course of 1984!

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LIVED TIME:
A POLANYIAN MEDITATION ON THE TEMPORALITY OF SELF AND GOD
IN AUGUSTINE'S CONFESSIONS

I have often wondered about Michael Polanyi's statement in Personal Knowledge that Augustine was the founder of postcritical philosophy. He puts it this way: "In the fourth century A.D., St. Augustine brought the history of Greek philosophy to a close by inaugurating for the first time a post-critical philosophy." This is curious because "postcritical" refers for Polanyi to philosophy that comes after the great "critical" era begun by Descartes and paradigmatically expressed by Kant. Nevertheless, he explains this claim by saying that Augustine "...taught that all knowledge was a gift of grace, for which we must strive under the guidance of antecedent belief: nisi credideritis, non intelligitis."¹ There is an ambiguity in the meaning of Augustine's concept of belief. While he usually speaks of it as doctrinal assent, the conscious acceptance of religious truths, such as the trinity or incarnation, it can also carry the connotation of a much deeper personal commitment ingredient in our very existing of which we are not ordinarily aware. It is in this existential rather than doctrinal meaning of belief that Polanyi sees Augustine originating postcritical philosophy.

"Postcritical" for Polanyi does not refer, therefore, to an era that comes chronologically after the period of Kant but rather to a philosophical orientation which recognizes that all knowledge is based on belief, and is hence contrary to the Kantian ethos, still very much with us today, that separates knowing and commitment. Such belief Polanyi calls "tacit commitment." To understand what Polanyi means by this, it is necessary to see that for him commitments can exist on unconscious as well as
conscious levels, and that this type is basically unconscious. Thus he speaks of a knower's tacit commitment to the search for knowledge, a speaker's to language, a thinker's to a cultural heritage, a citizen's to a community, and a doer's to its body and the space of its action. By reflection we can become conscious of these commitments; nevertheless, as we engage in the activity, we are unconsciously or tacitly dependent on the commitment, that is, unaware of it in the moment of relying upon it.

Even though Augustine speaks mainly of belief in the explicit sense of conscious assent, Polanyi discerns an additional meaning that has to do with commitments lying in the depths of the existing self without which it would not be. It is to this level of commitment that Polanyi wishes to call our attention as the way to go beyond the critical pursuit, whether in modern empiricism or rationalism, for a knowledge of objective certainty separated from the personal act of commitment. He finds just such a grounding of knowing upon commitment long before the emergence of the modern era of critical thought in one meaning of belief of this great pivotal figure who stands at the end of the Classical period and the beginning of the Middle Ages. This additional meaning of belief is, however, more latent than manifest in Augustine. He nowhere explicitly defines belief in this way and yet in his theology so richly oriented toward the personal the lineaments of tacit commitment are discernible even if not acknowledged by him.

This more deep-lying meaning of belief is especially evident in the Confessions, where he is exploring the foundations of his personal existence before and after conversion to Christianity. One aspect of personal existence in which we can see such belief at work is time. For Augustine temporality is not an objective feature of the world but a dimension of our personal being, although to be sure, in the world. As Polanyi would say, it is neither "objective" (that is, detached from human involvement) nor "subjective" (that is, detached from reality, having no bearing on anything beyond mere subjectivity and its projections), but "personal" (that is, something real beyond thinking or projection but upheld on a foundation of unconscious reliance). Augustine presents time as such a personal phenomenon, and in this we can discern the latent presence of tacit commitment without which the self would not be temporal, and therefore, human.

I call this essay a "meditation" because it is a search from a certain untraditional point of view for a depth of insight into the text and our lives, rather than a tight step by step argument moving by irrepresible logic to a single conclusion and thus issuing in the critical demolition of all alternative views. We will be looking at a side of Augustine that Christian theologians usually overlook so that we cannot assume a common point of view, as tightly reasoned arguments do, nor argue away the alternative views, since they have their appropriateness from their point of view and focused at their level of inquiry. We must first glimpse this facet of his thought by probing to the fitting depth and seeing what is there from a perspective sensitized to discerning the presence of tacit commitments. The confusions and uncertainties scholars have expressed in dealing with Book XI, which has proved resistant to normal theological interpretation, can, I believe, be resolved through recognizing the post-
critical lineaments in his view of time.

This is a meditation as well because it seeks to grasp imaginative connections between time and several theological issues. For instance, human temporality, usually juxtaposed to eternity, here in Book XI at least, even if perhaps nowhere else in his writings, provides an image for eternity. Other connections suggest answers to several questions that recur whenever one returns to the Confessions: Why does an autobiographical account of coming to faith even consider the matter of time? What difference does the Christian incarnation really make to his Platonism? What effect does the confessional, autobiographical form as prayerful meditations have upon any of its content?

Finally, this is a meditation because I am seeking to extend Polanyi's own thought. He has little explicit to say about time so I am groping, not only to illumine Augustine on time, but to make articulate what is intimated in his own perspective—an approach, I might add, thoroughly Polanyian, as he says: "I believe that the function of philosophic reflection consists in bringing to light, and affirming as my own, the beliefs implied in such of my thoughts and practices as I believe to be valid." With such a declaration of (complex) intent in the background, we begin with a close look from a postcritical perspective at what Augustine's view of time is in Book XI of the Confessions.

