

**The Poetics of Discovery II:  
Creative Imagination and Intuition  
in Polanyi, Stevens, and Bergson**

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**I. Introduction: the literary text as field of potential energy**

This paper presents the rudiments of a literary aesthetic based on Michael Polanyi's account of tacit knowing. I hope to show that his description of the process of discovery in science is a powerful explanatory model for understanding how poetic language is produced by the artist and makes a difference in the life of the engaged reader. Elements of the model have resonances with writers and thinkers from Thomas De Quincey in the nineteenth century to Henri Bergson, Wittgenstein, and others in the twentieth, as well as writers from antiquity acknowledged by Polanyi as sources, such as Augustine. All are contributors to what Dale Cannon calls an "intellectual ethos" that came to a unique focus in Polanyi's post-critical philosophy.<sup>1</sup> The paper looks at poetic language through the lens of the post-critical epistemology of tacit knowing. It also describes the importance of literary study as a way of engaging with the dynamics of tacit knowing and so understanding it from the inside rather than from external analysis. Entering the tacit dimension of knowing is, according to Polanyi, a crucial factor in the scientist's discovery of hidden order in nature. Just so, I will argue, tacit knowing is a crucial phase in the poet's or fiction writer's discovery of hidden order both in her art and in the existential realm; and in the transaction of reading, words, syntax, and literary devices like metaphor are gestures that tacitly transmit meaning from the writer to the reader.

Meaning in literature comes across in multiple layers, some explicit but a vaster range communicated tacitly. My argument is that an understanding of the epistemology of tacit knowing enables one to "tune in" to more of the layers of poetic language. In a minor masterpiece by poet Stanley Kunitz titled "The Layers" the speaker, roaming through the "wreckage" (memories) of his past life, hears inwardly a "nimbus-clouded voice" directing him to "live in the layers/not on the litter"—an imperative that he says he "lack[s] the art to decipher."<sup>2</sup> But the line may be taken as instruction in how to read the poetic text. The language of poetry has layers consisting of outer form (identified by critical intelligence) as well as tacit inner dimensions, perceived only by empathic contemplation, or as Polanyi puts it, "fiduciary commitment" to the search for meaning. By indwelling (living in) the layers of language and mind we make discovery of potential

order (or problematic disorder) in human experience, waiting to be known or worked out in the reality of experience outside the text. Kunitz's subtle indirect instruction to the reader also, I would say, involves resonating to the sub-rational energies of imagination and intuition communicated tacitly by poetic language. These urge us to move with those energies on to pragmatic or existential discoveries of our own. The paper explores how literary texts manifest *the tacit dimension of language*. Reading from an awareness of the "semantic" and "ontological" aspects of tacit knowing<sup>3</sup> (TD 13) opens one to the experience Polanyi calls "contemplation" or "contemplative communion"<sup>4</sup> (PK 197)—an avenue of understanding typically unavailable in either traditional or post-modern criticism. Contemplative reading, I argue, can guide one to enter the tacit dimension, and so proceed to make—or discover—meanings with existential significance.

The process of discovery includes deliberate acts—indwelling, and verification or validation. But at some point, Polanyi's scientist, impassioned with the drive toward discovery, releases some of the tension of deliberate effort and follows a spontaneous heuristic urge of tacit inference, in striving toward her goal. Much the same happens in the contemplative reading of literature. We start by indwelling the text. By releasing some of the tendency to "stand back" and read critically, "against the grain" of the text as it were, contemplative reading respects the tacit dimension in the language of poetry and so offers a way of reading "with the grain." This procedure is learned by allowing the texts to teach us, less about their ostensible subject matter, but more about the capacity of human consciousness to "know" (as Polanyi puts it) "more than [it] can tell" (TD, 4). That capacity has been eclipsed by the powerful tendency toward objectification in modern culture. Yet poets like T.S. Eliot, engaged perennially in "the intolerable wrestle/With words and meanings,"<sup>5</sup> instinctively know something of this "more" as they wrestle. And evidence of this kind of tacit knowing is found in abundance in world literature—sometimes in its content, but more in its forms—notably *metaphor* and other kinds of analogical thinking such as symbol and myth. Texts characterized as "the literature of power," I hope to show, make use of these and other literary devices to activate the reader's dormant capacities for tacit knowing in the discovery process.

In "The Creative Imagination"(1966)<sup>6</sup> and in *Meaning*,<sup>7</sup> Polanyi argues that a kind of artistic interplay between the pre-logical powers of "creative imagination" and "dynamic intuition" is crucial to advances in scientific inquiry and discovery. Using the work of poets, writers, and theorists as examples, including prominently the work of poet-theorist Wallace Stevens (1897-1955), we'll explore the idea that the same interplay of mental forces is palpably at work in the language of poetry and other literary texts. And the same

creative energies are at work, I will argue, in the consciousness of the reader—to ends that may also, by analogy with Polanyi's account of science, be called "discovery." In the course of this study I'll refer to the Henri Bergson (1859-1941), for his perceptive treatment of the themes of intuition and creativity that comport well with Polanyi's emerging post-critical views. Bergson is believed by scholars to have considerably impacted Stevens's art and studies of imagination in the creative process.<sup>8</sup> Probably the most widely read philosopher among artists and writers of his time, Bergson's writings are cited by both Polanyi and Stevens in support of their respective accounts of the tacit dimension and the creative process.

The poetics of discovery recognizes two opposite kinds of literary texts. One called (by literary theorist Thomas De Quincey) "the literature of knowledge," the other "the literature of power."<sup>9</sup> The function of the literature of power is not to inform or argue for the truth of a proposition, but to awaken the affections of readers to something more vital than propositional truth—in De Quincey's words that something is "power, or deep sympathy with truth." Its purpose is to *move* readers, intellectually, emotionally, or spiritually from one framework of assumptions to another more complex or creative framework, able to take more truthful account of the multiple dimensions of experience.<sup>10</sup> A text in the class of the literature of power offers the reader, I will claim, an entry point into a semantic field of potential energy, where words and sentences are designed to motivate or carry one onto a path of discovery. In writing about "composition by field" poet Charles Olson writes, "the poem is energy, transferred from where the poet got it . . . all the way over to the reader." It is "a high-energy construct"; its language creates "an energy-discharge." It is "an energy which is peculiar to verse" and obviously "different from the energy which the reader, because he is the third term, will take away."<sup>11</sup>

As Polanyi puts it in discussing the wider context of human evolution, we are embedded in a vast "field of new potential meanings" (*TD*, 91)—moving toward "an infinite range of higher meanings," asking us to "respond to potential meanings" with "ever more complex acts of understanding" (*TD*, 91). Every text offers the reader of the literature of power these opportunities, not just to "learn" about its contents but to experience its energy. "Tacit knowing establishes a meaningful relation between two terms," exemplified well by the *vehicle* (proximal term) and *tenor* (distal term) of metaphor, to yield "understanding of the comprehensive entity which [the] terms jointly constitute" (*TD*, 13). The skills involved in this type of understanding as applied to literature are a combination of contemplative and artistic abilities. They can to some extent be taught by teachers of literature who have developed them. But as literary scholar Toril Moi

argues, an attitude toward reading appropriate to the level of discourse in a text "can be understood as a form of aesthetic experience in which the reader lets the work teach her how to read it. The reader must be willing to let her own experience . . . be educated by the work."<sup>12</sup> This means trying to avoid imposing a critical methodology on literature whether or not it is "with the grain" of meaning in the text.

The field of potential energy in the encounter with literature is not localized in a private mind (Cartesian *cogito*) standing psychologically at a distance from the text. The field comes into being spontaneously, as a triadic interaction between the text, the person reading, and a third thing: emergent meaning, the event of discovery. Poetic language has the power to *refer* to things outside the text, but also in moments of epiphany to bring us to an experience William James called "the instant field of the present."<sup>13</sup> The interaction of the elements of the triad in reading is an event of tacit knowing. I claim here that reading a text in the literature of power activates the interplay of "creative imagination" and "dynamic intuition" in the mind of the reader as it was enacted by the author in producing the text in the first place. The text then gives us the traces or clues to the creative process of discovery put into effect by the writer. This is "the power of the written word"—according to first-hand reporting by novelist Joseph Conrad—"to make you hear, to make you feel—it is, before all, to make you see . . . [to receive] that glimpse of truth for which you have forgotten to ask."<sup>14</sup> Words like "see" and "glimpse of truth" here are metaphors for existential discovery. That is, meanings in the words and sentences of the text that enable the perception of new order in the human reality, with vital bearing on one's existence. As if addressing an anomaly stemming from Immanuel Kant's claim that we experience phenomenal appearances, but are cut off from seeing or knowing *the things themselves* which cause appearances, Wallace Stevens writes in his magnificent "Credences of Summer"

(1946):           Let's see the very thing and nothing else.  
  
                      Let's see it with the hottest fire of sight.  
                      Burn everything not part of it to ash.  
  
                      Trace the gold sun about the whitened sky  
                      Without evasion by a single metaphor.  
                      Look at it in its essential barrenness  
                      And say this, this is the centre that I seek.<sup>15</sup> (*CP*, 373)

What is it the novelist and the poet claim to "see" by the power of word? "The very thing" as it is, not as we force it to fit our social constructions. In these and other lines Stevens hints at an order of reality, independent of the perceiver, that is paradoxically accessible to the "fire" (spirit, energy) of our "inward sight" (Shelley's term, cited in *PK*, 199) by indwelling the word of poetry. Stevens speaks further of this creative

seeing as "an incandescence of the intelligence and so more than ever a triumph over the incredible"<sup>16</sup> (NA, 60). Through the experience of poetry, we come to identify with the kind of perception experienced and documented by the poet. From this experiential point of view students may make a shift from learning *about* literature, to learning *from* the texts, as an apprentice learns a skill from a master. It is concerned less with the subject matter of literature, and more with the affective and intellectual skills associated with tacit knowing—esp. advanced forms of intuition and imagination, and the post-critical reasoning that springs from them, in studying literary texts.

## II. Discovery through literature: Polanyi, Bergson, De Quincey

Contrary to Kantian critical tradition, Henri Bergson claims that there are "two ways of knowing a thing," one by "going all around it" the other by "entering into it."<sup>17</sup> The way of entering is the way of discovering the hidden coherences in persons and things. When I perceive an object, I recognize its "inner being," and in encountering a person, I see "states of soul" (Bergson writes). "I am in harmony with these states" and "enter into them by an effort of imagination." "I am in the object itself" and so break through the wall that in the Cartesian-Kantian framework separates subject from object, "appearances" from "things in themselves." What I discover and feel will depend upon whether or not "I have renounced all translation [e.g. social construction] in order to possess the original." I grasp not only its meaning, but the thing itself "from within, inside it, in what it is in itself" (CM, 159-60). When a character appears in a poem or novel, Bergson says, the reader gets a "simple and indivisible feeling" by "coinciding for a single moment with the personage himself. . . The character would be given to me all at once in its entirety. . . . [For] what is properly itself, what constitutes its essence, cannot be perceived from without, being internal by definition. . . ." Nor can it be expressed by discursive language, "being incommensurable with everything else. Description, history and analysis in this case leave me in the relative. Only by coinciding with the person itself would I possess the absolute." Bergson's term for this intuitive understanding of anything, but particularly of a person, as "the absolute" refers to an inner conviction of the person's reality, rather than observation or analysis of outward characteristics. Such knowledge "lends itself at the same time to an indivisible apprehension and to an inexhaustible enumeration. . . . it can only be given in an *intuition*, while all the rest has to do with *analysis*. We call intuition here the *sympathy* by which one is transported into the interior of an object in order to coincide with what there is unique and consequently inexpressible in it. Analysis, on the contrary, is the operation which reduces the object to elements already known, that is, common to that object and to

others. . . " (CM, 162). Intuition as a power of experiencing the inner being of another, like Polanyi's astronomer who contemplates the stars "from within," (PK 195), is the power that enables a reader to "identify" with a fictional character. It is also what enables us to activate the power of tacit knowing by entering into the depth dimensions (connotations, tonalities, the tenor in metaphor) of words in literature. In literary study we enter intuitively into the characters and language of the text, practicing intuitive *indwelling* as a deliberate phase of tacit knowing, on the way to spontaneous acts of discovery.