He begins with a comparison of time and eternity, distinguishing them as succession and perpetual present:

*Time is long only because of the numbers of movements passing by in succession, which cannot have a simultaneous extension; but that in eternity nothing passes by; everything is present, whereas time cannot be present all at once. It would be seen too that all time past is driven on by time future, and all the future follows from the past, and that both past and future are created by and proceed from that which is perpetually present.*

Time is a "passing by in succession" from the future into the past, whereas there is no "passing by" in eternity; everything is "perpetually present." Indeed, eternity creates past and future; it "dictates the times that are past and the times that are to come." While Augustine conceives eternity in terms of a temporal category, the present, he is, nevertheless, considering it here in the normal Christian way as the opposite of time; contrary to time, it "stands still and is neither past nor future." (Conf., XI, 11; p. 265)

Much of the ensuing discussion wrestles with the problems of time as succession, as a passing by of the future into the past, and assumes an eternity that does not contain past and future, for that would be to admit a passing by into what is always only present. If time is a passing by of the future through the present into the past, then the future is a "not yet" and the past a "no longer." (Conf., XI, 14; p. 268) What has not yet passed by does not yet exist and what has already passed by no longer exists. It would seem that only the present exists. But what is that? Is the present a century, a year, a month, a day? Within each of these he finds a passing by, so that he divides it into smaller and smaller units until he concludes, if time is succession, then the present must be an indivisibly small point:

And that very hour itself is made of fleeting moments; whatever part of these has fled away is in the past, whatever remains is in the future. If anything can be
meant by a point of time so small that it cannot be divided into even the most minute particles of moments, that is the only time that can be called "present." (Conf., XI, 15; p. 269)

How then, he asks, can even the present be said to exist? Such a present has "no duration and no extension"; (Conf., XI, 15; p. 269) "So that it appears that we cannot truly say that time exists except in the sense that it is tending toward nonexistence." (Conf., XI, 14; p. 268) But where then does time come from, he asks, where is it going to, and how is it passing by? (See Conf., XI, 21; p. 273)

It is easy to be misled by our own objectivist perspective about time into thinking that what Augustine has been presenting is his own view of time, and that the answer to these questions is found in repainting to a concept of eternity as a perpetual present that dictates time. This is not, however, the case. He rejects time conceived as only this kind of succession. While continuing to affirm the passing-by-ness of time, he reconceives time present as having extension and duration, and therefore embraces time past and future as existing.

Succession time is an objective view of time; it exists independently of a perceiver. This is basically Aristotle's view when he says "time is the number of motion or itself a kind of motion." While not referring explicitly to Aristotle, Augustine rejects just such a view that defines time in terms of motion: "Time, therefore is not the motion of a body." (Conf., XI, 24; p. 277) What Augustine realizes is that time is a dimension of our experience: we "feel spaces of time"; we "perceive definite periods of time"; and "we compare them" and "measure time by our perception of it." (Conf., XI, 15-16; pp. 269-270) We "feel" and "perceive" time because past, present, and future exist in the "secret place" of our mind: "It is in you, my mind, that I measure time." (Conf., XI, 17 & 27; pp. 270 & 281)

It is within the human mind that Augustine finds the locus of the existence of time past, present, and future. Here is not an infinitesimal point but a broad space of duration and extension. Even while things slip by from the future through the present into the past, the mind's act of attention is a constant and enduring present: "our attention (our 'looking at') is something constant and enduring, and through it what is to be proceeds into what has been." The breadth of the mind's attending extends to past and future: it "...is extended in two directions--toward my memory... and toward my expectation..." (Conf., XI, 28; p. 282) Moreover, the mind is the medium or the agency which makes possible the passage of time inasmuch as our attention is that through which the future moves into the past.

While Augustine continues to recognize that what has not yet happened and what has already happened do not exist as such, and that time is fleeting in the present, he now sees that past and future do exist in their relation to a self as the expected future and the remembered past of our present attention. Past, present, and future exist as actions of the mind's attention:

in the mind, which performs all this, there are three things done. The mind looks forward to things, it looks at things, and it looks back on things. What it looks forward to passes on through what it looks at into what it looks back on. No one, of course, can deny that the future does not yet exist. But nevertheless there is in the mind already the expectation of the future. No one can deny that the past no longer exists. But nevertheless there is still in the mind
the memory of the past. No one can deny that the present time has no extension, since it passes in a flash. But nevertheless our attention (our "looking at") is something constant and enduring, and through it what is to be proceeds into what has been. Thus it is not the future that is long, for the future does not exist; a long future is a long expectation of the future. Nor is the past long, since it does not exist; a long past is a long memory of the past. (Conf., Cl, 28; p. 282)

There are then three times: "the present time of things past is memory; the present time of things present is sight; the present time of things future is expectation." (Conf., XI, 20; p. 273) Another way in which he says this is that things in passing by leave "impressions" or "images." (Conf., XI, 18 & 27; pp. 271 & 281) When we measure the past and say that something past is longer or shorter, we are measuring these impressions or images. That is, the past is not a "no longer" and the future a "not yet," but they exist as dimensions of the present of enduring attention.

What Augustine has recognized is that conceiving time as succession is inadequate, not because time does not pass by, but because this apparently objective succession requires the notion of a perceiver: there is no "passing by" without a perceiver passed whom things pass by. While one can still divide time into infinitesimally small segments through thought, the time we experience in our living has a breadth. Even as time flies by us, we exist in an enduring present in which we attend to what is passing and we embrace a real past and future. While not denying the passing-by-ness of things, Augustine arrives at a concept of time that is not objective, but personal; what we might call "lived time." 6

This is a postcritical concept of time, for time is a dimension of human experience upheld by the human action of attention in the enduring present. While the personal nature of time is explicit in the text, the presence of tacit commitment is latent. It is implicit in Augustine's notion of the act of attention that sustains time. We are frequently led astray here because we are inclined to assume a Cartesian consciousness: mind, any act, and the act of attention must be explicit. This would, however, make nonsense of what Augustine is saying. If we attended explicitly to time in a constant manner, we would not be able to notice anything else. What Augustine is saying only makes sense if we understand mind, act, and attention as tacit. Only in an unconscious way can the mind's act of attention be a constant and enduring present, can the mind be the medium or agency enabling the passage of time. Through this tacit mind we are committed to time in its passing from future, through the present, and on to the past, and to time as this enduring present embracing the present future and present past, as anticipation and memory, as well as the present present, as sight. Even this present sight is tacit rather than explicit, since we never notice the present as such but always something in the present, since we do not notice our act of seeing while we are looking at something but only the thing looked at.