Coinciding with Bergson's conception of intuition as *sympathy*, in explaining the dynamics of literary experience, De Quincey argues that the purpose of "the Literature of *Knowledge* is . . . to give information, [the purpose of the Literature of *Power*] is to *move*. . . . The first is a rudder; the second, an oar or a sail. The first speaks to the *mere* discursive understanding [in the reader]; the second speaks ultimately, it may happen, to the higher understanding or reason, but always *through* affections of pleasure and sympathy."<sup>18</sup> "What do you learn from *Paradise Lost*?" De Quincey asks. "Nothing at all. What do you learn from a cookery-book? Something new, something that you did not know before, in every paragraph. But would you therefore put the wretched cookery-book on a higher level of estimation than the divine poem? What you owe to Milton is not any knowledge, of which a million separate items are still but a million of advancing steps on the same earthly level; what you owe is *power*—that is, exercise and expansion to your own latent capacity of sympathy with the infinite, where every pulse and each separate influx is a step upwards, a step ascending as upon a Jacob's ladder from earth to mysterious altitudes above the earth." De Quincey's "infinite"—construed as "non-finite" or "impossible to measure or calculate"—resonates strongly with Polanyi's adjective "unspecifiable" and his many references to "indeterminacy." These terms, like "sympathy"—also used prominently by Bergson as a synonym for the transformative power of "intuition" in creative evolution—belong to the lexicon of tacit knowing, the seedbed of creativity. Alluding to a view resembling Polanyi's levels of being,<sup>19</sup> De Quincey concludes: "All the steps of knowledge, from first to last, carry you further on the same plane, but could never raise you one foot above your ancient level of earth: whereas the very first step in power is a flight—an ascending movement into another element where earth is forgotten" (De Quincey). This flight is the process of discovery.

Polanyi's connected themes of "dwelling in and breaking out" (PK, 195f) in the discovery process resonate strongly with De Quincey's account of the effects of the literature of power. Polanyi describes "the scientist's urge to ponder new problems and break new paths in seeking to solve them. . . . The most radical

manifestation of this urge to break through all fixed conceptual frameworks is the act of ecstatic vision. . . . The conceptual framework by which we observe and manipulate things being present as a screen between ourselves and these things, their sights and sounds and the smell and touch of them transpire but tenuously through this screen, which [as prescribed by the Cartesian-Kantian paradigm of knowing] keeps us aloof from them. Contemplation [and, I would argue, contemplative reading—indwelling of a literary masterpiece like *Paradise Lost*] dissolves the screen, . . . and pours us straight into the experience; we cease handling things [in literary study, we relax some of the critical faculties in looking at the words and elements of literature] and become immersed in them" (*PK*, 199).

"Contemplation has no ulterior intention" such ideological agendas involved in critique. We move in the dynamic motion of tacit knowing, from indwelling of particulars to the gestalt forming process, where we begin to see comprehensive entities. "As we lose ourselves in contemplation" our own identity is transformed by the process; while the objects of contemplation [including works of art and texts of the literature of power] "are suffused by a visionary gleam" [a term Polanyi borrows from Wordsworth's "Ode on Intimations of Immortality"]. "Artistic creation and enjoyment are contemplative experiences" akin to religious communion. Like mysticism, art "breaks through the screen of objectivity and draws on our pre-conceptual capacities of contemplative vision. Poetry [as Shelly had said in "The Defence of Poetry" (1821)] 'purges from our inward sight the film of familiarity which obscures from us the wonder of our being,' it breaks into 'a world to which the familiar world is chaos'" (*PK*, 196-197, 199). We discover hidden coherences in the fabric of human existence, that emerge as form, like the "figure in the carpet" in Henry James's story of that title. For De Quincey, the "living power" of literature "quickens [the] affections" and "the instincts of wrong and right. Calling them into action, it rescues them from torpor. . . Human works of immortal beauty and works of nature in one respect stand on the same footing; they never absolutely repeat each other, . . . they differ by undecipherable and incommunicable [tacit] differences, that cannot be caught by mimicries, that cannot be reflected in the mirror of copies, that cannot become ponderable in the scales of vulgar comparison. . . . Ideals of justice, of hope, of truth, of mercy, . . . [when] put forth in literature . . . by the creative forces of man, . . . gain a vernal life of restoration, and germinate into vital activities."<sup>20</sup> In this view—shared in varying degrees by Bergson, Polanyi, and Stevens—literature becomes a driver of "creative evolution" in ethics and human sensibility.

Discoveries in literary study become increasingly possible, it seems, for readers who move beyond both conventional and post-modernist criticism—beyond what literary scholar Rita Felski calls "the limits of critique."<sup>21</sup> By the act of "indwelling" the particulars of the text, in anticipation of uncovering hidden order, we enter an initial phase of tacit knowing. The critical tradition that has dominated intellectual culture for generations has set rules, spoken and unspoken, that create boundaries between mind and reality, between the subject and object of knowing. In literary studies this has implied, also for some generations, holding the text at a distance in order to subject it to increasingly acute critique. Speaking of a still-dominant trend in criticism, Felski explains:

. . . the text is described as flat, shallow, empty, depthless, one-dimensional; it is a chain of signifiers, a verbal facade, a discursive structure, a weave of words. And the critic no longer digs down but draws away. Instead of foraging, nose close to the ground, for tempting truffles of truth, she stands back from the text to scrutinize it from afar. . . . [W]hile there are still scholars drawn to a depth hermeneutic . . . the rhetoric of standing back stretches over decades . . . (70).

Felski's *The Limits of Critique* (2015), unravels of the consequences of a "style of interpretation driven by a spirit of disenchantment," an attitude described by Paul Ricoeur as a "hermeneutic of suspicion," whose influence "reaches well beyond the confines of English departments" (Felski, 2). While prominent trends in literary theory insist implicitly on treating the text as an object, holding it at a critical distance to enable hyper-critical scrutiny of its meanings and contradictions, the post-critical poetics of discovery relies on indwelling the language of the text, and what Polanyi calls "fiduciary commitment"—in this case commitment not to a doctrine or proposition, but to a search for coherence. When the critical and analytic functions are relaxed, though not eliminated, the search may result in new insight about the formal properties of the work. It operates in tacit anticipation of discovering new knowledge about the order of existence itself. It does this by the metaphysics that in Bergson's way "transcend[s] concepts to arrive at intuition." Approaching the text by fiduciary commitment to the search and indwelling the particulars of its language, reverses dominant trends in much criticism. But because the language of literary texts is not designed to express critical thought, the post-critical method, starting with commitment and indwelling is often the most appropriate way of *getting* the intended humanistic import of texts. The intuitive component of tacit knowing coincides with respect for the intentionality implicit in the language structures of literature. The semantic structure of metaphor, as an

example, works not to convey information, but to *engage* the reader as a participant in discovering something previously unknown.