In the last few pages of Book XI he uses the reciting of a well-known psalm as an example of human temporality. Before I begin to recite, he says, my expectation is extended over the entire psalm; I attend to it in the present as expectation. As I recite it, it is all present to my attention but passes from the present of words expected to the present of words being said to the present of words remembered. Hence expectation grows shorter as memory grows longer until the recitation is finished. As
I am reciting, I am not focusing on all of it, but rather simply on the part that I am actually saying, or singing. Nevertheless, he wants to say, there is a sense in which I am attending to what has preceded, and is now in the past, and to what is to follow in the future, and therefore to the entirety of the psalm. Such "constant and enduring attention" cannot be a conscious focusing, as is occurring in what I am reciting at the moment, but must be tacit. I rely unconsciously upon past and future, and the whole, as I attend explicitly to the part I am at present reciting. Moreover, in such an act I am relying tacitly, as well, both upon my capacity to attend and myself as actor.

While the notion of tacit commitment is latent in all this—yet I am suggesting, is indispensable to making sense of it—Augustine, does, nevertheless, directly acknowledge two levels of knowing when he says: "What then is time? I know what it is if no one asks me what it is; but if I want to explain it to someone who has asked me, I find that I do not know." (Conf., XI, 14; p. 267) Here is a recognition, like Polanyi's "we can know more than we can tell," of the simultaneous explicit understanding and much richer inarticulate tacit grasp of which Polanyi is speaking.

This postcritical concept of lived time affects Augustine's understanding of eternity: he uses human temporality as an analogy for God's eternal knowing. After exploring human temporality through the example of reciting a well-known psalm, he expands the scope of enduring attention beyond a brief recitation to longer actions and, indeed, to the whole of a person's life and the entirety of human history:

The same holds good for any longer action, of which the psalm may be only a part. It is true also of the whole of man's life, of which all of his actions are parts. And it is true of the whole history of humanity, of which the lives of all men are parts. (Conf., XI, 28; p. 282)

Time is a dimension of experience such that I live, in some sense, with my whole life present to me, and moreover with the entire history of the human race similarly present.

Having so extended the horizons of the enduring human present, he then uses this to image God's own knowing:

Certainly if there were a mind gifted with such vast knowledge and foreknowledge as to know all the past and all the future as well as I know one well-known psalm, that mind is wonderful beyond belief, stupendous, and awe-inspiring. To that mind everything that is past and done, everything that is to come in future ages, is as clear as, when I was singing that psalm, it was clear to me how much and what I had sung from the beginning of it, how much and what remained to be sung before I reached the end. (Conf., XI, 31; p. 284)

God knows all of time as I know a well-known psalm while reciting it. Eternity—here is not the opposite of time; its perpetual present is seen as an enduring present. Past and future are embraced within eternity; the present is not static but enduring. Is there then a passing-by in God? Augustine does not say, he does not elaborate; the analogy implies that God, like humans, knows the future as genuinely future, that is, in expectation, and the past as the real past, that is, memory. Time passes in the enduring present of God from present expectation to present memory through present sight.

None of this Augustine develops. Nevertheless, it is interesting that within this analogy of lived time the differences between time and eternity are drawn out
principally in terms of distraction and clarity, not change and unchangeability. As we have seen in the above quotation, the entire future and past is as clear to God as the psalm is to the one reciting it. But in fact, there is for the self a distraction even in the reciting of a well-known psalm: "When a man is singing or hearing a song that he knows, his feelings vary and his sense is distracted as the result of his expectation of the words to come and his memory of the words that are past. But nothing of this kind happens to you..." (Conf., Cl, 31; p. 284) God's knowing of time is then not only more comprehensive but clearer.

Augustine does go on to speak at the end of this quote of the "immutably eternal"; (Conf., XI, 31; p. 284) but placed within the context of the analogy of lived time, this immutability is understood as an undistracted clarity. It is just such a God whom he has experienced in his own conversion, as his own time-full existence is being transformed now from "unlikeness" to God to "likeness," (Conf., VII, 10, XII, 28, XIII, 2-5; pp. 149, 310, & 317-319), from being "distracted" to being "concentrated," from being "wasted" and "scattered" to being "intent," from being "dispersed" to being "gathered," from being "torn apart" amidst the "many" to "flowing into" the "One." (Conf., XI, 29; p. 283)

The perpetual present of eternity is not the opposite of our experience of time passing from future into the past. It is rather like the enduring present of our attention holding before us time past, present, and future. It is, nevertheless, distinguishable from human time, but as clarity is different from distraction. Immediately after using this analogy of lived time for God, Augustine says that, of course, eternity is much more mysterious than this analogy would suggest: "But far be it from me to say that it is in this way that you, the creator of the universe, creator of souls and bodies, know all the future and the past. No; your knowledge is far more wonderful, far more mysterious than this." (Conf., XI, 31; p. 284) What we have seen is but an analogy. Nevertheless, he is using a temporal analogy here; regardless of how he speaks of eternity elsewhere, he is, in this locus classicus of Book XI, speaking of it in terms of lived time.

But why does he speak of time at all in an account of his conversion? There is certainly the philosopher's interest in a subject dealt with by classical thinkers to see now how it would look from the new perspective afforded by his conversion to Christianity; he tells God and us his "soul is on fire" in his "longing to know." (Conf., XI, 22; p. 274) More deeply, he has experienced the presence of God in his life through mystical ascent and wants to locate a time, beyond the fleetingness of temporal sequence, that provides space of sufficient permanence for meditation: "at your nod the moments fly past. Grant me from them a space for my meditations." (Conf., XI, 2; p. 258) Finally, he wants to comprehend the temporal space occupied by his conversion. He has narrated the multifarious changes in his life; time is of the essence. What is the nature of this time in which conversion has occurred and in which he has found an eternal foundation for his life? It is a time of enduring present in which the fragments of his entire life, past, present, and future, can be gathered together under the light of Christ and be transformed. If time were merely
fleeting, having no breadth, divine forgiveness for those moments past, which would be no-longer, might be possible, but such transformation here and now of the whole timeful self toward the likeness of God would be impossible.