## II. Literature as existential discovery: "The Myth of Sisyphus"

"Myths are made for the imagination to breathe life into them" writes Albert Camus in his incomparable four-page retelling of "The Myth of Sisyphus" (1942).<sup>22</sup> The narrative graphically illustrates the way literature works as a guide to readers searching for meaning and moving toward existential discovery. The retelling is designed to change us, our identity and our experience of the world. We know this not from reading about it, but by entering and becoming participants in its language games. Camus catapults us into an imaginative framework derived from ancient myth where we are (at first) mere witnesses of a harrowing drama. Here the central character (Sisyphus) is subjected in Hades to eternal punishment for his defiance, and stealing the secrets, of the gods. The "futile laborer of the underworld" is condemned to roll an immense rock to the top of a mountain each day, only to see it "fall back of its own weight." "At the very end of his long effort measured by skyless space and time without depth, the purpose is achieved. Then Sisyphus watches the stone rush down in a few moments toward the lower world whence he will have to push it up again toward the summit. He goes back down to the plain. It is during that return, that pause, that Sisyphus interests me" Camus's omniscient narrator tells us. "That hour like a breathing space which returns as surely as his suffering, that is the hour of consciousness." For us, as for Sisyphus, that is the hour of *epiphany*, a "manifestation" of a reality otherwise hidden, when consciousness wakes up from its habitual dormancy. In the case of Sisyphus, it is to make "the absurd discovery." "At each of those moments when he leaves the heights and gradually sinks toward the lairs of the gods, he is superior to his fate. He is stronger than his rock." In Sisyphus's epiphany he discovers something in the midst of suffering that is of immense existential worth. He discovers that he is conscious, in a high degree, and this gives him unexpected strength. Paradoxically, because of his moment of full consciousness, he discovers his superiority to his fate, that he is "stronger than his rock." The myth is designed to carry us by metaphors like "underworld," "rock," and "mountain," beyond our ordinary states of consciousness, from where we sit in modern times, to the role of witness to Sisyphus's drama and awakening. But at a certain point in reading, we "enter" as if drawn into a magnetic field, into the world of the story, and by the uncanny phenomenon of identification, into the consciousness of its main character. We become Sisyphus, by tacitly identifying with him. What he experiences, we experience. And his discoveries are our discoveries. The absurd discovery, that he is

trapped by forces above him, but capable of sudden insight or realization, gives him new vital understanding. With that understanding, he discovers happiness. In the end Camus tells us, "the struggle itself toward the heights is enough to fill a man's heart. One must imagine Sisyphus happy."

In the expository section of the text Camus explains its allegorical connection to modern times. Just as Jesus unpacks the parable of the sower and the seed for those who have ears but do not hear (Matthew chapter 13:1-23), Camus explains his myth to us, as if to validate Sisyphus's existential discovery, but also to confirm that we readers know how literary analogy works. By identification we live through Sisyphus' experience virtually, and are invited to share in his discovery. "The workman of today works every day in his life at the same tasks, and this fate is no less absurd. . . . [But for Sisyphus] the lucidity that was to constitute his torture at the same time crowns his victory." Later he explains another part of Sisyphus's discovery: "crushing truths perish from being acknowledged." The author compares Sisyphus to Oedipus who offers a "tremendous remark" that "rings out" in another existential discovery of coherence in the midst of tragedy and defeat, in a language event we are invited to enter as participants: "Despite so many ordeals, my advanced age and the nobility of my soul make me conclude that all is well."

Metaphor (like other forms of analogical language) in literature, is a manifestation of the *from-to* structure that Polanyi attributes to tacit knowing. From indwelling particulars, the mind surrenders to the tacit dimension and from there experiences something like gestalt formation or creative synthesis, which takes shape as new knowledge or discovery. In the "Myth" Camus skillfully uses metaphor to engage us, not just in learning about, but in the experience of the "absurd discovery" that despite defeat, "all is well." A concrete word-image—e.g. "a rock," "mountain," "lucidity" (originally implying luminosity), "water and sun," "warm stones and the sea," "crown"—forms the *vehicle*, which points to or "carries" us to an open-ended range of possible meanings (the *tenor*) of metaphor. The tension set up in the mind by the semantic structure of metaphor, "the tensive character of living language,"<sup>23</sup> virtually forces the imagination to *move*, in a *from-to* dynamic, *from* vehicle *to* tenor, and *from* the very indeterminacy of the meaning of the tenor, *to* interpretation as creative synthesis of verbal particulars, meaning-making as a part of discovery. When we succeed in understanding a word that ostensibly refers, in a poetic context, to a concrete thing—a rock or mountain—the vivid image it leaves in our minds opens out into multiple and often unspecifiable meanings. Traces of these meanings are left to us to decipher at deeper levels, as their visual and sensory details are synthesized to point us to potential coherences in our own experience. And so, by "dwelling" for a time in the language of

the text we engage not just in conventional learning but in a virtual apprenticeship. We learn, as it were, not so much from Sisyphus as a character but from the language of the text, and the passion and intuitive insight tacitly invested in it by the author. In the relation of apprentice to master, as Polanyi points out, what is mostly conveyed is not information, but nuances of unspecifiable (tacit) knowledge about how to attain the creative skills that make the apprentice into a master. In apprenticing ourselves to a text like this we indwell the particular references, to learn from the master consciousness that packed the text with manifestations of tacit knowing, how to practice the skills of tacit knowing.

#### **IV. The energies of tacit knowing: creative imagination and dynamic intuition**

In "The Creative Imagination" (1966), Polanyi explains with some precision and intensity the interplay of "creative imagination" and "dynamic intuition" that leads the scientist, when possessed by "heuristic passion," to the rush of increasing discernment that culminates in discovery.