Here then is a view of incarnate time-time as a dimension of human action, or more properly of human being, since it is not an act we perform at one moment and not another. To be human is to be committed to time, to participate in this enduring present. But what now has the incarnation to do with this? Augustine tells us the incarnation was the pivotal difference for him between the Platonists he had belonged to and the Christians he joined. Among the Platonists he found that the Word was the true light present in the world and in every person by which the world was made, but only among the Christians did he find: "that the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us." (Conf., VII, 9; p. 147; his Italics) Christ as incarnate Word is the mediator between the clarity of the One and the distraction of the many, between eternity and time. There is no doubt that belief in the self-emptying of the Son of God in Jesus and the ensuing crucifixion and resurrection are central to his conversion. But there is something else at work here in addition to this orthodox view.

Augustine not only believes in the incarnation of the Word in Jesus, he has experienced it within himself: his confessional search has shown the presence of the Word in his own life from the time of his birth. Here is still Platonism, but of the Johannine witness: "the Word, God Himself, is that true light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world." (Conf., VII, 9; p. 147; his Italics) Without its presence within ourselves we would not exist: "I could not exist therefore, my God, were it not for your existence in me." (Conf., I, 2; p. 18) The Platonist knew of the Word's presence in soul and world, but to recognize the Word has become flesh is to affirm a much more intimate connection between time and eternity than in the Platonists. For them the Word is present in the world and immortal soul as an eternal order, as the illumination of unchanging Being in the world of Becoming. If, however, the transiency of a human life and death in Jesus can embody the Word, then beyond the Platonists' eternal order in world and soul the Word has really entered the fleetingness of time.

It is this radical presence of eternity in time, in his own becoming, that Augustine has himself experienced as the scatteredness of his temporal existence has been gathered up by the One present in his life. Augustine reflects on time following the narrative of his conversion because he has experienced time, not merely as the flux of the Platonist's Becoming, but as the space of the eternal Word's appearing and transforming presence. This is a space with breadth, with duration and extension; how else could it be the enduring present of his first thirty-one years, how else could it be a place in which the non-fleeting Word could be revealed and grasped? The incarnation is an essential ingredient in Augustine's postcritical perspective because it is lived time the Word enters and dwells within; it is lived time that bears an eternal significance.

How then is the confessional form of his writing appropriate to this content? He begins and ends Book XI discussing confession. He tells stories "to stir up my own
and my readers' devotion toward you" and "to lay open our feelings to you, confessing to you our own wretchedness and your acts of mercy to us, so that you may set us entirely free...and we...become happy in you." (Conf., XI, 1; p. 257) He closes his inquiry into time confessing humility and a sense of security:

Let him who understands confess to you, and let him who does not understand confess to you. How high you are! And the humble in heart are the house in which you dwell. For Thou raisest up those that are bowed down; you are their height and from that height they do not fall. (Conf., XI, 31; p. 284; his italics)

Prayer, meditation, dialogue with God is the way to seek to know: "Let me seek you, Lord, by praying to you..." (Conf., I, 1; p. 17) What is sought is knowledge deep in "the inner recesses of your secrets" but it is a knowing which is to "share the joy of your light!" (Conf., XI, 31; p. 284) The permanence he has found in the flux of time is the rest he declares himself in search of in the Confessions' opening paragraph: "You stimulate him to take pleasure in praising you because you have made us for yourself, and our hearts are restless until they can find peace in you." (Conf., I, 1; p. 17) Time is considered within this confessional form because this dialogue, narrative, and prayerful wrestle with God reaches to and opens up that dimension of our temporal existence in which we in our enduring present encounter the enduring presence of the Word and find rest.

Incarnation and confessional form go hand in hand when the Word is Incarnate in one's own experience. Time and eternity are similarly intimately joined if the analogy of enduring present of human attention is used for God and if his enduring present is manifest within ours. And so we find in Augustine's discussion of time the foundations of a postcritical perspective: time is dependent upon belief since it is upheld by the personal foundation of attention which involves tacit commitment and awareness. Within the enduring present of our lived time is the enduring presence of the Incarnate Word. Because of the presence of the eternal in time, in my time, our time, Augustine can use a temporal analogy to speak of God and can discover God in his own existence through a confessional form of exploration. The general human experience of time is a religious phenomenon. Even though much of Augustine's thought separates the belief of Christians from universal human experience, there is in the midst of his dichotomous thinking another side, visible from a postcritical perspective, that affirms all humans as temporal beings live by belief and in that living encounter the presence of God, even though only a select few respond to it with conscious belief in the incarnation. We can begin to see, now I believe, how it might be that Polanyi thinks of him as inaugurating a postcritical philosophy.

From within such a perspective, time need no longer be an alien reality, threatening me with meaninglessness and death, which I must resist or be saved from. Rather it is part of me, part of the world I take up and dwell within. Within this time that I live, there is space to be, to be enriched by memory and expectation and present experience and to be open to that Light and Word Incarnate in my depths which can gather up my wasted and scattered self/selves toward a new wholeness that can begin to be at home in time.

R. Melvin Keiser
Notes


2 In his fine interpretation of Augustine no less a scholar than Robert Cushman expresses hesitancy over what Augustine is doing with time here, as indicated by such words as "apparently" and "seems" in the following passage: "Is it, then, the mind which constitutes the interval of duration? Apparently, this is Augustine's conclusion... Time, as the direction of duration, seems to be, then the endurance and identity of the mind..." (Robert E. Cushman, Faith Seeking Understanding: Essays Theological and Critical [Durham: Duke University Press, 1981], pp. 34-35; my italics).

3 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, p. 267.

4 St. Augustine, The Confessions of St. Augustine, trans. by Rex Warner, A Mentor-Omega Book (New York: The New American Library, 1963), XI, 11; p. 265. (All further references will be in text as Conf., with both book and chapter numbers and page numbers from this edition.)


7 Ludwig Wittgenstein makes a similar observation, perhaps influenced by this same statement, when he says: "What does it mean to know what a game is? What does it mean, to know it and not be able to say it?" (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. by G.E.M. Anscombe [New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953], par. 175). See William H. Poteat's identification of this Augustinian statement as a Polanyian theme in his Polanyian Meditations: In Search of a Post Critical Logic (privately circulated, 1979), pp. 98-99.


MICHAEL POLANYI AND THE FREEDOM OF SCIENCE

In the immediate post-war years there took place in this country a vigorous debate on the freedom of science that raised basic questions of perennial interest concerning the necessary conditions for the healthy growth of scientific research. It is worthwhile recalling that debate because of its relevance to current tendencies to plan science and to subserve it to sociological ends.

The root of that debate may be found in the previous decade, when a group of socialist scientists launched a campaign urging that science should be organised for the benefit of all. Their motivation was wholly laudable; they saw the widespread misery in many countries in the late 'twenties and early 'thirties, and were convinced that an era of health and plenty could be ushered in by the systematic application of science and, furthermore, that scientific research should be directed with this end in
view. These beliefs were powerfully expressed by Professor J.D. Bernal in his book 'The Social Function of Science' (Routledge, 1939) and in the widely-read popular science books of Lancelot Hogben, Hyman Levy and John Crowther. These writers greatly admired the way science was organised in the Soviet Union, and urged that their methods should be generally adopted.

During the war years many academic scientists willingly set aside their research, and bent their energies to the task of national survival. In so doing they recognised that they had to work towards definite objectives under centralised direction, and that their work must remain secret, conditions that are the exact opposite to those of normal scientific research. After the war, these habits tended to linger on, facilitating the task of those who aimed to establish the State direction of science as the accepted norm.

This was recognised by several prominent scientists as an insidious danger, and they saw an urgent need to reassert the freedom of scientific research and to counter the propaganda of the advocates of State direction. To do this they founded the Society for the Freedom of Science, and published a number of Occasional Pamphlets. The aims of the Society were summarised by its President, Sir George Thomson, at a meeting in 1951 to celebrate the tenth anniversary of its foundation:

I think our best defence is so to educate scientific and political opinion that it is realised that any interference with scientific liberty will quickly destroy the life of science, with all that that means for the well-being, and indeed for the safety of the State. To do this is one of our most important functions - planning 'is an insidious disease,' and it is our duty to meet it with new and effective remedies.

One of the most active members of the Society was Michael Polanyi, and in three of the earliest Occasional Papers he presented cogent arguments in support of the freedom of science. These papers are: No. 2, Rights and duties of science (1945); No. 4, The planning of science (1946); and No. 6, The foundations of academic freedom (1947).

In these papers he first emphasises the essential distinction between pure and applied science, the one directed to the extension of knowledge and the other to its practical application. The former proceeds by its inner logic, in a way that is understood by the working scientist. It is impossible to predict the results of any investigation, and in particular whether they will have any practical application. It is thus simply not possible to direct pure research so that it will subserve a particular social need, and any attempt to do so destroys the fruitfulness of that research. Once a discovery is made, however, and it appears to have some practical application, it is then possible to undertake research so as to realise that application in the most efficient way. Such research is indeed undertaken for a particular social purpose, and it is entirely sensible that it should be directed by the appropriate authority.

Polanyi remarks that there is in this no implication that the 'pure' scientists are in some way superior to the 'applied' scientists; it is just that they are engaging in different types of activity. Furthermore, these activities are distinguished by their objective, not by the means employed. Thus two scientists may be doing very
similar work with the same apparatus, and yet one is doing pure science and the other applied science. He illustrates this by the analogy of mines and tunnels, both of which are excavated by similar equipment, but have quite different objectives. It is no good confusing the two. If you are digging a tunnel it is no good doing it in a place where it might later on be useful as a mine, and if you are looking for minerals it is no good choosing the place so that your excavation will later be useful as a tunnel. Of course it is always useful to keep your eyes open; if in the course of digging a tunnel you happen to notice some useful minerals, then you note the fact and later, perhaps, you start to dig them out. But when you do this you stop digging a tunnel and start a mine.

The proponents of State direction frequently maintain that this is the most efficient way to solve problems, and this has indeed a superficial plausibility. Polanyi exposes the fallacy by another analogy: Imagine that you must complete a large and complicated jigsaw puzzle as quickly as possible. What would be the best way to go about it? An advocate of centralised direction would say that you must organise a team of people who will follow the instructions of a leader. The alternative strategy is to let each member of the team work individually on his own initiative, fitting in pieces wherever he can, all the time keeping his eye on what the other members of the team are doing, and adjusting his actions as far as he can to correlate with theirs. It is very easy to see which way will get the puzzle completed first.

Polanyi quotes a statement of Enrico Fermi: 'Experience has indicated that the somewhat haphazard exploration of the field of knowledge that results from an intensive freedom of the individual scientific worker to choose his own subject is the only way to ensure that no important line of attack is neglected.' Polanyi comments that the analogy of the jigsaw illustrates this, 'namely that on the one hand the actions of individuals acting according to their own judgement may become spontaneously - and yet efficiently - co-ordinated to a joint task, while on the other hand subordination of the individual efforts to a central authority would destroy their co-operation.'

Polanyi recognises the inadequacies of the jigsaw analogy, in particular the uncertainties in the overall pattern that we seek in scientific research contrasted with the certainty that in a jigsaw each piece has a definite place. While this is a warning not to carry the analogy too far, the progress of science over the last three centuries is sufficient assurance that there is an overall pattern, although often of deeper subtlety than that anticipated by even the most far-sighted discoverer. This gives us 'a sufficient logical ground for the spontaneous co-ordination of individual scientific discoveries. The ground is provided by such coherence as science does possess. In so far as there exists a steady underlying purpose in each step of scientific discovery and each step can be competently judged as to its conformity to this purpose and its success in approaching it, these steps can be made to add up spontaneously to the most efficient pursuit of science.'

Examined more deeply, science combines the two apparently opposed concepts of freedom, namely the absence of external constraint and the liberation from personal ends by submission to impersonal obligations. 'Originality is the principal virtue of
a scientist and the revolutionary character of scientific progress is indeed proverbial, and yet 'science has a most closely knit professional tradition' and is noted for its 'continuity of doctrine and strength of corporate spirit.' There is thus 'no conflict between the principles of spontaneity and constraint.'