We can see . . . what is meant by attributing reality to a scientific discovery. It is to believe that it refers to no chance configuration of things, but to a persistent connection of certain features, a connection which, being real, will yet manifest itself in numberless ways, inexhaustibly. It is to believe that it is there, existing independently of us, and that for that reason its consequences can never be fully predicted. . . . Our knowledge of reality has . . . an essentially indeterminate content: it deserves to be called a *vision*. This vision, the vision of a hidden reality, which guides a scientist in his quest, is a dynamic force. . . . [The] quest is guided throughout by feelings of a deepening coherence, and these feelings have a fair chance of proving right (CI, 93). We may recognize here the powers of a dynamic intuition. . . . Physics speaks of potential energy that is released when a weight slides down a slope. Our search for deeper coherence is likewise guided by a potentiality. We feel the slope toward deeper insight as we feel the direction in which a heavy weight is pulled along a steep incline. It is this dynamic intuition which guides the pursuit of discovery. (CI, 98)

The "feelings" that we are *onto something* when following a hunch, that we are being "guided by a potentiality," the sense of a "vision of a hidden reality," or premonition of a truth, are all examples of the countless "fields of forces" (PK 399) or partially formed "potential energies" lurking but potentially active in the tacit dimension of consciousness. A similar quest for "vision" animates the work of the poet and fiction writer. Because the language of literature has been forged over time to capture the energies of the soul, the unarticulated fields of energy in the tacit dimension of consciousness, the literary text offers an extraordinary

opportunity to experience those very energies consciously. The desire for deeper existential coherence in one's life circumstances tacitly motivates many readers of literary texts to get onto quests of their own. Like the creative scientist, the writer (sometimes) works from a motive of "universal intent,"<sup>24</sup> seeking existential coherences in the human reality that, if not provable empirically, can be widely validated by the intuitions of readers who follow the path marked out by the text. Stephan Daedalus, the protagonist of Joyce's *Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* (1916), writes of his quest in this way in his journal at the end of the novel "I go to encounter for the millionth time the reality of experience and to forge in the smithy of my soul the uncreated conscience of my race."<sup>25</sup> Whether an individual quest takes a form such as a desire for spiritual or personal development, a movement from "I-It" to "I-Thou" relations with others or with nature, self-actualization as in the case of Stephen Daedalus, or post-critical intellectual formation, etc. .<sup>26</sup>—Polanyi's account of dynamic intuition here suggests that there are principles (if not specific rules or steps) governing the process of discovery that one may choose to follow. The idea potential energy in physics works by analogy to stress the tacit heuristic force as well as the sense of clear direction felt by the searcher.

Polanyi continues: "Discovery is made therefore in two moves: one deliberate, the other spontaneous, the spontaneous move being evoked in ourselves by the action of our deliberate effort. The deliberate thrust is a focal act of the imagination [re-imagining the creative act that produced the work of fiction or poetry], while the spontaneous response to it, which brings discovery, belongs to the same class as the spontaneous coordination of muscles responding to our intention to lift our arm, [or play piano] or the spontaneous coordination of visual clues in response to our looking at something [such as a painting]. This spontaneous act of discovery deserves to be recognized as *creative intuition*" (CI, 103:3). If we take this account of discovery as applicable to literary experience, the quest to understand the language of poetry, and to decipher tacit ontological and semantic aspects of its language, we start by making the "deliberate effort" of immersion in the text. With patience, this effort releases spontaneous energy in consciousness enabling us to make leaps, sometimes of cognitive significance, other times of emotional or interpersonal intelligence. These leaps take form in the alternating processes of creative imagination and dynamic intuition. Creative imagination calls upon the dynamic power of intuition to integrate the perceptual elements rendered in the text as word-images, character, setting, action, etc. The writer as in the story of Sisyphus has already created a form by his aesthetic integration of these elements, which he presents to the reader as a set of clues to be re-imagined and intuitively re-integrated in the contexts of the reader's own experience.

Contemplative reading of a text like Camus's "Myth" may result in "self-giving integration" (*M*, 74-75) and existential discovery involving as Polanyi says a "felt unity, a tacit grasp of ourselves as a whole person" (*Ibid.*). Not only are the elements of the narrative integrated but "the self also becomes integrated as it is carried away" (*M*, 75) into new perception and understanding of the self in its existential condition.

#### V. Beyond the Kantian prohibition: Polanyi and Wallace Stevens

"To be meaningful, a statement must be substantially indeterminate."<sup>27</sup> This quietly arresting line from a lecture given by Polanyi in 1964 on "Commitment to Science" brings attention to a view of language that I suspect would be shared by many creative writers. But it takes a stand at odds with a dominant strand in the critical tradition in philosophy: from Descartes's "clear and distinct ideas" as the one admissible criterion of truth-telling; to Kant's imperious prohibition against knowing or speaking about "things in themselves" (the *noumenal* realm) defined as beyond the *phenomenal* world known to the senses; to the logical positivists' insistence that language must meet the standards of empirical verifiability.<sup>28</sup> Polanyi's view also appears to run counter to the early Wittgenstein's proclamation in 1916, "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence."<sup>29</sup> Isn't "indeterminacy" the opposite of "meaning"? The answer is yes, within the framework of positivism and the axioms of the critical tradition. In 2020 the paradox of Polanyi's line may appear to acknowledge deconstructive-postmodernist arguments for the radical instability of language. Whether intentional or not, Polanyi's paradox is striking in its dismissal of centuries of the very critical tradition that fostered the origins of modern science. His sense of indeterminacy as a precondition of meaning is a first principle of the post-critical framework of understanding and interpretation he championed. This framework represents a move beyond the closed referential systems of positivist logic in his time, as well as the postmodernist relativism still in play in today's intellectual culture. The new framework is a process-oriented system based on an alternative form of logic he calls "the logic of tacit inference."<sup>30</sup> This type of inference has a bearing on the thinking expressed in poetry and literary texts, where intuitive leaps often take precedence over linear logic to make sense of things. William Poteat coins the term "post-critical logic,"<sup>31</sup> in recognition of its ability to step outside the critical tradition. The contemplative approach to literature engenders a similar thinking frame we might call *poetic or metaphorical thinking*.

Widely recognized as a great experimental modernist, as a poet Stevens's field of exploration includes the relation of the human mind or imagination to the natural world. Discovery consists of epiphanies of personal realization about how imagination shapes and enhances the vividness and therefore meaning of

natural phenomena. By his allusion to the Kantian lexicon in his title, apparently concerned about the dilemma of living in a natural world of appearances and unknowable *things in themselves* which are the cause of appearances, in a poem titled "Not Ideas About the Thing but The Thing Itself" Stevens writes:

At the earliest ending of winter,  
In March, a scrawny cry from outside  
Seemed like a sound in his mind. . .

The sun was rising at six . . .

It would have been outside.

That scrawny cry—. . .