This unity between personal creative passion and willingness to submit to tradition and discipline is a necessary consequence of the spiritual reality of science. When the scientist's intuition seeks discovery it is reaching out for contact with a reality in which all other scientists participate with him. Therefore, his most personal acts of intuition and conscience link him most closely with the universal system and the canons of science. While the whole progress of science is due to the force of individual impulses, these impulses are not respected in science as such, but only in so far as they are dedicated to the tradition of science and are disciplined by the standards of science.

Thus, 'if the spontaneous growth of scholarship requires that scholars be dedicated to the service of a transcendent reality, then this impulse implies that they must be free of all other authority.' This applies not only to science but to all scholarship, and ultimately academic freedom can only exist in a free society.

If this transcendent reality is denied, and with it the spiritual foundations of all freely dedicated human activities, then the State inherits the ultimate devotion of men. 'If our conception of truth and justice are determined in any case by interests of some kind or other, then it is right that the public interest should overrule all personal interests in this matter. We have here a full justification of totalitarian statehood.'

The inexorable logic of this analysis of the freedom of the scientist and the consequences of its denial are borne out in grisly detail by the fate of science in Soviet Russia. As soon as one penetrates the superficial adulteration of its socialist admirers, one sees the appalling reality of science enslaved to an alien ideology. This also was publicised by the Society for Freedom in Science. Particular attention was paid to the destruction of genetics, the exile of Vavilov to his death in Siberia and his replacement by Lysenko. The poverty of Soviet science, and the enslavement of its spokesmen to Party dogma are scathingly exposed by the simple device of reprinting extracts from Pravda, Izvestiya and the Soviet Monitor.

Peter Hodgson

BOOK REVIEWS

Lesslie Newbigin, The Other Side of '84 W.C.C. paper £1.95 from B.C.C. 75 pp.

Questions for the Churches

I first read a typescript of this short book which came to me as an umpteenth photocopy of a fairly illegible original, and was very excited by it. Rumour has it that the author was driven to write it out of exasperation with discussions at the British Council of Churches which he felt rested upon a too-ready identification with post-Enlightenment values and assumptions. In sixty pages (there is a post-script by
Wesley Ariarajah from the perspective of Indian Christianity), Newbigin summarises a programme which he hopes will revitalise the Church for a dialogue with modern culture which is not hopelessly relativised by that culture. The book is already a summary of a vast enterprise, and a review which pretended to be able further to condense the material would be an impertinence. I shall therefore concentrate on one central theme, in which Polanyi's thought is used.

To engage effectively with a modern world-view dominated by post-Enlightenment science and rationalism, and to contribute to its future from a distinctive and valuable position, the Church must recover the courage of its convictions and speak authoritatively out of the faith grounded in Scripture and Tradition. In this sense, of staunchly advocating its distinctive perspective, not for its own benefit, but for the benefit of mankind, the Church is called upon and required to be legitimately and appropriately dogmatic. In other words, far from assuming a "dogmatic" position of "this is the way things are, and no discussion is necessary" (which is sterile), the Church must place before the world its own heart-felt contribution to the debate about the shape and future of society. It has insights which do not originate in a scientific world-view, which it should not abandon only to ingratiate itself with that world-view. On the contrary, it should cling to those insights until they are shown either to be untenable or to be of no value.

In this way, Newbigin picks out two central themes in Polanyi which cannot be separated: the notions of conviviality and of the paradox of self-set standards. Polanyi recognises the perpetual tension between our obligations to a peer-group, a community, a "convivium", as the source or fount of our world-view, and our equal (but sometimes opposite) obligation to dissent from the received wisdom of that world-view, not for our own sakes, but that the community might be enriched, moved on, restrained from or redeemed from error. This is the way of the cross, of the way which not out of pride but out of love refuses to comply. This is the paradox: because I love my community, and owe everything I believe and know to it (as the ground of my "fiduciary framework"), and am therefore under an obligation to it, for just this reason I cannot affirm aspects of its belief or practice which I am not persuaded of, and I am condemned and compelled to dissent either until I am convinced that I am wrong (let us never forget that aspect of things), or until they are convinced that they are wrong. In some cases, as with Jesus, this refusal to give in can lead to death at the hands of those one loves more than life itself. On this basis alone, religious education cannot be taught as an aspect of "culture", for it is of the essence of genuine religion that it reaches beyond its own culture without denying its dependence on its modes of expression and world-views. Rationalist utopianism now looks like a bad joke, along with other would-be secular messiah's and master-plans. Yet if religions stop where they point out these failures, perhaps with a touch of self-indulgent delight, they neither make a useful contribution to the debate, nor do justice to what they claim to believe.

All sorts of cliches and commonplace phrases spring to mind which are connected with this argument: "grasp the nettle"; "practice what you preach"; "have the courage
of your convictions". They are all opposite because at its heart the Church seems to have lost confidence in the credibility and relevance of what gave it life. We now need to justify ourselves in terms other than those arising directly from proclamation of the birth, life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, Son of God, Son of the Author and Creator of all things visible and invisible, whose mighty acts are proclaimed in Scripture and made known in Tradition. Either we capitulate to the kind of evangelical self-righteousness which asks whether you are saved (brother) with a doubtful glint in its eye, or to absorption into ephemeral issues which align all-too-easily with contemporary party politics and fringe groupings. In each case, but in markedly different ways, the result is superficiality; we content ourselves with addressing symptoms or counting heads because we can no longer find it in ourselves to believe that the Gospel itself can change the world radically, in the true sense of "to the roots of its being". Whatever the deficiencies of Newbigin's argument (and he admits that they are many), his response to this kind of analysis is plain: nothing less will do.

For Newbigin, the Gospel challenges the world thus: you are using the wrong concepts, in order to implement the wrong plans, which are directed towards the wrong goals; even your efforts at self-renewal are vain, and compound your hopelessness, for wherever you seek to cure a disease by addressing the symptoms rather than the cause you merely succeed in infecting others with it. Thus, if I understand him rightly, some Christians ally themselves with the Left in order to oppose the evils of the Right, or argue that we should spread materialist views of happiness in order to overcome the shortcomings of materialist economies that cannot deliver the goods (in all senses of the word), and so on. Nowhere does the Gospel speak distinctively against the innermost contradiction of Enlightenment philosophy: the establishment and defence of human autonomy based upon individualism simultaneously with the establishment and defence of objectivist science based upon the complete eradication of all personal elements from knowledge. The result, a man with rights but no duties, with perception and knowledge but no responsibility for what he perceives and knows, has been catastrophic.

The man Jesus placed love of God, and love of neighbour, and love of self, side by side because he did not see autonomy and independence as constituting "happiness". Today, the Church cannot preach a gospel which satisfies human expectations because nobody and nothing can satisfy expectations based upon illusion and error (Enlightenment expectations). Instead we should be asking at least five questions: what does it mean to be a human person; what is the goal of human life; what are the rights and capabilities of governments; what is our vision of the future; and what is involved in genuine knowing?

Newbigin reminded me of perhaps the greatest piece of literature in the Bible, if not the world, the story of Job. Unlike Job, the Church has sought to ease its suffering by listening too readily to latter-day Eliphaz, Bildad, Zophar and Elihus; it has too readily repented of its "dogmatism", of its lack of science, of its dependence upon distant history, of its lack of irrefutable proof for its claims. It would do
well to remind itself of him who created the foundations of the world. In that court, and in the presence of that judge, it would legitimately learn that it had uttered what it did not understand, and been charged and invested with words too wonderful for it to bear; and then it would see with its eyes what it had only heard with its ears, and could legitimately despise itself, and repent in dust and ashes.

John C. Puddefoot


Gunton's book will make fascinating reading for anyone interested in both theology and the thought of Michael Polanyi. I hope it will also provide an illuminating introduction to Polanyi's thought for those who have not yet discovered the relevance of his ideas for theological method. In the first instance, this book is about Christology, but the issues it raises are of central importance for theology as a whole. Gunton highlights the irreducibly dualistic assumptions, both epistemological and ontological, of classical and Enlightenment thought and shows how inadequate these are as a framework within which to explore theological and Christological reality. The fundamental problem of Christology is how to understand the claim that Jesus is both God and man. Gunton shows that if we are ever to understand the human life of Jesus as the presence of God in time and to make this central Christian claim meaningful, we need to work with non-dualistic assumptions about the nature of both knowing and being. He finds in Michael Polanyi's paradigm of personal knowledge the necessary non-dualistic framework of thought for this and argues that the key to this unitive understanding of knowledge lies in Polanyi's metaphor of indwelling, which enables us to do theology in a way that makes possible a critical affirmation of Christianity's foundational beliefs without introducing discontinuity. Once we accept that all knowing is a matter of 'indwelling', we can, says Gunton, appreciate that "(all) human intellectual enterprises are necessarily fallible, but not for that matter necessarily mistaken. In fact the reverse is the case. Because we indwell the world knowledge can be contingent, fallible and partial without for that reason losing its claim to be knowledge. That is the significance for our purposes of the epistemology of Polanyi." (p 145)

Not only does Polanyi free us from having to view the problems of Christology from the perspective provided by the Enlightenment, but he frees us to look again at the method of the New Testament, which confidently holds together that which is 'from below' - the human and temporal - and that which is 'from above' - the eternal and divine - within an interpretative framework supplied by tradition. Knowing by indwelling combines both approaches to Christology and allows us to work from above - experienced as a self-revelatory quality in the object of our knowing - and from below in a dynamic interaction of reason, imagination and intuition. Gunton is concerned to
show that it is possible to be modern and to contribute theologically to the thought of our age without capitulating to its immanentist thinking. Here it is important to take Gunton's point that it is not only the language of the tradition that we indwell, but the reality of which it speaks. According to Michael Polanyi, there is no direct fit between words and things. All language is indirect and can perform its task only with the aid of metaphor and other figures of speech. This is not to deny that words can bring to light hidden aspects of reality. When we use words successfully, this can be an aid to indwelling the reality to which they refer. But there is a dynamic internality of relation between our words and the real world. This inner dynamic is at work in the theological enterprise as in every exploratory activity of the human mind. There is no radical discontinuity between language and reality. According to the New Testament writers, Jesus Christ exists now as the object of present knowledge and Gunton suggests that "by our personal indwelling of his reality (through the language of worship and tradition) our words may come to express, successfully but indirectly, something of the truth about him." (p 147) The metaphor of indwelling is already familiar to the New Testament writers. Paul talks of being 'in Christ' and the Johannine literature contains many expressions of mutual indwelling. Even Polanyi's central category of conviviality echoes Christian language about a relationship with Christ which becomes more real in the worshipping community. As the personal relationship of worship gives rise to doxological language, this in turn is indwelt and makes possible a clearer account of the object of the believer's worship, through whom indwelling becomes actual.

The importance of Michael Polanyi's theory of knowledge for Gunton's thesis is out of all proportion to the space given to a description of his thought, but Gunton takes full advantage of its implications in working out his own methodological approach to Christology. In particular, he sees how it opens up the possibility of doing theology in a way that allows us to assimilate the gifts of tradition without being its slave and how it liberates us from a rigid view of the relationship of words and things. Polanyi's epistemology greatly strengthens Gunton's hand as he sets out to show how, "far from abandoning the tradition, we may learn to stand on the giant's shoulders in the cautious hope of being able to see a little further than they." (p 208) In his Epilogue, Gunton concludes his plea for continuity in Christology with the warning that "a 'critical' theology which operates only or chiefly by rejection of all that came before the modern era will be a blind theology, for it will have lost its roots" and he goes on to say that we shall not have the theological tools to combat distortions of Christology unless we accept the legacy of the Fathers and take further the process of thinking which they began. "They realized that the incarnation demanded a rethinking of the word 'God'. The God of Christendom largely...escaped that rethinking, but it was an aberration and untrue to the main direction of patristic theology and Christology." To renew our thinking "about the living Jesus of the Church's worship and of New Testament confession...cannot be done without assistance from the past, nor without the great labour of exercising thought and judgement as to where the past was right and where it was wrong." (pp 208/209)
The pivotal statement at the heart of Gunton's discussion is that Jesus of Nazareth is the logic of God's holy loving, making present in historical actuality its eternal reality. Within the dualistic framework of modern thought, the concept of God-manhood raises insoluble problems, not least because the words God man are understood in mutually exclusive ways, which make this kind of self-differentiation in God logically impossible. Gunton suggests that we can only avoid dualism and docetism by seeing the life of Jesus as the very power and knowledge of the love of God expressed under the conditions of temporality and humanity. The question of contradiction is then seen to depend, not on the concept of God uniquely present in the world, but in the meaning of the words we use to express this.