It was part of the colossal sun,  
. . .  
Still far away. It was like  
A new knowledge of reality. (*CP*, 534)

Does the bird's cry represent something beyond a common event in nature on a winter dawn? In one of his essays, Stevens writes: "According to the traditional views of sensory perception, we do not see the world immediately but only as the result of a process of seeing and after the completion of that process, that is to say, we never see the world except the moment after. Thus we are constantly observing the past. . . . The material world, for all the assurances of the eye, has become immaterial. It has become an image in the mind. The solid earth disappears and the whole atmosphere is subtilized not by the arrival of some venerable beam of light from an almost hypothetical star but by a breach of reality. What we see [or hear] is not an external world but an image of it and hence an internal world."<sup>32</sup> Implicitly puzzled by just such a sense of "breach of reality," the unnamed protagonist of the poem "knew that he heard it/A bird's cry . . ." one moment "outside," but a moment later "like a sound in his mind." With the protagonist we move through stages of "deepening coherence" toward discovery. The bird's cry in the end is "like/A new knowledge of reality," a new knowledge—that we are invited to share by identification with the protagonist. What is that new knowledge? We get it by becoming participants rather than observers of the scene. "The sun was coming from outside" we're told. But the scrawny bird's cry, and the human hearing of it, are bound together as parts of the "colossal sun"—arguably a symbol for ultimate reality. The poem invites us to "a new knowledge" by participating tacitly in a sense of unity between mind and nature. Is this a mystical union? Or is it simply discovery of reality as such? The poem's title implies that we are "not" confined to knowing just "ideas about the thing." Beyond Kant's prohibition against knowing the noumenal realm, the poem intimates

that we *can* know "the thing itself." The bird's cry achieves epiphany, "leaps to us from the vestment of its appearance" and shows itself as not just something in the mind, but a "new knowledge of reality." The thing itself, a real thing in nature, is both inside and outside, crystallizing a perception of the unity of mind and nature. We get this sense of unity by the literary device of epiphany, defined by James Joyce as recognizing "that the object is one integral thing, . . . a thing in fact: finally, when the relationship of the parts is exquisite, . . . we recognize that it is that thing which it is. Its soul, its whatness, leaps to us from the vestment of its appearance. The soul of the commonest object, . . . seems to us radiant. The object achieves its epiphany."<sup>33</sup>

In "An Ordinary Evening in New Haven" Stevens writes

The poem is the cry of its occasion,  
Part of the *res* itself and not about it. (*CP*, 473)

Like the bird's cry in the light of the colossal sun, the literary artifact—as "the cry of its occasion"—is also a part of the universal reality, the *res* (thing) itself, and not "about" it—not in the referential mode of "telling" about what can be observed. Instead, the different mode of Stevens tells us in another allusion to the Kantian lexicon. Like the sound of the bird the poem is a cry, in both the sense of shedding tears or generating emotional power, and the sense of a shout to wake us up. The poem, he's telling us, is not part of a referential system consisting of signifiers and signifieds. It is "not about" something external to its "cry." The cry is in and of the occasion of experience, part and particle of the "*res* [thing] itself." This is a poetic rendering of a discovery that moves past the Kantian impasse of sensing but being prohibited from knowing things in themselves. The poet arrives at discovery not by "going around" the thing, but by "entering" into it, as Bergson put it, and inviting us to enter with him.

In "Martian Cadenza" (1942), Stevens again shows how poetry addresses the philosophical dilemma of knowing things in themselves:

I  
Only this evening I saw again low in the sky  
The evening star, at the beginning of winter, the star  
That in spring will crown every western horizon,  
Again . . . as if it came back, as if life came back,  
Not in a later son, a different daughter, another place,  
But as if evening found us young, still young,  
Still walking in a present of our own.

II  
It was like sudden time in a world without time,  
This world, this place, the street in which I was,

Without time: as that which is not has no time . . .

IV  
The present close, the present realized,  
Not the symbol but that for which the symbol stands,  
The vivid thing in the air that never changes,  
Though the air change. Only this evening I saw it again,  
At the beginning of winter, and I walked and talked  
Again, and lived and was again, and breathed again  
And moved again and flashed again, time flashed again. (CP, 237)

Like the bird's cry of the previous text, Stevens here records a confrontation with a minute fact in nature, absorbs its presence as an external reality, then comes to an epiphany, a moment (as cited earlier from Stevens's essays), of "agreement with reality." By the metaphors of the bird's cry and the evening star we're being invited by the author to a purging of our "inward sight." In each reference, as Joyce puts it, we "recognize that it is that thing which it is." The word-image impels the reader to make the intuitive "leap" from "the vestment of its appearance" (the image as *vehicle* of the metaphor) to see its unspecifiable "whatness" or uniqueness, the thing itself for "that thing which it is" (the *tenor* of metaphor). For the poet, then, the "vivid thing in the air" (the luminous evening star) "that never changes" brings a tacit realization that he "lived and was again" (as if in a kind of naturalistic resurrection), "and breathed again" like one coming back from near-death. He discovers an experience like Bergson's "durational time." Unlike chronological time, Bergson's "durée" cannot be measured. It is indeterminate, not quantitative but qualitative time, realized not by objective knowing but by tacit knowing. In this perspective, captured in the language of poetry, the speaker enters "sudden time in a world without time." It is "the present realized" where he "lived and was again, and breathed again/And moved again and flashed again, time flashed again," a moment of discovery captured and shared with the reader by the language of epiphany.

What power "made the sky acutest at its vanishing?" Stevens asks in one of his greatest poems, "The Idea of Order at Key West" (1934). Watching a mysterious woman striding along the shore and singing (a metaphor for the poet interacting with nature), the narrator says

She measured to the hour its solitude.  
She was the single artificer of the world  
In which she sang. And when she sang, the sea,  
Whatever self it had, became the self  
That was her son, for she was the maker.

By listening to her song, the narrator experiences this epiphany, making order out of otherwise "meaningless" conditions, causing him to wonder "why . . .

the glassy lights,  
The lights in the fishing boats at anchor there,  
As the night descended tilting the air,  
Mastered the night and portioned out the sea,  
Fixing emblazoned zones and fiery poles,  
Arranging, deepening, enchanting night.