Many of the issues raised by this book concern questions of ontology as much as questions of epistemology, which gives me cause to regret that Gunton did not develop Polanyi's ideas more fully in this area in discussing the problem of soteriology. Gunton himself seems to handle the discussion more confidently at the epistemological than the ontological level, but he has to move from epistemology to ontology in dealing with the question of the relationship of Christology to soteriology and I believe he could have better illuminated the discussion if he had made use of Polanyi's ontology which flows naturally from his theory of knowledge and which has important implications for the nature of ultimate reality. However no doubt this needs to be the subject matter of another book.

Joan O. Crewdson

Dissertations on Michael Polanyi

In the American Society Newsletter Vol X No 2, Winter, 1983, the following list of dissertations appeared with an explicit reference to Michael Polanyi in the title. Richard Gelwick has begun a computer storage programme that will keep a record of Polanyi bibliography, so if readers of Convivium are aware of any similar studies in Britain, please let me know. I will pass on any information you send me, which should include: Author, Title, University, Dept, Year, Nature of Thesis.

Gelwick, Richard Lee.
Michael Polanyi: 'Credere Aude.' His Theory of Knowledge and Its Implications for Christian Theology.

Reshaur, Kenneth Morton.
Michael Polanyi: The Political Relevance of His Thought.
DAI V26(06) p. 3463. 1965 Political Science, General (0615).

Millholland, Donald William.
Beyond Nihilism: A Study of the Thought of Albert Camus and Michael Polanyi.
DAI V27(09), Section A p. 3114. 1966 Religion (0448).
Biersdorf, John Edgar.
Union Theological Seminary in the City of New York (0238) Th.D. 1968 266 pp.
Appraising the Presuppositions of the Pastoral Counselor: Some Applications of Michael Polanyi’s Understanding of Personal Knowledge and Psychoanalytic Investigations of Counter-Transference to Issues in Pastoral Counseling.
DAI V29(11), Section A, p. 4086. 1968 Religion (0448).

Wagener, James Wilbur.
The University of Texas at Austin (0227) Ph.D. 1968 226 pp.
The Philosophy of Michael Polanyi as a Source for Educational Theory.
DAI V29(05), Section A, p. 1692. 1968 Education, General (0515).

Keidann, Joao Carlos.
Michael Polanyi’s Theory of Knowledge as a Possible Framework for Communicating the Christian Faith.
DAI V31(03), Section A, p. 1363. 1970 Religion (0448).

Prust, Richard Charles.
The Knowledge and Reality of God: The Theological Implications of Michael Polanyi’s Epistemology and Ontology.
DAI V31(10), Section A, p. 5512. 1970 Religion (0448).

Smith, Gerald Lafayette.
Tacit Knowing and the Logic of Tradition: A Study in the Thought of Michael Polanyi.
DAI V31(06), Section A, p. 3027. 1970 Religion (0448).

Wilken, Raymond Edwin.
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (0090) Ph.D. 1970 325 pp.
The Relation of Polanyi’s Theory of Personal Knowledge to the Teaching of Biology.

Wohleber, David.
Application of the Polanyi Adsorption Potential Theory to the Absorption of Organic Liquids from Water Solution onto Activated Carbon.
DAI V31(05), Section B, p. 2615. 1970 Chemistry, Physical (0494).

Innis, Robert Edward.
The Logic of Consciousness: An Examination of Michael Polanyi’s Model of Mind.
DAI V32(02), Section A, p. 1015. 1971 Philosophy (0422).

Tiedeman, Kent Hallett.
University of Cincinnati (0045) Ph.D. 1971 159 pp.
Personal Knowledge: The Epistemology of Michael Polanyi.
DAI V32(06), Section A, p. 3375. 1971 Philosophy (0422).

Apctynski, John V.
Doers of the Work: Toward a Foundational Theology Based on the Thought of Michael Polanyi.
DAI V34(02), Section A, p. 0852. 1972 Religion (0448).

Ozcan, Mustafa.
Application of the Polanyi Adsorption Potential Theory to the Adsorption of Solid Solutes from Water Solution onto Activated Carbon.
DAI V33(11), Section B, p. 5178. 1972 Chemistry, General (0485).
Sannerud, David Laurence.
The Philosophy of Michael Polanyi as a Means for Integrating the Fine Arts in Higher Education.
DAI V33(05), Section A, p. 2261. 1972 Fine Arts (0357).

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OTHER MATERIAL TAKEN FROM THE AMERICAN POLANYI SOCIETY NEWSLETTER
FALL 1983. VOL XI NO 1.

It is interesting for us to note that our American counterpart have announced their intention to turn their Newsletter into a Periodical. I quote Richard Gelwick's words:

With this issue of our newsletter, we are experimenting with the possibility of developing a modest periodical that would provide space for longer communications and articles than at present. The inspiration for this approach comes from our counter in Great Britain, Convivium, which adopted this format several years ago. By using a format similar to Convivium, we will also be able to reproduce more conveniently copies of material in that publication. We made an agreement with Convivium earlier to exchange newsletters and to borrow freely from each other for the benefit of our members.

Richard goes on to raise questions of a name, resources, support for the idea and whether there should be an editorial and advisory group as well as leaders in developing the periodical. I may say that the American Newsletter already has a galaxy of names co-ordinating different areas of study under the general co-ordination of Richard Gelwick. We will follow their progress with great interest.

Most of the rest of the material in this Number consists of articles taken from the October issue of Convivium, 1983.