In "Large Red Man Reading," another account of poetry and its maker, we see an image of the poet (the Red Man of the title) "reading, aloud" . . . "from the poem of life" "the great blue tabulae" of the sky. Among his mysterious listeners are those "who would have wept to step barefoot into reality," listening for clues,

. . . as he sat there reading, from out of the purple tabulae,  
The outlines of being and its expressings, the syllables of its law:  
*Poesis, poesis*, the literal characters, the vatic lines,  
Which in those ears . . . Took on color, took on shape and the size of things as they are  
And spoke the feeling for them, which was what they had lacked. (CP, 423-24)

By the activity of *Poesis*, ancient Greek for "making," which also to contemporary ears implies discovery, the poet takes us into the ontological aspect of tacit knowing, bringing into being something (knowledge) that did not exist before. That something, he explains, is "the outlines of being and its expressings/The syllables of its law." Those expressings of "the outlines of being" take form in the poem, offering us clues to discover for ourselves "the syllables of its law."

In "Sunday Morning" (1915) the voice of the narrator, speaking of the woman protagonist, asks "What is divinity if it can come/Only in silent shadows and in dreams?" (CP, 67). The answer is epiphanies of immanence:

Divinity must live within herself:  
Passions of rain, or moods in falling snow;  
Grievings in loneliness, or unsubdued  
Elations when the forest blooms; gusty  
Emotions on wet roads on autumn nights;  
All pleasures and all pains, remembering  
The bough of summer and the winter branch.  
These are the measures destined for her soul.

And late in his life Stevens offers a different, more perceptive discovery. In "Final Soliloquy of the Interior Paramour," in dramatic monologue form, he speaks as if to his inner self, of "A light, a power, the miraculous influence" that brings a kind of naturalistic enlightenment—a form of immanence that includes a naturalistic transcendence:

We say God and the imagination are one . . .  
How high that highest candle lights the dark.  
Out of this same light, out of the central mind,  
We make a dwelling in the evening air,  
In which being there together is enough. (CP, 524)

By imagination the poet "probes for an integration" (*OP*, 196). "The gods are the creation of the imagination at its utmost" Stevens says (*OP*, 215). In "Final Soliloquy" he moves towards realizing in epiphany an "integration of incompatibles" (*M*, 125)—expressing "the outlines of being," not as *natural* but as *transnatural integrations* (*M*, 125). "God and the imagination are one." These lines, like those cited from "Sunday Morning" and other poems present discoveries expressed in literary epiphanies, virtually mentoring the apprentice-reader in experiences like that of the scientist in discovery who breaks through "all fixed conceptual frameworks in the act of ecstatic vision" (*PK*, 196).

### **VI. Conclusion: poetic truth, the unity of mind and nature**

In *The Tacit Dimension*, Polanyi writes ". . . tacit knowledge . . . consists in the intimation of something hidden, which we may yet discover," and asks: "can we recognize that a statement is true by appreciating the wealth of its yet undiscovered consequences? . . . It makes sense if we admit that we can have a tacit foreknowledge of yet undiscovered things. This is indeed the kind of foreknowledge the Copernicans must have meant to affirm when they passionately maintained, against heavy pressure, during the one hundred and forty years before Newton proved the point, that the heliocentric theory was not merely a convenient way of computing the paths of planets, but was actually true" (23). Some discoveries, many presented in propositional form (i.e. literature of knowledge), are subject to verification, which was the case with the Copernican theory and Newton's proof. Others not subject to *verification* because not in the form of propositions, may yet be worthy of *validation*, according to Polanyi's helpful distinction.

Results in science are subject to "verification" by reason and objective evidence. The arts and literature are instead evaluated "tested and . . . accepted" by "a process of validation. Our personal participation is in general greater in a validation than in a verification. The emotional coefficient of assertion is intensified as we pass from the sciences" to other articulate systems in the humanities. "But both *verification* and *validation* are everywhere an acknowledgment of a commitment: they claim the presence of something real and external" to the investigator. By contrast, "subjective experiences can only be said to be authentic" (or inauthentic); but these "do not involve commitment in the sense that verification and validation do" (*PK*, 202). What the critical tradition as applied to literary study has largely missed, due to the objectivist bias of the surrounding intellectual culture, is that the striving to express "something real" in literature has little to do with its referential capabilities, its capacity to describe or analyze persons, history, or things outside the text.

To judge poetic texts that way is to reduce the literature of power to the literature of knowledge, based on standards inappropriate to its artistic structure and intent. The "something real" in the literature of power is the fact that the text is "a high-energy construct." It is the potential energy, palpable in poetic language, that help us peel back "the film of familiarity" and wake up to "the outlines of being and its expressings," to discover more of the reality of the coherences in experience, the "shape and the size of things as they are."

In *The Necessary Angel* (1951), Stevens argues that "poetic truth is a factual truth, seen, it may be, by those whose range in the perception of fact—that is, whose sensibility—is greater than our own." The peculiar meaning that Stevens assigns to the term "fact" throws light on the question of poetic truth. He distinguishes between absolute fact—the raw perceptual datum, "destitute of any imaginative aspect whatever" (*NA*, 60)—and fact as perceived by poetic imagination. "The truth that we experience when we are in agreement with reality is the truth of fact" he maintains. "In consequence, when men, baffled by philosophic truth, turn to poetic truth, they return to their starting point, they return to fact, not, it ought to be clear, to bare fact (or call it absolute fact), but to fact possibly beyond their perception in the first instance and outside the normal range of their sensibility" (*NA*, 59-60). For Stevens "fact" is not only external reality, but whatever is known by "entering in" to a thing, in Bergson's terminology, or by "indwelling," to use Polanyi's term. It is "agreement with reality"—not simply the objective side of a subject-object complex, but the intersection, the "precise equilibrium" (*NA*, 9) of the elements of experience, some of which we call internal and others external. This, in Stevens's view, is brought about by "imagination," defined as a "power of the mind over the possibilities of things" (*NA*, 136), a forming "power that enables us to perceive . . . the opposite of chaos in chaos" (*NA*, 153). Agreement with reality is an achievement of tacit knowing.

The "return to fact" in Stevens's work hints of breaking out of the "picture" of the intractable separation of mind from reality inherited from the Kantian framework, and deeply embedded in our culture and language. With some degree of universal intent to make such a break through, Stevens strove to write "the poem of fact in the language of fact" (*OP*, 164), envisioning mind and nature, instead of separate entities, as "a necessary unity," in the words of Gregory Bateson.<sup>34</sup> The theory of tacit knowing shows us that consciousness is not primarily a "spectator" or "mirror of nature," but in Polanyi's words, a "power for structuring reality."<sup>35</sup> If taught from the perspective of the theory of tacit knowing, literature can be a potentially enormous aid in strengthening students' skills of indwelling, breaking out of closed systems of thought, and discovery. The teaching of literature can offer students more than analysis or art appreciation,

valuable as those may be in certain contexts.<sup>36</sup> If I am right about the value of the theory of tacit knowing for understanding literary texts, and the relevance of literary study for developing the skills of tacit knowing, the teaching of literature could in the future play a significant role in shifting education from an over-emphasis on objective facts to learning how to participate in the creative process of discovery.

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## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Dale Cannon, see "Beyond Post-Modernism via Polanyi's Post-Critical Philosophy" *The Political Science Review*, 2008: 37:68-93; and "Being Post-Critical" in *Recovering the Personal: The Philosophical Anthropology of William H. Poteat*, ed. Dale W. Cannon and Ronald L. Hall (New York: Lexington Books, 2016) pp. 21-46.

<sup>2</sup> Stanley Kunitz, "The Layers" in *Passing Through: The Later Poems, New and Selected* (New York: Norton, 1995), pp. 107-108.

<sup>3</sup> Polanyi, *The Tacit Dimension* (New York: Penguin, 2009; orig. publ. 1966), 13; cited in text as *TD*.

<sup>4</sup> Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, c. 1958; corrected ed. 1962), p. 197; hereafter cited in text as *PK*.

<sup>5</sup> T.S. Eliot, from "East Coker" part 2, *Four Quartets*, in *The Complete Poems and Plays 1909-1950* (New York: Harcourt, 1962), p. 125.

<sup>6</sup> Polanyi, "The Creative Imagination" in *The Concept of Creativity in Science and Art*, ed. Denis Dutton and Michael Krauz (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981; orig. publ. 1966), pp. 91-108, cited as *CI*.

<sup>7</sup> Polanyi and Harry Prosch, *Meaning* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1975), cited in text as *M*.

<sup>8</sup> Tom Quirk, *Bergson and American Culture: Wallace Stevens and Willa Cather* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), see esp. chap. 5 "Poetry and the System of the World" pp. 180-219.

<sup>9</sup> Thomas De Quincey, "The Literature of Knowledge and the Literature of Power" (1848); <https://supervert.com/elibrary/thomas-de-quincey/the-literature-of-knowledge-and-the-literature-of-power>, (accessed 10.1.2020).

<sup>10</sup> For a perceptive study of Polanyi's metaphors for being "moved" toward imaginative integrations (i.e. discoveries) in literature, see Jean Bocharova, "Towards a Post-Critical Literary Theory" *Tradition and Discovery*, 45:1, February 2019, 4-15. The metaphors Bocharova unpacks are "Descending" as of a heavy weight on a gradient, a "slope of deepening meaning"; "Indwelling"; and "Transcending."

<sup>11</sup> Charles Olson, "Projective Verse" <https://www.poetryfoundation.org/articles/69406/projective-verse>, (accessed 10.1.2020).

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<sup>12</sup> Toril Moi, "The Adventure of Reading: Literature and Philosophy, Cavell and Beauvoir." *Literature and Theology* (2011) 25/2: 125-140.

<sup>13</sup> William James, *Essays in Radical Empiricism* (New York: Dutton, 1971), p. 15.

<sup>14</sup> Joseph Conrad, [https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Joseph\\_Conrad](https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Joseph_Conrad), (accessed 10.7.2020).

<sup>15</sup> Wallace Stevens, *The Collected Poems* (New York: Knopf, 1967), p. 373; hereafter cited as *CP*.

<sup>16</sup> Stevens, *The Necessary Angel: Essays on Reality and the Imagination* (New York: Vintage, 1951), p. 60; cited in text as *NA*.

<sup>17</sup> Bergson, "Introduction to Metaphysics" (1903) in *The Creative Mind* (Totowa, NJ: Littlefield, 1975), p. 159; cited in text as *CM*.

<sup>18</sup> De Quincey, see note 9, above.

<sup>19</sup> See Richard Gelwick, *The Way of Discovery: An Introduction to the Thought of Michael Polanyi* (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2004, orig. publ. Oxford UP, 1977), pp. 91-92, 94-99.

<sup>20</sup> De Quincey, see note 9, above.

<sup>21</sup> Felski, *The Limits of Critique* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015).

<sup>22</sup> Albert Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays*, tr. Justin O'Brien (New York: Random House, 1961), pp. 88-91.

<sup>23</sup> Philip Wheelwright, *Metaphor and Reality* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962), p. 54.

<sup>24</sup> For discussion of verification vs. validation see *PK*, pp. 46-48, 201-202.

<sup>25</sup> Joyce, *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* (New York: Viking, 1972; orig. publ. 1916), pp. 252-253.

<sup>26</sup> Dale Cannon, "Being Post-Critical."

<sup>27</sup> Polanyi, "Commitment to Science" Duke Lecture 1964, <http://www.polanyisociety.org/Duke-intro.pdf>. (accessed, 10.1.2020), p. 1.

<sup>28</sup> A.J. Ayer, "The Principle of Verification," in *Language, Truth and Logic* (New York: Dover, 1952; orig. publ. 1936), pp. 5-16.

<sup>29</sup> Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (London: Routledge, 1963; orig. publ. 1921), 7.

<sup>30</sup> Polanyi, "The Logic of Tacit Inference" (1964) in *Knowing and Being*, ed. Marjorie Grene (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 138-158.

<sup>31</sup> Poteat, *Polanyian Meditations: In Search of a Post-Critical Logic* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1985).

<sup>32</sup> Stevens, *Opus Posthumous* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1957), pp. 190-191; cited as *OP*.

<sup>33</sup> Joyce, *Stephen Hero* (New York: New Directions, 1963, orig. publ. 1944), p. 58.

<sup>34</sup> Gregory Bateson, *Mind and Nature—A Necessary Unity* (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton, Press, 2002).

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<sup>35</sup> Polanyi, "The Metaphysical Reach of Science" Duke Lecture 1964, <http://www.polanyisociety.org/Duke-intro.pdf>; (accessed, 10.1.2020), p. 13.

<sup>36</sup> See, Martin Turkis, "Robert Scholes: A Philosophically Grounded Approach to English Pedagogy as Popular Post-Critical Education" *Tradition and Discovery*, 2017, 43:2, 43-61.

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